dissenting.
¶26 The issue characterized as “positive misconduct” has been adverted to and left open in previous cases. See ante ¶ 8 n. 3. In describing the situation as a case of complete abandonment, the court of appeals has finally given the question a proper label. In my view, that court reached the correct result. See Panzino v. City of Phoenix, 195 Ariz. 453, 990 P.2d 654 (1999). Agreeing with its analysis, I need respond to only a few of the points made in this court’s majority opinion.
¶27 Under the facts of this case, the conduct of Panzino’s lawyer cannot be considered neglect, excusable or inexcusable. He literally abandoned Panzino, leaving her totally unrepresented. Indeed, she would have been much better off without her lawyer’s so-called help. The court of appeals described the situation quite well in stating that the lawyer
neglected not just one part but the entirety of his client’s claim. One may fairly summarize his representation by saying that he filed Panzino’s claim against the City, parked it on the inactive calendar, and abandoned it, ignoring the rules, ignoring notices from the court, ignoring even the court administrator’s dismissal order, and calendaring no deadlines [The lawyer’s] neglect of Panzino’s claim against the City was egregious; it was “consistent, wide-ranging, and of long duration”; and it “‘amounted to nothing short of leaving his client [ ]unrepresented.’ ”
195 Ariz. at 460, 990 P.2d at 661 (quoting Mission Ins. Co. v. Cash, Sullivan & Cross, 170 Ariz. 105, 109, 822 P.2d 1, 5 (1991)). This being true, I cannot agree with the majority’s view that we should look at this case as one of neglect. See ante at ¶¶ 3 and 7. I agree that because Rule 60(c), Ariz.R.Civ.P., permits relief for excusable neglect, we cannot grant relief from a judgment for inexcusable neglect. But we deal here with complete abandonment, a different matter than han*450dling the ease in a negligent or even grossly negligent manner.
¶ 28 For the same reason, I cannot agree with the majority’s view that the general rules of agency require or should require the lawyer’s acts or omissions to be charged against his client. This lawyer ceased representing his ehent and abandoned his role as her agent. He left Panzino turning in the wind, uninformed, unrepresented, and helpless. As the majority correctly describes it, the lawyer had abandoned Panzino and was no longer acting on her behalf. The majority holds, nevertheless, that Panzino remains responsible “for the actions of [her] lawyer.” Ante at ¶ 18. But that result is inconsistent with the rule that a client is not bound by his lawyer’s unauthorized actions when those actions affect and impair the client’s substantial rights. See Garn v. Garn, 155 Ariz. 156, 160, 745 P.2d 604, 608 (1987) (attorney has no implied or apparent authority to stipulate to settlement without client’s consent).
¶ 29 Finally, I do not agree that adoption of the positive misconduct rule would have any significant effect on the finality of judgments, given the existing provisions of Rule 60(c), which, not too infrequently, permit relief from final judgments. As the majority itself notes, the additional cases in which the positive misconduct rule has been applied are limited to rather extraordinary facts and are very few and far between. See ante at ¶ 17 n. 6 and ¶ 24.
¶ 30 Thus, I would agree with the court of appeals that when the facts show total abandonment of a client, Rule 60(c)(6) allows equity to intervene and grant relief. That relief, of course, should not be granted if the client’s actions have contributed to the situation in any way or if the grant of relief would cause any significant prejudice to the opposing party. See Seacall Dev., Ltd. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 73 Cal.App.4th 201, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 229 (1999). In either of those events, principles of equity would militate against granting relief. This record establishes neither factor; nor has the city’s response made such claim. I must therefore respectfully dissent.