1. The accusation against the defendant for theft by taking was issued some months before the trial, and examination of the record reveals that the defendant was originally represented by another attorney. The fact that the defendant changed counsel and that the new counsel, who came in one day prior to the trial, requested a continuance which was denied, does not represent reversible error. The defendant, riot the state, is chargeable with the delay in such a situation, absent a showing of why the late employment of counsel occurred. Neither was the fact that the accusation was amended to correct the name of the owner of the inspection stickers allegedly stolen from "Fred Hawkins” to "Fred Hawkins Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.” cause for a continuance, it not appearing that this in any way weakened the presentation of the defense.
2. Robert Franklin, a state’s witness, testified that the defendant, who worked for "Fred Hawkins Chrysler Plymouth,” turned over to him 19 inspection stickers stolen from that employer and that he sold 16 of them. Another witness testified Franklin was apprehended when "a citizen came to me and advised me that Robert Franklin had had the inspection stickers selling them.” It affirmatively appears that the defendant’s part in the conspiracy was divulged by Franklin. The name of the citizen who identified Franklin need not be divulged where that witness’ testimony was not necessary in *89obtaining a conviction of this defendant. Estevez v. State, 130 Ga. App. 215 (2) (202 SE2d 686) (1973).
3. An oral motion to suppress the defendant’s confession of the theft was overruled, over his objections that he was denied counsel prior to signing the confession, and that he was offered, as a reward for signing, an accusation alleging only one theft (the book of tickets) rather than 19 (each individual ticket). A GBI agent, two Cornelia police officers and another peace officer testified denying both that any such conversation took place and that any such question ever came up. Another person present during part of the proceedings, a justice of the peace, did not testify. Cross examination, however, pulled out of one of the officers the statement that "there was mention that he could be charged for each individual sticker ... told him there could possibly be a warrant for each sticker.” Another officer called in rebuttal said that the justice of the peace, in front of the defendant, "did say something to the effect that 19 charges or 19 counts versus 1.”
This court, as a result of this testimony, feels there is at least a strong suggestion that the defendant was led to believe, whether intentionally or not, that he was gaining by his confession the advantage of a one-count rather than a nineteen-count accusation against him. This feeling is all the stronger in that the defendant, although the Miranda rights had been read to him, had no attorney at the time, and now contends that he asked for and was refused counsel prior to signing the confession.
The situation closely resembles that of the "marijuana dog” in Swift v. State, 131 Ga. App. 231 (206 SE2d 51) (1974), where Judge Evans, in a majority opinion, held that a roadblock conducted by a county drug abuse squad with the aid of a marijuana sniffing canine was operating as a subterfuge in claiming the spot check of automobiles was for the sole purpose of examining licenses and inspection stickers. The reversal was, however, overturned in State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535 (207 SE2d 459) (1974), holding that "where there is a conflict in the evidence on the motion to suppress, the ruling of the trial court will be upheld where there is any evidence to authorize a finding in support of his order.”
*90In view of the dissenting opinion, it is not out of place to consider what difference, if any, there is between the "clearly erroneous” and the "any evidence” rules. The Supreme Court in Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 (242 SE2d 101) (1978), citing two Court of Appeals cases that "the 'clearly erroneous’ standard of the Administrative Procedure Act [is] the same as the 'any evidence rule’ ” again emphasizes that the court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to the weight of the evidence.” Since in criminal cases we adopt the any evidence rule in the appellate court, although the fact arbiter in the trial court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, where a Jackson-Denno hearing requires a finding based only on a preponderance of evidence (Hurt v. State, 239 Ga. 665 (238 SE2d 542) (1977)), it stands to reason that this is all the more reason for holding, as both the civil and criminal cases do generally, that a judgment of the trial court supported by competent evidence will be upheld in this court unless it is clearly erroneous, meaning legally insufficient.
The dissent here urges that a different meaning be given to the words "clearly erroneous” in Jackson-Denno hearings than either this court or the Supreme Court has ascribed to them in any other appellate proceeding. Phrases should not be given varying meanings depending on the type case in which they appear. The dissent relies on Williams v. State, 119 Ga. App. 557 (167 SE2d 756) (1969), where it was shown by undisputed evidence that the defendant was offered a benefit for his confession. Obviously, then, the admission of the confession under such circumstances was "clearly erroneous.” That case and others like it involve no question of weighing evidence, but only the question of whether the evidence, in the view most favorable to establishing the point, is legally sufficient for that purpose. Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486, 493 (220 SE2d 448) (1975) (on which Peek v. State, 239 Ga. 422 (238 SE2d 12) cited by the dissent, depends), where it is stated that a jury instruction "was contrary to Ga. Code § 59-904 quoted above and was thus clearly erroneous.” Clearly erroneous simply means erroneous as a matter of law. On the other hand, as stated in Hurt v. State, 239 Ga. 665, 668, supra (also cited in the *91dissenting opinion): "This court does not pass on the weight of the evidence but on the sufficiency thereof to sustain the verdict.” The Supreme Court has indeed stated in these cases that where the issue of voluntariness is supported by a preponderance of the evidence it cannot be held to be "clearly erroneous,” but it has also said, time and again, that after verdict evidence in conflict will be construed to uphold it, and the presumptions will be exercised in its favor. "Appellate courts will pass not on the weight, but on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict.” Gaines v. State, 239 Ga. 98, 100 (1) (236 SE2d 55) (1977). The same presumptions will be applied, after verdict, to evidence regarding voluntariness of a confession as to any other evidence.
Nor does this approach work any change in Georgia law, or make more possible any unconstitutional result. Confessions have always been scanned with care and caution. Where the evidence as to voluntariness is in conflict, the issue is for the finder of fact, not for this court. " 'Before a confession — is admissible in evidence, a prima facie showing as to its voluntary character must be made; and if this preliminary proof fails to make such a showing, the confession. . . must be excluded; . . . after such proper preliminary proof, the confession. . . becomes admissible, but the defendant may by evidence attack its voluntary character, and in that event the question as to voluntariness is for the jury; . . . where the voluntary character of a confession is made to appear by unequivocal evidence, the mere existence of attendant facts and circumstances, . . . which do not directly or necessarily dispute the prima facie showing, will not require exclusion of the confession from evidence, but the question as to its voluntary character should properly be left to the jury. . .; and . . . ordinarily the question as to whether confessions and incriminatory statements, unexceptionable in themselves, were made under previous undue influences still operating on the mind of a defendant, is not a question of law for the court, to be resolved by excluding such evidence, but is a question of fact for the jury . . .’ ” Coker v. State, 199 Ga. 20, 23 (33 SE2d 171) (1945) quoting from Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686, 710 (13 SE2d 820) (1941). Obviously that which is a *92jury question on conflicting evidence may not be "clearly erroneous,” although a jury might have found otherwise. If, on the other hand, it is erroneous as a matter of law it is both clearly erroneous and unsupported by any competent evidence. This being so, the distinction drawn in the dissent is unnecessarily narrow.
Submitted February 2, 1978 Decided May 3, 1978 Rehearing denied May 26, 1978 Kimzey, Kimzey & Carter, M. Keith York, for appellant. Linton K. Crawford, Solicitor, for appellee.Judgment affirmed.
Quillian, P. J., Webb, Mc-Murray, Shulman, Banke and Birdsong, JJ., concur. Bell, C. J., concurs in the judgment only. Smith, J., dissents.