In this appeal the Court is asked to determine the constitutionality of Idaho’s present public elementary and secondary school financing system. The trial court determined that the present system, with its heavy reliance on the ad valorem property tax,1 violates Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Idaho Constitution by failing to provide the requisite “uniform system of public schools.” The trial court ordered the defendants to restructure the financing system in such a manner as not to violate the constitutional provision. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. We find that the public school financing system of the State of Idaho does not violate Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Idaho Constitution, nor does it deny plaintiffs-respondents, and those similarily situated, equal protection of the law. Article 9, Section 1, of the Idaho Constitution states:
“The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools.”
I.
This case was brought as a class action in the district court and decided on the basis of briefs, oral argument, and stipulated facts.2 The trial court found: Plaintiffs Marba C. Thompson and Paul S. Thompson are residents, property owners, and taxpayers within Pocatello School District No. 25; plaintiffs Bradley, Annette, Leslie, Leanne, and Stephen Thompson are all minor children of Paul and Marba *795Thompson, and reside in and attend the various schools of Pocatello School District No. 25 (during the 1971-72 school year) ; the plaintiffs in this class action represent themselves and others similarly situated with that class being all children in the State of Idaho who are attending the free public elementary, junior high and high schools in this state, with the exception of those children in that school district, the identity of which is presently unknown, which affords its students, in the view of the trial court, the greatest educational opportunity of all school districts within Idaho; defendants D. R Engelking, serving as the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the individual members of the State Board of Education, State Auditor Joe R. Williams, and State Treasurer Marjorie Moon are parties in their official capacities; the County Auditor, Treasurer, and Assessor of Bannock County, Canyon County, Bingham County, Latah County and Ada County, all of which are counties in the State of Idaho, are parties defendant in their official capacities for their respective counties.
The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that (1) the plaintiffs have been denied equal protection of the laws of the United States and cf the State of Idaho, and (2) the school financing system of Idaho is void and without force or effect as repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and to the fundamental law and the Constitution of Idaho. The plaintiffs requested that (1) the defendants be ordered to reallocate the funds available for financial support of the school system and (2) that the court retain jurisdiction to afford defendants and the Legislature a reasonable time in which to reallocate those funds and to otherwise restructure the financing system so as to provide “substantially equal educational opportunities” for all children of the state, as required by the equal protection clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. The trial court found a justiciable controversy in plaintiffs’ allegations and defendants’ reply asserting the constitutionality of the financing system.
Based upon the trial court’s jurisdictional findings and the findings of fact set out in the following section concerning the exact workings of the funding system, the trial court made the following conclusions of law: The class action was properly brought by the plaintiffs; the above listed defendants are proper parties; the court had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, and, therefore, had the power to determine the constitutionality of the school financing system of the State of Idaho; the State of Idaho, by and through the defendants has the duty under the provisions of Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Idaho Constitution to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools for all children in the state, including plaintiff children; the state legislature has the plenary power to provide for, regulate, control and alter the public schools of the state to meet the requirements of Art. 9, Sec. 1 [the trial court citing Andrus v. Hill3 ] ; the constitutional mandate to the state to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public schools requires that the system provide an equal educational opportunity to all children attending the public schools in the state.
The trial court concluded that there is a significant connection between the sums expended for education and the quality of the educational opportunity; and therefore, a system of school financing which results in disparity of per student expenditures by the various school districts, cannot meet the so-called constitutional mandate of complete equal educational opportunity. Since it concluded that the above denial resulted from the present system of financing, the trial court found that system unconstitutional and allowed the defendants *796until July 1, 1975, to correct the alleged constitutional deprivations.
Finally, the trial court concluded that the public school financing system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Art. 1, Sec. 2, of the Idaho Constitution. As authority for that conclusion, the lower court cited San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez4 and Robinson v. Cahill.5
From these conclusions of law, the appellants make the following assignments of error: the trial court erred in finding that the Idaho Constitution requires equal educational opportunity for all students attending public elementary and secondary schools; the trial court erred when it concluded that a connection exists between education expenditures and the quality of the resulting educational opportunity; the trial court erred in its conclusion that a system of finance in which per pupil expenditures vary directly with the amount and value of taxable property within the school district cannot meet the constitutional mandate when the school districts vary widely in concentration of taxable property; the trial court erred when it concluded that under the existing system of public school financing the education opportunity available to a pupil is materially dependent upon the amount and value of the taxable property within the school district in which the pupil resides, and that the amount and value of such property varies widely among the existing school districts; the trial court erred when it held that the existing financing system does not provide equal educational opportunities to all public school pupils in the state.
II.
Before turning to the substantive issues of this case, it is necessary to first describe the public school financing system of Idaho. Both the appellants and the respondents have noted the clarity of the description of the system incorporated in the trial court’s findings of fact. With this we agree, and borrow heavily from those findings.
Approximately 185,700 children attend public elementary and secondary schools in Idaho. The system is composed of 115 school districts. The funds supporting these public elementary and secondary schools in Idaho are derived from five sources, those being state funds, county property tax, local school district property tax, federal funds, and funds received from miscellaneous sources such as activity fees and lunch programs. In the school year 1970-71, the statewide total expenditures from all funds totaled $123 million. The summary, as stipulated, as to source and percentage therefrom was as follows: state funds — 36%; county property tax —7%; local school districts — 40%; federal funds — 11%; miscellaneous — 6%.6
*797The local school districts raise their 40% of the funds through ad valorem taxes levied on the property within their districts. The levies are composed of the General School Levies, Migratory Farm Levy, School Plant Facilities Reserve, School Emergency Fund, Special School Assistance Levy and the Equalization Levy.7
Primarily, the education funds from the state are distributed through the Foundation Program.8 This program is essentially a formula established by the Legislature to distribute available funds in an attempt to equalize the amount of money available per pupil9 in the various school districts, and contains three distribution components which are the Foundation Education Program, the Foundation Transportation Program and the Foundation Exceptional Education Program. State funds for the Foundation Program are derived from state general fund appropriations, endowment fund earnings, and other miscellaneous revenues under the control of the state legislature.10
The formula under which these funds are distributed to the districts may be summarized as follows: multiply the total weighted average daily attendance of the district11 by the.state average cost factor *798per student;12 subtract from that the product obtained by multiplying the adjusted assessed valuation13 of the district by 22 mills; add the district allowance for the Foundation Exceptional Education Program (80% of the cost of personnel hired to work with children who require special education and services); and add the Foundation Transportation Program allowance.14
The final effect of the Foundation Program is a 22 mill level of taxation that is equalized among the districts. When the mill levy of the districts is combined with the state funds, each district has available essentially the same base amount of funds per ADA. To raise the additional funds deemed necessary, the locally elected trustees of the individual school districts levy taxes against the taxable property within the district. Because of the variation in the assessed valuation per pupil in the Idaho school districts, the amount which the individual districts can raise with each mill levied varies greatly.
