dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Today the majority holds that an ADA plaintiff has standing to sue for things that did not injure him. In holding that a plaintiff who has encountered or has specific knowledge of one barrier at a facility may sue for any unknown barrier on the premises related to his disability, the majority reasons that “[i]t makes no sense to require a disabled plaintiff to challenge, in separate cases, multiple barriers in the same facility, controlled by the same entity, all related to the plaintiffs specific disability. We do not believe Congress would have intended such a constricted reading of the ADA which could render the benefits it promises largely illusory.” The majority’s approach compromises longstanding constitutional principles for the sake of convenience, and ignores the fact that no orm — not even Congress — can preempt the Constitution and confer standing to a party for things that have not injured him.
A plaintiff who seeks federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that he has standing to pursue his claims in federal *1050court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Doran has fallen short of meeting this burden. As the Supreme Court has held, to establish standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ ”. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be “fairly ... traee[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Id. at 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations omitted). The elements of standing are not mere pleading requirements, but rather must be supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Importantly, standing requires that “the party seeking review be himself among the injured.” Id. at 563, 112 S.Ct. 2130. To establish that the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, it must be “concrete and particularized,” which requires that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 561 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The result of this requirement is that the individual plaintiff, and not some other hypothetical disabled person, must have been injured by the alleged ADA violation. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (“[Standing is not dispensed in gross.”). Taking these principles into account, a plaintiff should not be able to get his nose in the door of federal court with one alleged statutory violation and then sue for countless other alleged statutory violations that have in no way affected him.
As the majority offers a hypothetical story as a point of illustration, it seems appropriate to do the same in order to emphasize the far-reaching implications of the holding today. Imagine that a mobility-impaired person decides to spend the day at a large shopping center that contains, among other things, restaurants, shops, a movie theater, and a health spa. He is not planning on doing anything in particular, but in the past he has enjoyed browsing in the shops, and hopes to dine at one of the many restaurants in the evening. He also would like to see one of the movies playing at the theater if anything piques his interest. Much to his chagrin, however, upon his arrival at the shopping center he discovers that there are no handicapped parking spots and he is therefore unable to park his van. At this point, it is beyond question that the plaintiff has, in fact, suffered a cognizable injury in fact pursuant to the ADA.
Seeing the error of its ways, the shopping center quickly rectifies the problem. However, in the meantime the plaintiffs expert clandestinely examines all areas of the center, and identifies hundreds of other ADA violations that could hypothetically affect a mobility-impaired person throughout, none of which the plaintiff encountered or had knowledge of at the time the complaint was filed. Based on the majority’s holding, the scope of the violations for which the plaintiff is able to sue is arguably boundless. The plaintiffs lawyers will argue that they are not limited to the common areas, but are able to sue all of the establishments in the shopping center that present hypothetical injuries to the plaintiff. Difficult questions inevitably arise: should plaintiffs standing extend to all of the shops he planned on patronizing, and to the movie theater where he might *1051have seen a movie? Does it extend to the health spa, where he had no plans of going that day but has a membership? What about the stores he has never been to before, but he might have stumbled upon in the course of his outing? Moreover, what mechanism is in place to substantiate the claims of a plaintiff in this position regarding the establishments he intended to patronize or plans to visit in the future? 1
Standing is indispensable; it cannot be disregarded because it is inefficient, or because to do otherwise might, as the majority opines, not pragmatically “make sense.” See, e.g., Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (“[Standing is] the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.”). The majority’s position loses the forest for the trees. Generally, standing-requirements actually enhance efficiency by concentrating limited judicial resources on controversies as to those who have actually suffered injuries. Instead, the majority’s approach gives ADA plaintiffs a carte blanche, an invitation to bring litigation even outside the presence of a real live case or controversy. See, e.g. Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, No. CIVS-03-1843DFL CMK, 2005 WL 2072013 at *4 (E.D.Cal., Aug.25, 2005) (“[t]he court’s resources are best spent resolving real issues that have affected real people at the present time rather than reaching out to decide matters that may not affect anyone or that may be resolved without judicial action.”). I can think of no other area of the law where we bestow a plaintiff with the right to assert any potential injuries he may suffer at the hands of the defendant at some future time. See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (“if the right to complain of one administrative deficiency automatically conferred the right to complain of all administrative deficiencies, any citizen aggrieved in one respect could bring the whole structure of state administration before the courts for review. This of course is not the law.”).
