dissenting.
The issue we are now asked to decide is whether Section 3 of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 19876 (hereafter “the Act”), now codified at OCGA § 9-11-9.1, offends Art. III, Sec. V, Par. III of the Georgia Constitution, which provides that “[n]o bill shall pass which refers to more than one subject matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.” As this court noted in Central of Ga. R. Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 845-847 (31 SE 531) (1898), this Georgia contribution to American constitutional law7 contains two separate restrictions: a “single subject” requirement and a title requirement. The single subject provision is designed to “inhibit the passage of what is often termed ‘omnibus’ or ‘log-rolling’ bills,” Central of Ga. R. Co., 104 Ga. at 846-847, in which many diverse matters are contained in one bill “with the view of combining in their *826favor the advocates of all and thus securing the passage of several measures no one of which could succeed upon its own merits.” Camp v. MARTA, 229 Ga. 35, 38 (189 SE2d 56) (1972). The title requirement facilitates the legislative process in two important ways. First, it prevents the surprise that may result when the title of an act does not fully inform legislators of the act’s contents. Fortson v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 472, 474 (208 SE2d 68) (1974) (citing Prothro & Kendall v. Orr, 12 Ga. 36, 43 (1852)); Cade v. State, 207 Ga. 135 (60 SE2d 763) (1950). Second, the title requirement alerts the citizens of this state, especially affected groups and parties, to the subjects the legislature is considering. Green v. Bryson, 223 Ga. 862, 864 (159 SE2d 56) (1968); Nelson v. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804, 807 (147 SE2d 424) (1966); Central of Ga. R. Co., supra, 104 Ga. at 845.
In this case, the question of impermissible “log-rolling” need not be addressed because I conclude, as the appellants contend, that the title of the Act gave citizens and legislators notice that the body of the Act would contain matter related to medical malpractice actions only and did not fairly apprise citizens and their legislators that Section 3 of the Act, now codified at OCGA § 9-11-9.1, would apply to professional malpractice actions in general.
In this regard, § 9-11-9.1 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify.” Id. at (a). In Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435 (383 SE2d 867) (1989), this court correctly held that “under its plain language, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 applies to ‘any action for damages alleging professional malpractice’ . . . [and] is not restricted to medical-malpractice actions.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 438. In Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117 (414 SE2d 197) (1992), we subsequently held that the reach of § 9-11-9.1 was limited to the definition of “professional” contained in the OCGA, currently §§ 14-7-2 (2); 14-10-2 (2); and 43-1-24. Given the plain meaning of the statutory language, our rules of statutory construction prohibited us from relying on the short title and caption of the Act to hold that the statute was limited to medical malpractice actions only. Telecom*USA v. Collins, 260 Ga. 362, 363-364 (393 SE2d 235) (1990) (plain language controls unless it produces absurdity); Thomas v. Bd. of Commrs. of Chattooga County, 196 Ga. 10 (25 SE2d 647) (1943) (courts may look to caption of an act in construing only an ambiguous statute).
Curiously, no litigants in previous cases involving § 9-11-9.1 have asked us to consider the issue presented by this case — whether the short title and the caption failed to put legislators and citizens on notice of what was contained in OCGA § 9-11-9.1, in violation of Art. III, Sec. V, Par. Ill of our Constitution. This issue puts the focus on the language of the short title and the caption of the Act. The caption *827of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1987 provides as follows:
To provide substantive and comprehensive reforms affecting claims for medical malpractice; to provide a short title; to amend Title 9 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to civil practice, so as to provide that minors who have attained the age of five years and incompetents shall be subject to limitations of actions provisions regarding medical malpractice; to provide for periods of limitation and repose; to provide exceptions; to provide findings; to provide that certain actions shall not be revived or extinguished; to provide that in any case in which professional malpractice is alleged, an affidavit of an expert competent to testify setting forth the particulars of the claim shall be filed with the complaint; to provide the contents of such affidavit; to provide exceptions; to provide procedures; to provide that no period of limitation is extended by such filing requirements; to amend Chapter 1 of Title 51 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to general provisions affecting torts, so as to provide immunity from civil liability to certain health care providers or other entities providing professional services without compensation or the expectation thereof; to provide exceptions; to provide for applicability; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.
(Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1987, pp. 887-888.