In summary, the overall scheme of funding the public schools is in part dependent upon the school district ad valorem property tax. Because of the differences in the assessed valuations of the districts, the amounts raised and spent per pupil varies among the several districts. The trial court found this circumstance to be violative of Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Idaho .Constitution.
III.
We reject the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs-respondents and the conclusions made by the trial court. To do otherwise would be an unwise and unwarranted entry into the controversial area of public school financing, whereby this Court would convene as a “super-legislature”, legislating in a turbulent field of social, economic and political policy. We are especially cognizant that the facts and socio-economic conclusions which respondents presented to the trial court are controversial, sketchy and incomplete. In light of the issues as *799framed in this appeal, we hold that the present system of financing public education in the State of Idaho does not deny equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the federal or state constitutions,15 nor does it violate the mandate of the education article of our state constitution.16
Respondents contended below that because unequal amounts were expended per pupil in the several school districts of the state, those students in school districts with low or median expenditures per student were deprived of equal educational opportunities as compared to those students in school districts having high levels of funds expended per student. This, it was alleged, denied plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, equal protection of the laws and denied them of a fundamental right to be educated. As noted earlier, solely upon the basis of documentary evidence and counsels’ argument, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to respondents. The court held the present system of financing public education in Idaho did not provide equal educational opportunities and therefore violated that provision of the Idaho Constitution requiring the Legislature to “ * * * establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools.”17 The trial court also concluded that Idaho’s system of financing public schools was not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, or of Art. 1, Sec. 2, of the Idaho Constitution.18
We agree with the trial court’s disposition of respondents’ Federal and State equal protection argument, but-we hold the trial court erred in its interpretation of the state constitution’s education article. We reach this conclusion after a careful analysis of our Constitution, the circumstances surrounding its adoption, and the long line of cases in which this Court has adjudicated questions relating to our system of public schools and to its financing. At the same time, while the trial court was incorrect in its expansive interpretation of Art. 9, Sec. I of the Idaho Constitution, we agree that any examination of our public schools and their system of financing must rest upon Article 9 of the Idaho Constitution in its entirety.
Simply stated, the decision of the trial court rests upon the conclusion that money is the basic and overriding criterion for adequate education as was the thesis of Serrano v. Priest.19 We agree that funds must be supplied to provide for teachers, supportive staff, physical facilities, texts, supplies, transportation, and the myriad of other necessities in today’s public educational system. However, we cannot base our conclusions on what exactly is basic education, what is necessary in basic education, and what are so-called “equal educational opportunities” on the findings and conclusions of the trial court as are now before this Court. Assuming, arguendo, that the Idaho Constitution requires that our public school students receive equal educational opportunities, we cannot adopt the ultimate conclusion advanced by respondents, i. e., that unless a substantially equal amount of funds are expended per pupil throughout the state, subject only to natural variances such as sparsity of population, students in those districts receiving less than that district with the greatest ex*800penditure per student are denied equal educational opportunities.
The trial court’s holding that equal expenditures per student is the overriding criteria in measuring equal educational opportunities is based solely upon documentary evidence. Such need not conclusively bind this Court.20 This factor must be stressed in light of the considerable debate among educators and commentators respecting the assumption “ * * * that the quality of education varies directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, therefore, the difference in quality between two schools can be determined simplistically by looking at the difference in per-pupil expenditures.” 21 Because of this ongoing argument as to the relationship of funds expended per pupil (above a minimum level needed for proper facilities, etc.) to the quality of educational opportunity, we refuse to venture into the realm of social policy under the guise of equal protection of the laws or fundamental right to education. The courts are ill-suited to a task which is the province of the legislature.
The trial court found that the present system of funding public education in Idaho did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or that provision’s equivalent in the Idaho Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 2.22 That holding was based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez23 and the rationale of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill.24 We agree that the Rodriguez decision is a final determination of the effect of the federal equal protection clause on the question of public school financing.25 We also agree that the Idaho system of public education does not deny equal protection under the Idaho Constitution.
In Rodriguez the federal supreme court initially applied the recently re-espoused two-tiered “strict scrutiny — compelling state interest” test26 in deciding whether the Texas system of financing public education, a system akin to the method of supporting public schools in Idaho, was violative of the federal equal protection clause. *801The Court found the Texas system had not been shown to discriminate against any suspect class, i. e., the system had not been shown to discriminate on the basis of wealth. The Court went on to examine the second aspect of the strict scrutiny approach. Did. the Texas school financing system violate a substantive, fundamental constitutional right? The Court held that education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, stating that the right to education was not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Since the Texas system did not violate either of these two criteria, suspect class or fundamental right, Texas was not obliged to show a compelling state interest for the system. Rather, in assessing the system under the lesser rational basis test, the Court held that the Texas plan rationally furthered a legitimate state interest.27
'The argument is advanced that under the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test used by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, our system of public school financing violates the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution. Its proponents contend that there exists in Idaho a substantive fundamental right to education, based upon Art. 9, Sec. 1 of the Idaho Constitution.28 They follow with the contention that because of the variances between school districts in the amount expended per pupil, resulting in allegedly unequal educational opportunities for those students in districts receiving less than the maximum amount per capita, the fundamental right to education of those students in the districts expending less than the maximum amount per student is violated and their right to equal protection of the laws is denied, since the state cannot show a compelling interest for the disparity in amounts expended per district per student. This argument must be rejected for several reasons.
