with whom TAYLOR, Justice, concurs (dissenting).
I concur with the majority opinion that the Industrial Accident Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) correctly held as a matter of law that the accident of October 10, 1960, did not arise out of and in the course of claimant’s employment. However, I cannot concur in the reversal of the award and remand for further proceedings and redetermination.
On an appeal from an Order of the Board, the review by this court is limited to questions of law. Idaho Const. Art. 5, Section *4339; I.C. § 72-609. The constitutional provision and the statute impose upon this court the duty to affirm the Board unless the findings of fact are not based on any substantial, competent evidence.
This record discloses Dr. Hawkins was the physician that treated claimant for her injuries. Claimant, first injured September 16, 1960, continued to work after that date, first consulting her physician a week later on September 24, 1960. The report of Dr. Hawkins, in his first written report of this accident stated her injury did not result in any permanent disability. Reports of Dr. Hawkins, submitted after the second accident, in reply to an inquiry as to whether the injury will result in a permanent disability, merely show “Unknown”. Dr. Hawkins described her first injury:
“At that time there was evidence of contusion, black and blue spots on her hip, her arm, and severe strain of her right lower back and right sacroiliac. X-rays were taken which revealed no evidence of fracture.”
He further stated that at the time of the second injury she was off work:
“Yes, she was coming to my office for treatment of the spine condition in the low back area, and that was aggravated, and the severe neck and shoulder injury were sustained on her way to the office.
* * * * ijc ' *
“Q. Would you give them an estimate of permanent disability, if you have any.
“A. I would estimate about 15 percent of the loss of the leg and arm — 15 to 18 percent. Her low back is unstable on that side and I don’t think it will improve much.”
Claimant testified:
“MR. HUNTER: Were you getting better at the time you had the second injury?
“A. I feel maybe I was getting along a little better — I don’t know. I was just steady getting worse all the time after I got hit, I was just a lot worse.”
Dr. Barclay, a physician that examined claimant after both injuries, testified in his deposition:
“A. She suffered two distinct separate injuries to the back. The first occurred on the 17th day of September, 1960, when she slipped on some eggs falling to the concrete floor. She progressed well under treatment and told me in fact she was almost recovered from that when she suffered the second injury in an automobile accident on 10-10-60 in which she injured both the upper back and the neck.
“Q. She indicated to you that she was virtually over the first injury at the time she suffered the second?
*434“A. Yes.
“Q. Did she indicate to you at the time you examined her where the present injury was bothering her with reference to whether it was her upper or lower back?
“A. In the upper back.”
Dr. Barclay also stated he made a subjective and objective examination of claimant and examined the two X-rays taken by Dr. Hawkins; that claimant from his observation had a normal gait, no limp, or apparent disability; the spine was essentially negative, it had normal contours; there was no muscle spasms, nor limitation of motion of the spine; that she complained of no pain on bending, and the reflexes in the knees and ankles were normal; that straight leg lift caused no pain in the back; that the motion of the neck was not impaired and there was no complaint of pain on motion of the neck. That she did have some muscle spasm in the area of both shoulders in the suprascapular area.
He further testified in response to a question asking his opinion as to the cause of claimant’s injuries:
“Of course I have very little to go on, but the patient’s own statements, because I was not in a position to observe her during the time she had these two accidents, but she stated to me that she was practically over the pain and disability from her first injury when the second one came along.”
In discussing the estimate by Dr. Hawkins of claimant’s disability, Dr. Barclay stated he thought Dr. Hawkins’ estimate of the disability resulting from the combined accidents was too high.
The Board had before it a conflict in the evidence as to claimant’s estimate as to her condition at the time of the second accident, and also sufficient evidence from which it could have determined a partial permanent disability ranging from none to that equivalent to some degree less than 15 to 18 percent of the loss of the leg and arm.
The Board, in considering the opinions of Dr. Hawkins and Dr. Barclay was not bound to accept these opinions, for the opinions of experts are advisory only and are for the assistance of the triers of the facts to understand and apply other evidence. Nistad v. Winton Lumber Co., 61 Idaho 1, 99 P.2d 52; Evans v. Cavanagh, 58 Idaho 324, 73 P.2d 83. The Board, faced with a conflict in the testimony of the doctors as to the estimate of disability, resolved it as was done in Watkins v. Cavanagh, 61 Idaho 720, 107 P.2d 155.
The Board having made findings based on substantial competent evidence, this Court is bound by such determination. See: Watkins v. Cavanagh (supra); Bower v. Smith, 63 Idaho 128, 118 P.2d 737; *435In Re Walker’s Claim, 80 Idaho 420, 332 P.2d 199; Moeller v. Volco Builders’ Supply, Inc., 81 Idaho 349, 341 P.2d 447; Sutton v. Brown’s Tie and Lumber Co., 82 Idaho 135, 350 P.2d 345; Zimmerman v. Harris Lumber Co., 82 Idaho 187, 350 P.2d 746.
Dr. Hawkins testified that he was unable to allocate to the first accident or to the second accident, the amount of medical expenses incurred after October 10, 1960. The Board in its findings determined medical expenses after that date were not attributable to her first accident. This finding should not be disturbed, for claimant had the burden of proof to establish these items, which she failed to do. See: Stroscheim v. Shay, 63 Idaho 360, 120 P.2d 267; Miller v. City of Boise, 70 Idaho 136, 212 P.2d 654.
Claimant requested attorney fees be awarded under the provisions of I. C. § 72-611, which provides for an award in case the claim is contested without reasonable ground or the surety has refused or neglected to pay compensation within a reasonable time. The Board made no specific findings concerning this, but did not award any attorney fees. The record discloses a bona fide question as to the amount of medical expenses and loss of time attributed to the industrial accident and the automobile accident, which issue was not finally resolved until the hearing before the Board.
By its failure to make such an award the Board in effect denied such award. The failure to specifically find on this issue is not sufficient ground to remand the case for further hearing; the record is sufficiently clear that a specific finding is not needed to understand the issue; Merrill v. Merrill, 83 Idaho 306, 362 P.2d 887.
The award of the Industrial Accident Board should be affirmed.