(special concurrence) .
I concur with the results obtained by the majority opinion and concur with the majority opinion in all respects but one. The majority opinion holds that a donee-survivor of a joint bank account must show the donative intent by clear and convincing evidence. I disagree.
The authority cited by the majority does not dictate that result. While both the Griffiths and Chase cases reach that result, both were written prior to the adoption of I.C. § l5-6-104(a). Bogert expressly chose not to apply I.C. § 15-6-104(a). The standard of proof discussed in Cooke was unnecessary and dicta.
An even more compelling reason for my disagreement is the legislative history of I.C. § 15-6-104(a). It is clear that the sweeping revision of Idaho’s probate code by the legislature followed almost completely “the Uniform Probate Code.” Section 6-104(a) of that Uniform Code expressly required a showing of intent by clear and convincing evidence to negate a presumption of donative intent and survivorship. I would hold that our legislature in enacting I.C. § 15-6-104(a) expressly rejected the “clear and convincing” language of the Uniform Code and therefore I believe it to be the clear legislative intent to place the donative intent burden of proof upon the donee but only require that burden be carried by a preponderance of the evidence as distinguished from “clear and convincing” evidence, Cf. 9 Idaho Law Review 143 (1973).