First, we must determine the proper application of the Idaho equal protection clause. In Caesar v. Williams,29 this Court without attempting to fully define the meaning of the Idaho Equal Protection Clause held that the clause forbids state discrimination that reflects no rational policy, but which is simply arbitrary and capricious action. The Caesar holding reflects the traditional “rational basis” test which was the standard finally used by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez to determine the constitutionality of the *802Texas school financing system. In Weller v. Hopper,30 this Court held that a retail liquor licensing statute forbidding the licensing of one whose license had been revoked for a felony conviction denied equal protection of the laws in violation of both the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution, since the Court concluded that the attempted classification was unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory.
In State v. Cantrell,31 the Court was faced with an equal protection attack on statutes dealing with the regulation of retail sales of liquor, requiring, with certain exceptions, that establishments so engaged be located within an incorporated city. In discussing the equal protection requirements of both the federal and state constitutions, the Court held that a discriminatory classification must reflect a reasonably conceivable, legitimate public purpose and must reasonably relate to that purpose. The Court went on to say that in respect to the police power at least, the legislature “ * * * must be free to remedy parts of a problem, or to recognize degrees of a problem and to formulate solutions in the areas it determines to be more in need or more readily corrected than others. . . . [T]o require either that the legislature remedy at once all aspects of a particular problem or that it do nothing would emasculate the plenary power expressly granted by the state constitution.”32 Not only is the legislature granted plenary power in the exercise of the police power, but also in the field of public education. Electors of Big Butte Area v. State Board of Education.33 In Cantrell, the Court mentions by way of footnote the more rigorous “compelling state interest” test, which, it notes, has been applied by some appellate courts to cases of “suspect” classifications based on race, national origin and alienage, or to infringements of “fundamental interests” such as voting, procreation and rights respecting criminal procedure.34
In holding the Idaho motor vehicle guest statute unconstitutional as an impermissible classificatory scheme violative of the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions, this Court again used the rational basis test to determine that the statutory scheme which discriminated against any negligence cause of action brought by a motor vehicle guest bore no rational relationship to the objectives sought to be advanced by the legislature through the guest statute. Thompson v. Hagen.35 In Thompson, the Court mentioned the two-tiered analysis followed by the United States Supreme Court wherein discrimination involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights are judged under the “strict scrutiny” test.36
We believe this to be an inappropriate occasion to adopt for use by this Court in interpreting the Idaho equal protection clause, the two-tiered strict-scrutiny test used by the United States Supreme Court to initially scrutinize Rodriguez, and applied in other decisions such as Shapiro v. Thompson,37 and as mentioned by way of dicta in Cantrell and Thompson. Nor, are we inclined to now adopt, so as to dispose of this appeal, the definition of “fundamental right” as set forth in Rodriguez, i. e., a right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.38 In Cantrell and *803Thompson this Court did not expressly adopt the strict scrutiny test. Also, in Caesar, in Weller, in Cantrell and in Thompson the Court analyzed those decisions in light of both the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and of the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution. In those cases the Court used the rational relationship test as the basis for its determination. In the instant case we are dealing solely with an equal protection challenge to a statutory financing scheme under the Idaho Constitution.
In past cases the Court has interpreted the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution as being susbtantially equivalent to the federal clause. But, it is clear that this Court could reach a result in interpreting the Idaho equal protection clause differing from an interpretation of the federal equal protection clause.39 For these reasons we refuse to use the “strict scrutiny” test, encumbered as it is with serious problems, to determine if our system of public school financing violates the Idaho equal protection clause. The prudent and correct path is to continue with an analysis of the equal protection argument along the traditional lines of the rational basis test. Using such an analysis, we find that the Legislature, acting in its plenary capacity to establish and maintain a system of public education, has acted rationally and without unconstitutional discrimination in setting up a system of financing, wherein a large portion of revenues for the public schools are levied and raised by and for the local school districts. This Court has recognized the validity of that policy:
“Traditionally, not only in Idaho but throughout most of the states of the Union, the legislature has left the establishment, control and management of the school to the parents and taxpayers in the community which it serves. The local residents organized the school district pursuant to enabling legislation, imposed taxes upon themselves, built their own school house, elected their own trustees and through them managed their own school. It was under these circumstances that the ‘Little Red School House’ became an American institution, the center of community life, and a pillar in the American conception of freedom in education, and in local control of institutions of local concern. In the American concept, there is no greater right to the supervision of the education of the child than that of the parent. In no other hands could it be safer.
‘The American people made a wise choice early in their history by not only creating forty-eight state system of education, but also by retaining within the community, close to parental observation, the actual direction and control of the educational program. This tradition of community administration is a firmly accepted and deeply rooted policy.’ ” Andrus v. Hill.40
IV.
But, for the sake of argument, let us for a moment adopt the contention that the Idaho system of public school financing is subject to analysis under the two-tiered “strict scrutiny — compelling state interest” test to determine if the Idaho equal protection clause has been violated. To qualify for analysis under the strict scrutiny test, the challenged statutory scheme must discriminate against a suspect class or infringe upon a fundamental constitutional right. The majority in Rodrigues dismissed the notion of suspect classification based upon wealth, finding an “ . . . absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of ‘poor’ people or that it results in the ab*804solute deprivation of education . . .”41 The high court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that because inequities existed in the taxable wealth of the various school districts, there resulted an impermissible discrimination against those situated in the less affluent districts. We agree.42
The next step is to examine the scheme for an infringement of a fundamental constitutional right. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that a fundamental right exists only where such right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The argument is advanced .in the instant case that Art. 9 of the Idaho Constitution expressly guarantees a right to education, and establishes said guarantee as a “fundamental” constitutional right to be analyzed under the “strict scrutiny” test.
