concurring in the opinion of McDEVITT, Justice.
I.
In this past week this Court has received from the Supreme Court of the United States its recent opinions in United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992). That opinion appears to be pertinent to the above entitled case which this Court has had under consideration since we heard oral argument in January 1992. As is readily observed, Justice McDevitt has expressed his views in writing what may become the majority opinion. Justice Johnson has favored the members of the Court with his differing views as has Justice Boyle. A reasonable inquiry is to ascertain what effect, if any, Nordic Village has on the controversy still before us.
Initially it is to be noted that this Court’s opinions in In re Snake River Basin Water System, 115 Idaho 1, 764 P.2d 78 (1988), show that Justice Johnson wrote the opinion for the Court. Although three justices joined that opinion, I wrote a sole dissenting opinion at 115 Idaho at 10-11, 764 P.2d *125at 88-89. The views which I expressed were mine and mine alone. Now, when the majority of four justices appears to be presently not all of the same mind in regard to the sequel Snake River Basin controversy now before us, and with Nordic Village now at hand, it is in order that my views be expressed for what they may be worth.
Rather than recapitulate or synopsize, perhaps it is better that my short opinion written in 1988 be displayed for the benefit of interested readers. In doing so, those paragraphs which to my mind are the more applicable are emphasized:
The claim of the irrigation districts and the water districts, and the user members thereof, as I understand the claim to be, is not that they assert any new water rights, but simply challenge the right of the state of Idaho in the person of its legislature to cause to be relitigated that which has been litigated, or to readjudicate that which has been adjudicated and gone to a final judgment.
It has been held that a water right is a property right. An adjudicated water right is a highly perfected water right. It is the decree or judgment of a state district court, and once wholly final is subject to no attack other than that it was fraudulently obtained. The McCarran Report, partially reprinted in the majority opinion, 115 Idaho at 7-8, 764 P.2d at 84-85, acknowledges that ‘the State courts are vested with the jurisdiction necessary and proper ... for the administration of and adjudication of water rights under state laws.’ This has always been my understanding. I agree with the Report in the statement that in practically every case all water users on a stream are interested parties to any court proceeding. I am not persuaded that all such water users are necessary parties in all cases, in the sense that the action cannot proceed without a state court (here, Idaho) gaining jurisdiction over them. A water user having a valid state judicial decree in his pocket, meaning one that flows from a valid court decree, will be interested, of course, but not necessarily a necessary party. Else, why, one might ask, what has he gained by having once successfully litigated, if into litigation once again he will be forced?
The pertinent portion of the McCarran Report, 115 Idaho at 7, 764 P.2d at 84, as I comprehend its language, is that it has in mind only those water users claiming a water right by reason of the ownership of the United States or any of its departments who seek to don the cloak of immunity which does shield the United States of America. The McCarran Act itself shreds that assumed cloak.
I take no umbrage with the final paragraph of the Report which is reprinted in the majority opinion, 115 Idaho at 7, 764 P.2d at 84, i.e., ‘that it is essential that each and every owner along a given water course, including the United States, must be amenable to the law of the State, ...’ My understanding is that prior litigation on the tributaries of the Snake River afforded all owners on those rivers or streams the opportunity to be involved. If the opportunity to litigate was present but eschewed, the litigation is nevertheless as final as to those who did not chose to participate as to those who did so. Such an action was basically in rem.
The McCarran Act undoubtedly is, as Justice Johnson has written, a Congressional waiver of otherwise unassailable federal immunity as to actions for stream adjudications brought in Idaho courts. The so-called ‘special appearance’ of the United States District Attorney for Idaho is in my view of no consequence. The law heretofore has been that the United States can only be sued by its consent, and if district attorneys are freely empowered to give or withhold that consent, I am woefully ignorant of that change. As for my part, until I become better informed, the United States of America, and each and all of its departments, agencies, bureaus, and whatever, are in court because of the McCarran Act, or, conversely, are not in court because of that Act’s inapplicability, which I much doubt, and on which *126issue I agree with Justice Johnson’s opinion.
But, accepting that the United States may be subject to jurisdiction of an Idaho state district court, I am left wondering how that conclusion necessitates a holding that water right users possessing valid judgments or decrees and, probably valid water rights of any degree, can be brought into this action against their will.
As mentioned above, it can be said confidently without citation that an adjudicated water right is a property right. Like any other property, it can be forfeited or abandoned, but there is no such claim here. Like any other property, it can be taken by such authorities as have the power of eminent domain, but a just compensation must be paid therefore.
