Betty Warren alleges her employer, Solo Cup Company, compensated her male coworker at a higher hourly rate based on his gender in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Warren appealed and we affirm.
I. Background
In 1999 Betty Warren began working at Solo Cup Company (“Solo”), a manufacturer of disposable cups and plates, as a “packer,” earning $6.04 per hour. In 2000 Warren switched positions and became a “tool crib attendant,” earning $6.31 per hour. She received three raises over the next two years and eventually reached an hourly wage of $7.52. When Warren began working in the tool crib, Solo tracked its parts using manual inventories recorded on a written card system. Eventually Solo computerized its tool crib, using a software system to track and inventory parts. This modernization made it important for tool crib attendants to possess computer skills.
In December 2002 Solo contemplated hiring a tool crib attendant to cover the third shift so the tool crib would be continually staffed. Having recently decided to lay off all of its full- and part-time security guards, Solo decided to offer the new tool crib position to Don Lorenz, one of its security guards. As a security guard, Lorenz started at $6.50 per hour and worked his way up to $7.43. Solo offered him a raise with the new position, to $7.75 per hour. Tony Peyton, the head of Solo’s human resources department, testified that Lorenz’s raise was based on his “computer skills and his potential”; Lorenz holds a bachelor’s degree in anthropology and two master’s degrees in education and urban planning, respectively.
Warren, who has a high school diploma, was upset when she learned Lorenz was earning more money than she was for similar work in the tool crib. She went to *629her supervisor to discuss the discrepancy, and her supervisor explained there was a company book that dictated the starting wage for tool crib attendants. When Warren protested that she “knew more than Lorenz,” Warren was fired. At the time Solo’s explanation for her firing was that she was “generating too many orders,” which apparently is not a good thing for a tool crib attendant.1 In the context of this litigation, deposition testimony revealed that Warren was resistant to working with computers, and Warren herself admitted to being “kind of mediocre” with computers.2
Warren filed a three-count complaint in federal district court, alleging she was paid unequal wages due to her gender in violation of both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and that her termination violated the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 601. Warren later abandoned her FMLA claim. Solo moved for summary judgment and prevailed, and Warren appealed.3
II. Analysis
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “construing all facts, and drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts” in favor of Warren. Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 326 (7th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]o avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant bears the burden of setting forth ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Vanasco v. Nat’l-Louis Univ., 137 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
A. EPA Claim
Warren first argues that Solo violated the EPA because her hourly rate as a crib attendant was less than Lorenz’s. The EPA prohibits employers from paying employees different wages based on gender. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir.2000). “To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA, [Warren] must show,” by a preponderance of the evidence, that: “(1) higher wages were paid to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring substantially similar skill, effort and responsibilities, and (3) the work was performed under similar working conditions.” Stopka v. Alliance of Am. Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir.1998). No proof of discriminatory intent is required. Id.; see also Varner, 226 F.3d at 932.
We assume, arguendo, that Warren established a prima facie case, so the burden *630shifts to Solo “to establish one of four statutory defenses.” Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir.2006); Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir.1989) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974)). The statutory defenses kick in if the difference in pay is attributed to “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The fourth exception is a “broad, ‘catch-all’ exception and embraces an almost limitless number of factors, so long as they do not involve sex.” Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.
So “[i]n effect, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act establish a rebuttable presumption of sex discrimination such that once an employee has demonstrated that an employer pays members of one sex more than members of the opposite sex, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a gender neutral justification for that wage differential.” Varner, 226 F.3d at 932. The justification need not be a “good reason,” but merely a gender-neutral one. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir.2005). The justification “must also be bona fide. In other words, an employer cannot use a gender-neutral factor to avoid liability unless the factor is used and applied in good faith; it was not meant to provide a convenient escape from liability.” Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1211.