We agree with the analysis presented by the New Jersey Supreme Court, cautioning against the categorizing of “fundamental” versus “non-fundamental” rights:
“But we have not found helpful the concept of a ‘fundamental’ right. No one has successfully defined the term for this purpose. Even the proposition discussed in Rodriguez, that a right is ‘fundamental’ if it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, is immediately vulnerable, for the right to acquire and hold property is guaranteed in the Federal and State Constitutions, and surely that right is not a likely candidate for such preferred treatment. And if a right is somehow found to be ‘fundamental,’ there remains the question as to what State interest is ‘compelling’ and there, too, we find little, if any, light. Mechanical approaches to the delicate problem of judicial intervention under either the equal protection or the due process clauses may only divert a court from the meritorious issue or delay consideration of it. Ultimately, a court must weigh the nature of the restraint or the denial against the apparent public justification, and decide whether the State action is arbitrary. In that process, if the circumstances sensibly so require, the court may call upon the State to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient public need for the restraint or the denial.” Robinson v. Cahill.43
We also find merit in the warning sounded by several courts which have examined the question of local taxation for raising public education revenue, that in holding those schemes unconstitutionally violative of equal protection, similar provisions for the support of other necessary governmental services normally provided by local governmental entities which are customarily financed to a substantial degree by local property taxes might be subjected to the same fate. Those services include local police and fire protection, support of the local judiciary, roads and many others. In Rodriguez, the majority per Mr. Justice Powell, cautioned:
“Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an unconstitutional method of providing for education then it might be equally impermissible means of providing other necessary services customarily financed largely from local property taxes, including local police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We perceive no justification for such severe denigration of local property taxation and control as would follow from appellees’ contentions. It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon *805the relative wealth of the political subdivision in which citizens live.” 44
For these reasons, we refuse to classify the right to education as a fundamental right which compels the State, for the purposes of financing, to wipe out local entities and finance on the basis of revenues raised by some sort of statewide system.
V.
Art. 9, and in particular, Sec. 1, does not guarantee to the children of this state a right to be educated in such a manner that all services and facilities are equal throughout the State. Such a centralized system of education is not required by our Constitution. Our position is supported by an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of our constitution, its language, subsequent legislative and judicial history in connection with the education article, and ample, although conflicting, authority from appellate courts of other states that have dealt with this issue.
Statements made by several of the delegates to the state constitutional convention during that body’s discussion of the education article demonstrate that the delegates were greatly concerned with public education and felt the need to provide for a continuing system of public education for the children of the state. Some of those remarks indicate a great concern over the manner of financing public education, together with a natural aversion for raising school revenues by taxation. Delegate (later Senator) McConnell stated, while debating the appropriate means to protect the funds expected to be raised from the sale or leasing of lands to be received from the federal government for public school purposes :
“Mr. Chairman, I think no fund is more sacred than the school fund, and perhaps there is no other fund so sacred; it should be guarded in every manner possible, and by having this provision in here, the children will always be made sure there will be that much money to their credit, and we will have that much at stake in our schools. But if there is no provision for making this fund good in every way; it may be squandered, and the first thing we know our school fund will be so small that we can only maintain the schools by local taxation.” 45
After carefully examining these statements, we conclude that the delegates were actually concerned with excessive direct taxation of the citizenry to support public education and not with an absolute prohibition on the raising of school revenues by local taxtion. As Delegate Parker remarked during that same discussion on the school lands:
“Let us hold on to them, and as our territory develops these lands will increase in value and we shall be able to get money for school purposes without calling upon the people for direct taxation for money for educational purposes, . . . . ”46
The proclamation of the territorial governor calling for the convention, lists as one advantage of statehood: “When these school lands shall have been sold in accordance with existing laws, our school taxes will be reduced to an inconsiderable rate.” 47 The history of our constitutional convention does not support the conclusion that the delegates were opposed to local taxation for raising the necessary revenue for local public schools.
Furthermore, an examination of those debates fails to support the trial *806court’s conclusion that the education article requires a public education system wherein equal amounts are expended per pupil on a statewide basis. Stated simply, Art. 9, Sec. 1, is a mandate to the State through the Legislature to set up a complete and uniform system of public education for Idaho elementary and secondary school students.48 Art. 9, Sec. 1, reads: “[/]£ shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools.” (Emphasis added.) On its face, this section mandates action by the Legislature. It does not establish education as a basic fundamental right. Nor, does it dictate a central state system of equal expenditures per student. As Delegate Parker remarked during debate on the proposed educational article:
“The duty of the state, Mr. President, is simply the teaching of the children of the community the three R’s — to learn to read, to write, and the rules of arithmetic, and the duty of ■ the state ends right there. . . . ”49
But today, Parker’s statement cannot be given its literal meaning. There is, at least in the context of our present society, more inherent in a thorough system of education than instruction in the three “R’s”. The constitution gives the Legislature plenary responsibility and duty to establish and maintain a uniform and thorough statewide system of education. It did not require that system be in all ways equal throughout the state, nor did it give to individuals a fundamental right to completely equal educational expenditures.50
At its first session following Idaho’s entry into the Union, the Legislature passed an “Act to Establish and Maintain A System of Free [Public] Schools.”51 In part the act provided:
“For the purpose of establishing and maintaining public schools in the several counties of the State, the board of county commissioners of each county shall, at the time of levying the taxes for State and county purposes, levy a tax of not less than five mills nor more than ten mills on each dollar of taxable property in their respective counties for school purposes.” 52
******
The county superintendent shall proceed to apportion the public school moneys, both county and State . among the several school districts, in the following manner, to wit: One-half of the whole amount he shall divide equally among the several districts that have complied with the provisions of this act; the remaining one-half of said whole amount he shall apportion per capita among the several districts in proportion to the number of children in each district, . . . Provided, That each district is entitled to one share in the apportionment of the first one-half, regardless of the number of children therein . ,”53
This legislation clearly shows the intent of our first legislators, less than two years *807after the drafting of the state constitution, to finance public education partially with State funds and partially with funds raised by direct taxation levied by the counties and the several school districts. It also demonstrates the intention that funds from various revenue sources need not be appropriated equally on a per student basis, and that the people of the various counties, through the action of their respective board of commissioners, and of the various school districts by ballot, might levy property taxes unequal between the several districts and between the several counties to finance the local public schools. Since that first enactment, the statutory scheme for the financing of public education has been revised many times. Yet, public education in this State continues to be supported by state and local funds, with the local contribution based upon a system of real property taxation measured and assessed upon the local level.