Although feeling not obliged to search for authority in that vein, a study of Justice Johnson’s opinion reassures me when I read on page 14 of the slip opinion his ten line excerpt from California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340[ (9th Cir.1961) ], in which litigation the state of California was positioned as is Idaho in this litigation, i.e., the defendant. The plaintiffs in that action were owners of the beneficial use of the river of the San Joaquin River below the dam. The United States over its protest was joined as a necessary party defendant.
What I make out of reading that case as it definitely has application to the case at hand, is that '... the United States has the power to acquire the rights of these plaintiffs through exercise of eminent domain.’ Rank, 293 F.2d at 35j. And, [wjhile a state can bestow property rights on its citizens which the United States must respect, it cannot take from the United States the power to acquire those rights.’ Id. at 35j. Presently, the United States of America is not attempting to seize or otherwise appropriate any property rights. In fact, all that we see is the claim of the United States District Attorney, Idaho, that the United States is not in court.
I am unable to see the grounds upon which the state of Idaho can force the owners of valid water rights to litigate that which is res judicata. Nor do I understand how the legislature can purport to authorize such. The legislature is prohibited by two constitutions from impairing the obligation of contract, and in my humble view, an adjudicated water right, especially one with whiskers, is on an even higher plane than a contract.
Until better informed, I must respectfully dissent, and am deeply concerned with the plight which the state of Idaho has brought down on the innocent owners of water rights in Idaho. Those water rights are not free-hanging merchandise like tires and beer, but are appurtenant to lands which lands for the most part would be greatly devalued without water rights. To make such owners parties to this litigation is tantamount to an impermissible restraint on the right of free alienability of land.
In re Snake River Basin Water System, 115 Idaho at 10-11, 764 P.2d at 88-89 (emphasis in original and added).
II.
With the foregoing background out of the way, turning first to Justice McDevitt’s opinion, correctly noted therein is the genesis of this on-going litigation, i.e., the 1985 legislature’s enactment of I.C. § 42-1406A, most provisions of which the reader will find displayed in footnote 2 of Justice McDevitt’s opinion.7 Justice McDevitt, fol*127lowing his review of applicable law, reaches the conclusion that the United States is required to pay a filing fee to the clerk of the district court. In other words, immunity from paying fees has been waived. Presently I am not persuaded of any error in his analysis.
III.
Finally, turning to the Nordic Village opinions which we recently received, once again I find that those two highly esteemed jurists on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens and Justice Black-mun, have provided the necessary guidance. First, their dissent nicely brings attention to what the majority has done in the area of sovereign immunity:
An officer of an insolvent corporation appropriated corporate funds and used them to discharge a personal tax obligation. Because the Federal Government was the ultimate recipient of the stolen property, the Court holds that the bankruptcy trustee cannot avoid the transfer. The interest in a rigid interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity outweighs the interest in equitable treatment of general creditors and shareholders of the corporate debtor. This result is neither necessary nor just.
Nordic Village, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1017-18 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Their assessment that the Court, speaking through the opinion of Justice Scalia, condones an injustice is readily accepted, as is also true of the statement that the Court’s interest in a rigid interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not outweigh the equitable treatment of general creditors and shareholders of the corporate debtor. The Court evades this conclusion by hypothesizing “plausible” alternatives of the statute, by refusing to consider its legislative history, and by reiterating the Court’s view that waivers of immunity must be strictly construed.
The entire content of the opinion with its veritable footnote history of criticisms of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is well worth the reading. The views of Justices Stevens and Blackmun are well-stated and convincing. Presently, although the controversy laid before us comes in the context of a huge adjudication of water rights, and is not a bankruptcy outgrowth, my regard for the views of Justices Stevens and Blackmun, guide me to agree with Justice McDevitt, who has appropriately reached the correct conclusion.
QUAERE: Is this action, which arose in state district court and is now pending in this Court, such a suit as is contemplated in § 666, 43 U.S.G., California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.1961)? 8
ANSWER: It so appears to be. Accordingly I concur in Justice McDevitt’s opinion.
. Omitted therefrom immediately following I.C. § 42-1406A(l) and (2), is (3)(b) which mandates that the director “[m]ay petition the district court to commence an adjudication of the water rights of the main stem of the Snake River which forms the boundary between the state of Idaho and the states of Oregon and Washington. The director may include within his petition under this paragraph any unadjudicated tributaries. The director shall not include in the petition filed under this paragraph any adjudicated tributary unless the United States, or other parties who consent is necessary, refuse to consent to the jurisdiction of the district court *127to adjudicate all federal or Indian water rights claims pursuant to the McCarran amendment, 43 U.S.C. section 666."
. Action there was initiated in state district court, and on defendants’ motion removed to the United States District Court under the provisions of 2 U.S.C. 1441(a) Rank v. Krug, 90 F.Supp. 773 (S.D.Cal.1950).