dissenting.
I feel required to dissent in the instant case because, in my judgment, the majority opinion rejects this Court’s usual standard of review and perhaps makes inoperable or at least curtails Idaho’s detachment statute. I.C. § 50-230.
The court below viewed the premises and its surroundings under the statute which expressly authorizes such procedure. I.C. § 50-229. See also Hammond v. City of Chubbuck, 95 Idaho 618, 515 P.2d 565 (1973); Ball v. Village of Parma, 49 Idaho 40, 286 P. 24 (1930). Based on the testimony and other evidence presented to the trial court and its view of the premises, the trial court made a finding of fact that detachment would not materially mar the symmetry of the city of Blackfoot. In my judgment, this Court should not replace that *268valid finding with one of its own, but on the contrary must view the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the respondent. In re Webber’s Estate, 97 Idaho 703, 551 P.2d 1339 (1976). In a similar detachment case, Chaney v. Village of Middleton, 58 Idaho 289, 72 P.2d 850 (1937), this Court stated:
Appellant [Village] further contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment in that it does not show the detachment of the land will not mar the symmetry of the village; also that it fails to show the land does not receive sufficient special benefit to justify its retention within the corporate limits.
The symmetry of the village will not be marred by the change in its boundaries which will result in the detachment of respondents’ land. There is some conflict in the testimony as to whether the land of respondents has derived, or will derive, any substantial benefit from being within the corporate limits, but that tending to support respondents’ contention clearly preponderates over that offered in opposition thereto. The trial judge listened to the evidence and examined the premises. He had a better opportunity than have we to judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, and he was on the ground where he could see what they were testifying about.
Id. at 295, 72 P.2d at 852 (emphasis added).
I do not believe the finding of fact by the district court was clearly erroneous and, if nothing else, the split decision in this case should indicate that it was not.
The majority opinion focuses on the question of symmetry and, even more narrowly within that concept, on whether the detachment of property wholly surrounded by the boundaries of a municipality necessarily disturbs the symmetry of the municipality. Such is admittedly a difficult issue. The Idaho case of Maxwell v. City of Buhl, 40 Idaho 644, 236 P. 122 (1925), is a leading case on the national scene and most often cited in regard to the question of city symmetry. See, e. g., In re Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937); Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1011 (1929); Black’s Law Dictionary 1619 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); 83 C.J.S. Symmetry 932 (1953). “Symmetry,” as defined by Maxwell, requires due proportion of the parts of a body, conformance and consistency, and correspondence of similarity of form on opposite sides of an axis or center. It is my judgment that, as found by the trial court, the Maxwell elements would continue to be present in the city of Blackfoot after the detachment of the Rameys’ 16 acres. The exterior or physical symmetry of the outside boundaries of the city of Blackfoot was not perfect prior to the detachment of the Ramey property and will be no less perfect after detachment. The Maxwell decision also defines “mar” and “materially,” and under those definitions the city of Blackfoot is not disfigured by the annexation. In argument, the Rameys’ “island property” was analogized to a hole in a doughnut, which is natural and which does not necessarily disturb symmetry. I would agree, but would add that such is a matter of proof and here that burden of proof was sustained. See Town of Fond du Lac v. City of Fond du Lac, 22 Wis.2d 533, 126 N.W.2d 201 (1964).
The majority opinion here also relies on Ball v. Village of Parma, 49 Idaho 40, 286 P. 24 (1930). The surroundings of the detached land were explicitly considered by the Ball decision in its ascertainment of symmetry. In the instant case, the trial court took into consideration the surroundings of the Ramey property in arriving at its decision. Functionally, the Rameys’ property fits in well with neighboring uses, such as the railroad and stockyards, a cemetery, a veterinary clinic, an armory, the Eastern Idaho State Fairgrounds, and a racetrack. Not only does the Ramey property use for agricultural purposes fit well into the area, but it has the additional effect of acting as a natural buffer between, the stockyards to the west and an area of new homes to the east. See In re Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d 1195.
Statutes permitting detachment of lands for municipalities should be liberally construed to effect their purpose. See Wol*269bach v. Villege of Flossmoor, 329 Ill.App. 528, 69 N.E.2d 704 (1946). The Illinois court, in quoting from an earlier case, stated:
“The Legislature has determined that an evil exists in compelling owners of tracts of twenty acres or more, not subdivided and which border a city or village, to pay taxes for urban benefits. It is obvious that unsubdivided tracts of this size do not possess any characteristics of city or village property. They receive no practical benefits from being within the limits of such municipality and contributing, by paying taxes, to the expense of the maintenance and administration of such local governmental agency.”
Id. at 704-05.
I believe the above language is clearly applicable to the circumstances of the case at bar. The district court found, and in my judgment, correctly, that the conditions for detachment under our statute were present. Such findings, again in my judgment, are sustained by the evidence, and the decision of the district court therefore should be affirmed.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.*270APPENDIX