Many times since the adoption of the Idaho Constitution, the judiciary has been called upon to adjudicate disputes touching upon the meaning of the education article and upon the financing of public education. In interpreting Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Idaho Constitution, this Court has repeatedly held that the Legislature has the primary and fundamental duty to establish and maintain a system of public education. American National Bank v. Joint Independent School Dist.54 To fulfill that duty the Legislature has provided general laws for education and left the day-to-day control of the schools at the local level. As noted earlier, this pattern, followed throughout the Union, has repeatedly been approved of by this Court. Andrus v. Hill.55 In Andrus, the Court noted that as the state’s population grew, accompanying by a trend towards urbanization of the population, “. . and as some districts increased rapidly in taxable wealth while others remained comparatively static, it appeared desirable to make changes in order to secure more nearly equal educational opportunities to the children in the different districts. The state equalization fund and the county general levies were some of the means employed.” 56 We therein recognized that the Legislature had seen fit to attempt through the use of state foundation funds and general county school levies to more nearly equalize the disparity that existed between the districts in per pupil expenditures.57 *808However, while Andrus and similar cases recognize the need for subsidies to districts with low tax bases, and approve of the Legislature’s attempt to provide that assistance, we do not interpret them to say that Art. 9, Sec. 1 grants a fundamental right to education, whereby in keeping with some nebulous conceptualization of equal educational opportunities, the Legislature is obligated to establish a statewide system of financing so that each school district receives sufficient funds so that equal sums are expended per student throughout the state.58
Idaho has long utilized local taxation for support of the public common schools. In Fenton v. Board of County Commissioners,59 this Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of a statute, whereby the county commissioners were directed to levy a county-wide tax on real property of not less than 5 mills and no more than 10 mills per dollar of assessed valuation for support of the public schools.60 In holding the statute constitutional, this Court remarked:
“Schools cannot be established or maintained without revenue, and there is no inhibition in the Constitution on the Legislature from delegating the authority to raise revenue for that purpose to proper local officers.
If, under said provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature has by general law made provisions for the government and support of the common schools by providing suitable machinery and committing the details of its operation to local officers, they then have complied with the provisions of said section 1 of article 9 of the Constitution. The Legislature might delegate the exclusive authority to the board of trustees of each district to levy the taxes for school purposes within its district, but the Legislature has not done so. However, each district may levy a special tax, and the board of commissioners is authorized to levy (a tax) . . . to be apportioned among the districts as provided by law.
It was well known that there were school districts in the state containing a small amount of taxable property and that it would be impossible without classification to raise a sufficient amount of money by taxation on such property to maintain the school in such district for the time required by law; and the method adopted by the Legislature in requiring the several boards of commissioners to levy a tax . . . for public school purposes and to divide it among the districts . . . would assist the weaker districts, and thus enable them to give the children in such districts the required amount of schooling per year.” 61
Idaho precedent does not support respondents’ arguments or the trial court’s conclusions. In fact, prior judicial authority sustains the contrary viewpoint. Unequal amounts can be expended per pupil among the several districts depending on the tax base of the respective districts. But, on the other hand, our analysis does not lead to the conclusion that school programs and their financing are to be left to *809the complete discretion of local authorities. That, too, would be contrary to the constitutional mandate to the Legislature to maintain and establish a system of public education. Our analysis of the education article of the Idaho Constitution is supported by the great weight of authority from the courts of other states which have interpreted provisions in their respective state constitutions similar to Art. 9, Sec. 1. Yet, we acknowledge that judicial authority can be cited to support respondents’ contentions.
Robinson v. Cahill 62 is such a case reaching a conclusion contrary to what we hold is a proper disposition of this appeal. In Robinson, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the claim that the New Jersey system of financing public education, which relied heavily upon local real property taxation, violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and New Jersey constitutions. However, in interpreting that section of the New Jersey constitution which required the state to provide “a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all children in this State . . . ” the New Jersey court concluded that phrase required equal education opportunities for all children and proceeded to measure equality of opportunity upon the basis of statewide equality of expenditures per student. We decline to accept the conclusions adopted in Robinson for the reasons stated in this opinion. We point out (1) the controversy that exists concerning the relationship of funds expended per pupil and the equality of educational opportunity, and (2) that Idaho precedent, dealing with the responsibilities and duties of the various levels of government in our own educational system, requires a different conclusion from that reached by the New Jersey court in analyzing their constitution adopted in 1947.
In Serrano v. Priest,63 the California Supreme Court accepted plaintiffs’ equal protection argument. However, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the California system of school financing violated Art. IX, § 5, of the California Constitution which reads in pertinent part: “The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year . . . .” The court stated: “[W]e have never interpreted the constitutional provision to require equal school spending; we have ruled only that the education system must be uniform in terms of the prescribed course of study and educational progression from grade to grade.” 64 Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court, in Shofstall v. Hollins,65 was called upon to interpret those sections of the Arizona Constitution mandating “a general uniform public school system .” (art. XI, § 1) and “a system of common schools by which a free school shall be established . . . ” (art. XI, § 6). That court held the Arizona constitution established education as a fundamental right. However, while finding the right to a basic education, the Arizona high court upheld the Arizona system of financing public education:
“A school financing system which meets the educational mandates of our constitution, i. e., uniform, free, available to all persons aged six to twenty-one, and open a minimum of six months per year, need otherwise be only rational, reasonable and neither discriminatory nor capricious.