Solo has carried its burden. The company established a bona fide, gender-neutral rationale for the discrepancy in pay: Lorenz is more skilled in using computers than Warren and has a bachelor’s and two master’s degrees. “Under the EPA, differences in education and experience may be considered factors other than sex.” Merillat, 470 F.3d at 697 (citing Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir.2003)). Warren has a high school diploma and admitted her computer skills were deficient. Although Lorenz’s bachelor’s and master’s degrees do not include a specific emphasis on computers, the evidence is undisputed that he knew more about computers than Warren. Moreover, the record establishes that at times Warren went out of her way to avoid using a computer at work because it was unfamiliar to her. Solo’s motion for summary judgment on Warren’s EPA claim was properly granted.
B. Title VII Claim
Warren next argues Solo paid her a lower hourly rate than Lorenz in violation of Title VII. She proceeds under the indirect method set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), so the initial burden is on Warren to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This requires Warren to show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job to Solo’s expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside of the protected class. Id.
Warren failed to establish a prima facie case because she is not similarly situated to Lorenz.4 An employee is similarly *631situated if the employee is “comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir.2006). “In evaluating whether two employees are directly comparable, the court must look at all relevant factors, including whether the employees *(i) held the same job description, (ii) were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications — provided the employer considered these latter factors in making the personnel decision.’ ” Bio v. Fed. Express Corp., 424 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir.2003)).
The fourth factor is the focus of this case: Warren and Lorenz have very different educational backgrounds, experiences, and qualifications. Warren has a high school diploma; Lorenz has a bachelor’s and two master’s degrees. Moreover, Lorenz’s computer skills are superior to Warren’s. Warren maintains Lorenz’s advanced degrees and computer skills are irrelevant because the tool crib job description requires neither. But the tool crib job description is not conclusive on this question. Employers are permitted to compensate employees differently based on skills that are not specifically required in a given job description so long as the employer considers those skills when making the compensation decision. See Bio, 424 F.3d at 597.
Lorenz and Warren are not materially comparable in education, experience, and computer aptitude, and Solo considered these differences when deciding to pay Lorenz a higher hourly rate. Accordingly, Solo’s motion for summary judgment on Warren’s Title VII discriminatory pay claim was properly granted.
The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.
. Solo belatedly offered a business-related explanation for the termination — that one tool crib position was being eliminated — but because we construe all facts in the light most favorable to Warren, we disregard it.
. One of Warren's supervisors, Nancy Drig-gers, testified that Warren “just didn't want to work on a computer" and "just really didn't want to deal with the computer.” Driggers said Warren "would rather do almost any of the other jobs other than work the computer.” Driggers also indicated Warren "did not have an easy time working on the computer.”
.In response to Solo’s motion for summary judgment, Warren attempted to pursue a new claim: that her termination violated Title VII. The district court correctly concluded that Warren had waived this claim by failing to raise it in her complaint. Accordingly, Warren's termination is not at issue in this appeal; we address only her unequal pay claims.
. In her appellate briefs, Warren contends the district court ignored evidence regarding another Solo female employee, Sandra Weir. Weir worked as a security guard, like Lorenz, and was laid off at the same time Lorenz was offered the tool crib attendant position. Warren focuses on the fact that Weir had taken computer classes yet was not considered for the tool crib position that went to Lorenz. Warren poses this question: “If the reason for *631starting Lorenz at a wage rate higher than the Plaintiff was because of his superior computer skills and not because of his sex, why did ... [Solo] not even consider the credentials of Weir, despite her repeated inquiries about the job?” We do not understand the import of this inquiry; Weir’s alleged computer experience has nothing to do with the discrepancy in Warren's and Lorenz’s hourly wage. Warren does not allege that Solo discriminated against women by not hiring them for tool crib positions. Warren’s termination is not at issue in this appeal; only Warren's claims for unequal pay under the EPA and Title VII are properly before the court. We do not see how Solo's failure to consider Weir for the tool crib position has any relevance to the pay discrepancy between Lorenz and Warren.