The majority’s holding is premised on the Eighth Circuit decision Steger v. Franco, which allows for an ADA plaintiff to sue for all violations pertaining to his disability regardless of whether he encountered or knew about them. See Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir.2000).2 Some of the wording in Steger, however, is “fundamentally incompatible” with established constitutional standing principles. See Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134 (S.D.Cal.2006). To allow a plaintiff to sue for ADA violations he neither knew about nor encountered directly flies in the face of Lujan’s requirement that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individualized way.” See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The approach advanced in *1052Steger has been the subject of criticism, both by the dissenting judge in Steger, see Steger, 228 F.3d at 894-96 (Loken, J., dissenting) as well as district courts within the Ninth Circuit, see Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1142 (S.D.Cal.2006); Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 389 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1249 (S.D.Cal.2005); Wilson v. Norbreck, LLC, No. CIVS040690DFLJFM, 2005 WL 3439714, at *1 (E.D.Cal., Dec.14, 2005); White v. Divine Investments, Inc., No. Civ.S-04-0206FCD/DA, 2005 WL 2491543 at *3-4 (E.D.Cal. Oct.7, 2005); Org. For Advancement of Minorities v. Brick Oven Restaurant, 406 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1126 (S.D.Cal.2005); Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, No. CIVS-03-1843DFL CMK, 2005 WL 2072013 at *3-5 (E.D.Cal., Aug.25, 2005).
The majority’s reliance on Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.2002) is also misplaced. While Pickern did engage in a discussion of Steger, its reference to the Eighth Circuit’s holding was a limited one. Pickern merely holds that an ADA plaintiff who has actual knowledge of illegal barriers and has been deterred by them may seek relief for their removal, even if he has not personally encountered them.3 Pickern did not address the issue of whether a plaintiff who knows about or encountered one or even several illegal barriers has standing to sue for all illegal barriers related to his disability within that facility. I think Appellant’s brief says it best: “[i]f Doran were arguing that he was denied full and equal enjoyment of the store, then the district court would be correct: an individual can hardly complain about unknown discriminatory acts. To hold otherwise would allow disabled plaintiffs to sue without having suffered the (minimal) injury-in-fact required under the ADA, and eviscerate the Article III constraints imposed by Congress.” See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 28. Though I remain puzzled as to why plaintiff-appellant’s own brief would contain this language, I think he hits the nail on the head.
Although one might argue that Steger has pragmatic appeal, when it comes to abiding by the Constitution, the fact that adherence to it might be inefficient or impractical is simply not enough to preempt its force. Time and again, the Supreme Court has refused to allow the arguments of “piecemeal litigation” or “convenience and efficiency” to negate the fundamental, constitutional requirement that plaintiffs present an actual case or controversy in order to have Article III standing. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (“[i]n the light of this overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper constitutional sphere, we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience and efficiency”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).
It goes without saying that convenience does not, or at least should not, play a role in our adherence to the Constitution. I am reluctant to contemplate the potential far-reaching implications of the majority’s holding.
Accordingly, I dissent.
. The variations on this theme are endless. What is the potential scope of injuries relating to a mobility-impaired job applicant whose wheelchair gets caught on a mat in the lobby of a large office building, or a blind high school student on a campus tour of a prospective college who encounters an elevator in the main building without the required signage? May the job applicant now sue for all unknown violations at every place of public accommodation throughout the entire building? May the student sue the college for violations relating to his disability that exist in all of the school’s buildings, even ones that are located on a separate campus across town? In my mind, any liberalization of the injury in fact requirement is unacceptable. One can only imagine the avalanche of litigation that today's holding has the potential to generate.
. Despite the liberal holding in Steger, it is worth noting that the cases of four out of the five plaintiffs in that case were dismissed for failure to establish standing.
. It is of interest that the one plaintiff-appellant in Pickern apparently is the same person who is the plaintiff-appellant here. Counsel in this case claims to have been counsel in the Pickern case.