A school financing system which has a rational and reasonable basis and which meets the educational mandate of our constitution should, unless otherwise discriminatory or capricious, be upheld.” 66
*810In Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear,67 the Washington Supreme Court refused to invalidate the Washington system of public school financing, which also has as one of its major bases, the local real property tax. The court rejected plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments and also their contentions that the present system violates various provisions of the state constitution relating to public education. According to the plurality opinion, Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Washington Constitution, which declares it to be “the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children,” imposes a direct duty upon the state to provide an adequate system of public education, the nature and extent of that duty and the means for carrying the duty out, resting with the Legislature and the state superintendent of public instruction.
“Thus, it is the legislature and the state superintendent upon whom the constitution and statutes impose the responsibility of discharging the paramount duty of the state (1) to make ample provision for the education of all children; (2) to prescribe and enforce the minimal standards necessary to constitute ample provision; and (3) to allocate state equalization funds however they may be described so that every child has access to a ‘general and uniform system of public schools’ without ‘distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.’ ”68
The plurality opinion rejected plaintiffs’ allegations that the Legislature had failed, by using the present financing system, to establish a “general and uniform system of public schools” in accord with Art. 9, Sec. 2, of the Washington Constitution. That the various school districts varied in size and tax base, they held, did not necessitate a finding that the Washington system of public education was neither general nor uniform.
That the public schools are partly funded with local property taxes does not deprive the system, we think, of those constitutional qualities described as general and uniform — for it is the system which must be kept general and uniform under that provision and not the 320 districts. A general and uniform system, that is, a system which, within reasonable constitutional limits of equality, makes ample provision for the education of all children, cannot be based upon exact equality of funding per child because it takes more money in some districts per child to provide about the same level of educational opportunity than it does in others. Thus, the record shows that all states of the Union, except Hawaii, recognize that taxable property values per pupil vary among the districts because expenditures per pupil vary, too. Uniformity of size and property values among school districts is not . . . essential, we think, to a general and uniform system.
******
A general and uniform system, we think, is, at the present time, one in which every child in the state has free access to certain minimum and reasonably standardized educational and instructional facilities and opportunities to at least the 12th grade — a system administered with that degree of uniformity which enables a child to transfer from one district to another within the same grade without substantial loss of credit or standing and with access by each student of whatever grade to acquire those skills and training that are reasonably understood to be fundamental and basic to a sound education . . .”69
*811For all of the above reasons, we refuse to overturn the present system used in this state to finance public education. Neither equal protection, nor Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Idaho Constitution, require that the public schools be financed so that equal amounts are expended per pupil, subject only to such variables as geographic or-demographic location.
In conclusion, we reject the arguments raised by respondents. We hold that the trial court erroneously interpreted the mandate of Art. 9, Sec. 1 of the Idaho Constitution. The record does not demonstrate a failure by the Legislature to comply with its mandate to establish a system of basic, thorough and uniform education; nor, does that record demonstrate an inadequacy of funding to maintain that system of education. Therefore, the decision of the trial court is reversed.
Costs to appellants.
McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur. SHEPARD, J., concurs specially with opinion in which McFADDEN, J., concurs. DONALDSON and BAKES, JJ., dissent.. The taxing system will be explained in the second section of this opinion.
. Exhibits A through H, which are primarily copies of official reports of the State of Idaho, were submitted to the trial court. Exhibits K through Q consist for the most part of reports of the state for the school year 1972-73, and have been. admitted as a part of the record before this Court pursuant to our order allowing augmentation of the record.
. 73 Idaho 196, 249 P.2d 205 (1952).
. 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).
. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973).
. The total expenditures for the 1971-72 school year were $136 million, while the 1972-73 school year figure was $147 million. The percentages as to revenue sources for those two years were as follows:
State County Local Federal Misc.
1971-72 33% 6% 38% 11% 12%*
1972-73 34% 7% 40% 10% 9%
Due to an unusually high percentage from bond revenue.
. The various levies may be defined as follows :
A. General School Levies: There are two types of general school levies.
1. Maintenance and Operation Levy (M&O). This is for current operating expenses paid out of the general fund. School boards can levy up to 27 mills on assessed valuation (not adjusted assessed valuation) for M&O. A levy above 27 mills requires a “voter override” election. At the time this suit was filed the M&O limit was 30 mills. (I.C. § 33-802).
2. Bond Interest and Redemption Levy. This is for paying maturing bonds and interest. Bonded indebtedness is limited to 20% of assessed valuation of a district. (I.C. § 33-1103).
B. Children of Migratory Farm Workers Levy: This permits districts to levy 5 mills for the education of the children of migratory farm workers. However, if the districts total M&O levy exceeds 30 mills, including this levy, a voter override election is required. (I.C. § 33-803).
C. School Plant Facilities Reserve: A district, with a vote of the electors can levy up to 15 mills for up to ten years for this reserve to pay for future capital costs (I.C. § 33-804, § 33-901).
D. School Emergency Fund Levy: Up to 3 additional mills, without a voter override election, may be assessed to pay for an increased number of pupils in the district over the previous year (I.C. § 33-805).
E. Special School Assistance Levy: This permits an additional county levy up to 3 mills to assist school districts with assessed valuations of less than $2,500 per pupil. This provision is without practical effect today since no district in the state qualifies. (I.C. § 33-806).
F. School District Equalization Levy: School districts in counties which assess property at a lower percentage of market value than the state average are required to levy an additional amount so that the total M&O levy in the district raises an amount equivalent to 22 mills on the adjusted assessed valuation of the district’s real property (adjusted assessed valuation is the value of the district if it were assessed at the average percentage of market value for the state as a whole). (I.C. § 33-1016).
. Idaho Foundation and Transportation Programs, Idaho Code, Title 33, Chap. 10.
. On an “average daily attendance” basis (A.D.A.) : ADA or “pupils in average daily attendance” is computed from the daily school attendance figures for the 28 best weeks of the school year. [I.C. § 33-1001(4)].
