with whom Mc-QUADE, Justice, concurs (dissenting).
We cannot agree that I.C. § 13-201 is coextensive with the provisions of § 31-1512 in relation to orders of boards of county commissioners with-respect to reorganizing school districts; or the organization of hospital districts under S.L.1955, Ch. 184; or any other order of such boards concerning which the legislature has specifically directed that the appeal procedure relative to it shall be governed by a specified statute or statutes.
It is our view that at the time the legislature enacted the “Act For Reorganization Of School Districts” (S.L.1947, Ch. Ill) is specifically adopted I.C. §§ 31-1510, 31-1511 and 31-1512 as specific and special statutes to exclusively govern the procedure for appeals from orders and decisions with respect to reorganizing school districts.
In this connection attention is called to the provisions of I.C. § 42-2924 which spe*118cifically provide that an appeal to the Supreme Court from a district court judgment relative to the organization of drainage districts shall be taken within thirty days after the entry of such judgment. Said statute also provides that such appeal be taken “in the manner provided by law for appeals in civil actions”, and also that “upon such appeal no bond shall be required and no stay shall be allowed”. Notwithstanding the fact that I.C. § 13-201 was, as now, in force and effect this Court in In re Drainage District No. 3, 40 Idaho 549, 235 P. 895, held that the provisions of the special statute (I.C. § 42-2924) would be controlling. In said case the Court stated and quoted with approval as follows :
“It is a familiar rule in statutory construction that a particular provision controls a general one.
“ ‘Where there are two provisions in a statute, one of which is general and designated to apply to cases generally and the other is particular and relates to only one case or subject within the scope of the general provision, then the particular provision must prevail; and if both cannot apply, the particular provision will be treated as an exception to the general provision.’ ”
In said case the respondent contended (as do the respondents in the instant case) that the provisions of the general statutes should apply and while discussing such contention the Court said:
“Counsel for respondent earnestly contends that it is not reasonable to presume that the Legislature intended to exempt the remonstrants on a drainage district appeal from the statutory requirement of giving an undertaking on appeal, when litigants in other civil actions who appeal are commonly compelled to do so. However this may be, in view of the fact that no stay was allowed pending the appeal, the Legislature may have thought it was only fair to release the appellant from the necessity of giving the usual bond for costs on appeal. At any rate the Legislature undoubtedly had the power to make such provision, and this court is not called upon to consider its wisdom or expediency.
“The requirement of an undertaking on appeal is purely statutory, and where the statute in express terms negatives the requirement,, it carmot be read into the statute by reference to a general provision which otherwise would be controlling.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Neill, 79 Idaho 385, 319 P.2d 195, 199, this Court said: “We recognize the rule that a particular statute, in case of conflict or inconsistency, controls over a general statute”. We think the following quota*119tions from the decision of this Court in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 191 P.2d 359, 363, are pertinent:
“Hence, it is a canon of statutory-construction that a later statute general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special or specific statute, will be considered as not intended to affect the special or specific provisions of the earlier statute, unless such intention is clearly manifested or unavoidably implied. * * *
“The repeal of statutes by implication is not favored. The courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication, and they will not make such an adjudication if they can avoid doing so consistently or on any reasonable hypothesis, or if they can arrive at another result by any construction * * * which is reasonable. Also, the courts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to hold that it repeals another by implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation leading to an adjudication of repeal by implication unless it is inevitable, and a very clear and definite reason therefor can be assigned * * * unless a legislative intent to repeal or supersede the statute plainly and clearly appears. The implication must be clear, necessary, and irresistible. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.) Koelsch v. Girard, 54 Idaho 452, 33 P.2d 816; State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 78 P.2d 125; Storseth v. State, 72 Idaho 49, 236 P.2d 1004; Idaho Wool Marketing Association v. Mays, 80 Idaho 365, 330 P.2d 337.
It seems clear to us that the decision of this Court in In re Drainage District No. 3, supra, is decisive of the issue here involved and that the majority opinion is in effect an abandonment of one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction that implied repeal of special statutes by general statutes is not favored; that such abandonment leaves an interpretation of other statutes uncertain and tends to promote confusion in the law.
There is no language contained in I.C. § 13-201 which provides or implies that this section shall govern as concerns all judgments rendered on an appeal from an order of a board of county commissioners. Nor does the act by which I.C. § 13-201 was amended in 1957 contain any language from which a legislative intent to repeal or supersede I.C. § 31-1512 plainly or clearly appears or even remotely implies such action. There is no conflict between the two statutes when considered in connection with the order here involved.
The legislature having specifically adopted the provisions of I.C. § 31-1512 as exclusively controlling relative to appeals from an order such as is here involved, we feel that such legislative directive should be followed and respondents’ motion denied.