. County (The amount raised by a required county-wide levy of 8 mills on the adjusted valuation of taxable property together with miscellaneous funds in the county school fund. See I.C. §§ 33-904, 33-1009(3) (a), 33-1011, 33-1015.) and school district revenues (the amount which may be raised by a levy of 22 mills on adjusted property valuation in the district. See §§ 33-1002, 33 — 1016.) included in the Foundation Program are not physically transferred to the state, but are dealt with as credits in the total amount of funds available for distribution to the districts under the Foundation Program formula.
. Weighted Average Daily Attendance (WADA): The average daily attendance (ADA) is weighted to allocate extra funds for the more costly aspects of the school program. The secondary school attendance figures are weighted (multiplied) by 1.3. Sparsity factors are applied to pupils in districts with smaller schools. These factors range from 1.25 for elementary schools with less than 100 ADA to 1.0 for districts with more than 300 elementary ADA. The sec*798ondary sparsity factors range from 1.7 with ADA less than 100 to 1.0 with 750 or greater ADA. The exceptional child sparsity factors range from 1.80 with less than 4 exceptional children ADA to 1.60 for 10 or more exceptional children ADA.
The total of the ADAs multiplied by the various factors results in the WADA.
. State Average Goat Factor Per Student: This is obtained by (1) multiplying the Adjusted Assessed Valuation for all school districts by 22 mills, (2) adding the product obtained by multiplying the Adjusted Assessed Valuation for all counties by 8 mills, (3) adding all state appropriations, endowment earnings, miscellaneous revenue; and county school fund balances, (4) subtracting the Foundation Transportation, and (5) dividing the remainder by the total WADA of all school districts in the state. (I.O. § 33-1002(5)).
The trial court found that this factor “ . . . bears no relationship to actual expenditures per pupil but simply fixes the per pupil amount of state controlled funds available for distribution through the formula.”
. Adjusted Assessed Valuation: Property taxes in this state are not levied on the full market value of property, but on an arbitrary percentage of that value called the “assessed valuation.” The percentage of market value at which property is assessed (assessment ratio) varied in 1970-71 from 13.4 to 20 in different counties. Because of the variations in the assessment ratios used by the counties, an Adjusted Assessed Valuation is used by the state in calculating the Foundation Formula. The State Tax Commission determines the state average assessment ratio which is divided by the assessment ratio of a county. This factor is multiplied by that county’s assessed valuation to obtain the Adjusted Assessed Valuation. For example, if the state average assessment ratio is 15% and a county uses a 10% ratio, the county’s assessed valuation would be multiplied by l%o> or 1.5, to obtain the Adjusted Assessed Valuation.
.Foundation Trmsporation Program Allowance: This program is designed to pay part of the costs of pupil transportation. The program pays 90% of the difference of the approved transportation costs of the district less the amount one mill would raise when applied to the adjusted value of the taxable property in the district. (See I.C. § 33-1006).
. U.S.Const. Amend. 14, and Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 2.
. Idaho Const. Art. 9, and in particular, § 1.
. Idaho Const. Art. 9, § 1.
. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 2: “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform or abolish the same whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature.”
.5 Cal.3rd 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
. See Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra n. 4, 411 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 1291, 36 L.Ed.2d at 37, n. 56 (1973). See Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, supra n. 20, wherein a plurality of the Washington Court found “ * * * that assessed valuation per pupil not only has little to do with the quality of education in the enumerated districts, but that no decision as to the equal protection of the laws nor the paramount duty to provide uniform education can be based upon it. The significance of assessed valuation per pupil is thus inconstant, tenuous, superficial and coincidental only.” 84 Wash.2d at 707, 530 P.2d at 191. But see Robinson v. Cahill, supra n. 5, 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277, wherein the New Jersey Supreme Court held: “But it is nonetheless clear that there is a significant connection between the sums expended and the quality of the educational opportunity.”
. See n. 18, supra.
. Supra, n. 4.
. Supra, n. 5.
. Accord, Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, supra, note 5. In Serrano v. Priest, supra n. 19, the California Supreme Court held, in a decision rendered before Rodriguez, that California’s public school financing system, which relied heavily on local real property taxes with resulting substantial disparities among individual school districts in the amount of funds expended per pupil, was discriminatory and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The California Court held that Art. 1, § 11 and § 21 of the California Constitution were “substantially the equivalent” of the federal equal protection clause and so ruled that their analysis of the federal equal protection argument was also applicable to an analysis of the state equal protection question.
. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).
.In so holding, Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, wrote: “Texas has acknowledged its shortcomings and has persistently endeavored — not without some success — to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditures without sacrificing the benefits of local participation. The Texas plan is not the result of hurried, ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving substance to the presumption of validity to which the Texas system is entitled, . it is important to remember that at every stage of its development it has constituted a ‘rough accommodation’ of interests in an effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. . . . One also must remember that the system here challenged is not particular to Texas or to any other State. In its essential characteristics, the Texas plan for financing public education reflects what many educators for a half century have thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 50 states, especially where the alternatives proposed are only recently conceived and nowhere yet tested.” [Footnotes omitted. Emphasis added.] 411 U.S. at 55, 93 S.Ct. at 1308, 36 L.Ed.2d at 56-56.
. Idaho Const. Art. 9, § 1: “The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools.” [Emphasis added.]
. 84 Idaho 254, 371 P.2d 241 (1962). The Court held that “ * * * equal protection is subject to all limitations inherent in the Constitution itself, and valid enactments of the legislature.” 84 Idaho at 268, 371 P.2d at 249.
. 85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d 792 (1963).
. 94 Idaho 653, 496 P.2d 276 (1972).
. 94 Idaho at 656, 496 P.2d at 279. Footnote omitted. Emphasis added.
. 78 Idaho 602, 308 P.2d 225 (1957). Accord, Andrus v. Hill, supra n. 3, In re Common School Districts Nos. 18 & 21, 52 Idaho 363, 15 P.2d 732 (1932). Sec Fenton v. Board of County Commissioners, 20 Idaho 392, 119 P. 41 (1911).
. N. 9, 94 Idaho at 655-56, 496 P.2d at 278-79.
. 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974).
. 96 Idaho at 21, 523 P.2d at 1367.
. Supra, n. 26.
. Supra, n. 4, 411 U.S. at 33-34, 93 S.Ct. at 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d at 43. See Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, supra n. 20; Robinson v. Cahill, supra n. 5. But see Serrano v. Priest, supra n. 19.
. See Robinson v. Cahill, supra n. 5. But cf. Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, supra n. 20; Serrano v. Priest, supra n. 19.
. Supra n. 3, 73 Idaho at 200, 249 P.2d at 207. See generally Hanson v. DeCoursey, 66 Idaho 631, 166 P.2d 261 (1946).
. Supra, n. 4, 411 U.S. at 25, 93 S.Ct. at 1292, 32 L.Ed.2d at 38.
. Accord, Robinson v. Cahill, supra, n. 5; Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, supra, n. 20; Contra, Serrano v. Priest, supra, n. 19.
.Supra, n. 5, 62 N.J. at 491-92, 303 A.2d at 282. See also 62 N.J. at 494 and 303 A.2d at 283-284.
. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, n. 4, 411 U.S. at 54, 93 S.Ct. at 1307-08, 36 L.Ed.2d at 55. Cited in Robinson v. Cahill, supra, n. 5, 62 N.J. at 489, 303 A.2d at 281; Shofstall v. Hollins, supra, n. 25, 110 Ariz. at 91, 515 P.2d at 593.
. 1 Proceedings of the Idaho Constitutional Convention of 1889 (Hart ed. 1912) at 647 (Hereinafter “Constitutional Proceedings”).
. Id. at 650.
. Proclamation of Governor George D. Shoup calling for the Constitutional Convention, May 11, 1889, 1 Constitutional Proceedings, p. VI.
. See generally Paulson v. Minidoka County School District, 93 Idaho 469, 463 P.2d 935 (1970).
. 1 Constitutional Proceedings at 695 (Emphasis added).
. It should also be pointed out that the education article, setting forth the responsibilities of the state in regard to public education and establishing a fund to finance a portion of that system, is on a different plane' than is, for example, Art. 1 of the Idaho Constitution, wherein the framers set forth fundamental rights guaranteed to the people by that constitution.
. Idaho Session Laws, 1st Session, 1890-91, p. 131 et seq.
. Id., § 20, p. 136.
. Id., § 22, p. 137. Infra, at § 33, p. 142, the act further provided that electors of a regular school district could decide “ . upon the question of whether or not any special tax shall be levied for any purpose, such as building or repairing school houses, or for the support of public schools in the district; . . . ”
. 61 Idaho 405, 411, 102 P.2d 826, 828 (1940) : “[T]he duty of maintaining the public schools is imposed by the constitution as a primary and fundamental duty of state government; [Sec. 1, Art. 9, Const.] Accord, Electors of Big Butte Area v. State Board of Ed., supra, n. 33; Fenton v. Board of County Commissioners, supra n. 33.
. Supra, n. 3. In, Andrus, the Court quoted from “A Report of the Idaho Education Survey Commission (Peabody Report)” p. 49, found in 73 Idaho at 202, 249 P.2d at 208-09.
“The functions of the state are the determination of standards, the provision for financial support, and the promotion of educational leadership; whereas the functions of local school districts are those of planning for school programs on all levels, providing for the efficient operation and management of the schools, and taxing for their financial support. This sharing of responsibility for public education by the state and the local school district has served to keep the schools close to the people, while at the same time it has provided for guidance and direction of the state educational agencies. This pattern permits local initiative and stimulates educational progress.”
. Supra n. 3. 73 Idaho at 201, 249 P.2d at 208.
. See Hansen v. DeCoursey, supra n. 40. In Hansen, the Court was asked to rule upon a statute which empowered the county commissioners to levy a county-wide tax above and beyond the tax of the local school districts to be used to provide additional pay for teachers. In approving the statute, the Court held:
“This clearly leaves the management and control of the schools to the county and the districts, as has been policy throughout the state’s history. The legislature in the case at bar has merely made it possible for the more needy schools of the county to obtain help from the whole county, if such assistance is necessary, in the judgment of the county superintendent of schools and the commissioners . . . Thus it leaves the common school subject to local control, *808and, for the purposes of the emergency, the Act presents a plan for raising additional funds for payment of teachers’ salaries without interfering with local management of the schools.
*****
Considering the policy of our state constitution towards education (Art. 9, sec. 1) and our policy to leave the common schools under local control, it would seem that the Act before us offers a very wise method of obtaining additional funds for the needy school.” 66 Idaho at 635-36, 166 P.2d at 262-63.
. See Fenton v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, n. 33. See generally Independent School District v. Common School District, 64 Idaho 303, 131 P.2d 786 (1942).
. Supra, n. 33.
. The statute in question was similar to portions of the act providing for the establishment of a public school passed by the First Session of the Legislature. See supra at 22.
. 20 Idaho at 403-04, 119 P. at 45. See Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Shoshone Co., 63 Idaho 46, 116 P.2d 225 (1941).
. Supra, n. 5.
. Supra, n. 19.
. 5 Cal.3d at 596, 96 Cal.Rptr. at 609, 487 P.2d at 1249 (Citation omitted).
. Supra, n. 25.
. 110 Arizona at 88, 515 P.2d at 592-93.
. Supra, n. 20.
. 84 Wash.2d at 719, 530 P.2d at 197-98.
. 84 Wash 2d at 727, 530 P.2d at 202. But see Rosellini, J., concurring in the result:
“I do not . . . concur in those portions of the opinion which would seem to suggest that the State is now providing ‘ample’ education for all students. There is too much public opinion to the contrary and too many *811facts of which the members of this court are inescapably aware to justify such a conclusion.
* * * * *
But since the record does not clearly disclose this inadequacy, I believe that my proper function as a member of the judiciary is not to convert my personal opinion to a constitutional mandate. 84 Wash.2d at 730, 530 P.2d at 203.