In deciding whether this caption and the short title put citizens and their legislators on notice of the broad impact of § 9-11-9.1, we must bear in mind the purpose of the constitutional provision. “The purpose of this constitutional provision is to protect the people against covert or surprise legislation,” Nelson, supra, 221 Ga. at 807, particularly since “ [i]t is a common practice to pass bills by their title only. . . .” Prothro & Kendall v. Orr, supra, 12 Ga. at 43. In short, the title of a bill must be honest. It must provide adequate notice to citizens and their legislators of the subjects contained therein. To this end, we have held that the title must not be “deceiving upon a casual reading of only the [caption] of the [a]ct.” (Emphasis supplied.) Lee v. State, 239 Ga. 769, 770 (238 SE2d 852) (1977).
In this case, the majority opinion undermines the purpose of the constitutional provision by focusing on the phrase “professional malpractice” in the caption in isolation instead of determining what is communicated to legislators or concerned citizens by the Act’s short title and entire caption. Examining the caption, we see, first, that the opening clause states that the Act is “to provide substantive and comprehensive reforms affecting claims for medical malpractice.” A legis*828lator or citizen reading this clause, especially given that the short title preceding that opening clause is the “Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1987,” would, with some justification, believe that the remaining clauses of the caption would set forth the substantive and comprehensive medical malpractice reforms mentioned in the opening clause. Moreover, the phrase “professional malpractice” is mentioned only once in the twenty-one lines of the caption, is buried in the middle of the caption, and is bracketed by a provision affecting medical malpractice statutes of limitation and repose and another provision reforming the liability of health care providers in emergency or charitable settings. The contents of the caption, especially when read alongside the Act’s short title, gave inadequate notice that the affidavit requirement would apply to suits against riverboat captains and harbor pilots. Rather, the title probably left most reasonable legislators and concerned citizens with the distinct impression that the affidavit requirement was designed to reform medical malpractice only.
In addition to focusing on the phrase “professional malpractice” in isolation, the majority invokes the legislative history of the affidavit requirement to support its conclusion that the title of the Act gave legislators and citizens adequate notice. This reliance on legislative history, however, is misplaced. First, the constitutional provision in question requires the title of the act to provide adequate notice; it does not say that the legislative history will suffice. Considering the profusion of bills that legislators must review, it is contrary to the spirit of the constitutional provision to rely on legislative history to determine if legislators received adequate notice of what was contained in the body of an act.
Moreover, the legislative history of the affidavit requirement leads to the inescapable conclusion that the legislators were not adequately notified that the affidavit requirement extended beyond the medical profession to other professionals. The Senate included a blanket affidavit requirement in the Senate substitute for the House bill that eventually became the broadly applicable Tort Reform Act of 1987, but the House rejected the substitute bill. 1 H. Jour. 1134. The caption of the rejected bill, like the caption of the Tort Reform Act of 1987, began with the comprehensive statement: “To provide substantial and comprehensive civil justice reform affecting tort claims litigation.” See 1 H. Jour. 1131 and 1193. The caption of the rejected bill then proposed that “in any case in which professional malpractice or product liability is alleged, an affidavit of an expert competent in the field setting forth the particulars of the claim shall be filed with the complaint.” 1 H. Jour. 1131. Since the opening clause of the caption dealt with tort reform in general, any citizen or legislator who read the clause of the caption dealing with “professional malpractice or product liability” would have obtained real no*829tice of the comprehensive nature of the affidavit requirement. Perhaps because of such clear notice, the members of the legislature rejected the bill, and the affidavit requirement contained therein was not included in the equally comprehensive Tort Reform Act of 1987.
Instead, it can be surmised that the defeated supporters of the broad affidavit requirement smuggled the requirement, Trojan Horse fashion, and without the words “product liability,” into the body and the caption of the more limited Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1987, which begins its much less ambitious caption with: “To provide substantive and comprehensive reforms affecting claims for medical malpractice.” Ga. L. 1987, p. 887; 1 H. Jour. 1189. Had the words “product liability” remained in the affidavit requirement and had they accompanied the words “professional malpractice” in the caption of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, a legislator, upon reading the caption, might have been reminded of the broad affidavit requirement defeated as part of the Tort Reform Act. The words “product liability” were possibly deleted for just that reason. Given the medical malpractice reform orientation of the caption of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, and given the deletion of the words “product liability” from the rejected provision of the Tort Reform Act, the majority’s reliance on the legislative history of the affidavit requirement in the Tort Reform Act to conclude that citizens and legislators received adequate notice from the caption of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act is misplaced.
Moreover, the 1989 amendment to the 1987 Act, which refers to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 as requiring an affidavit in medical malpractice actions, supports the conclusion that many legislators believed that the Act applied to medical malpractice actions only. The majority opinion states that we have already rejected this argument. This is not so. In Greene, supra, 259 Ga., which involved only a question of statutory construction, we simply found that the medical malpractice caption in the 1989 amendment had to be construed in light of the plain language of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 and in light of prior cases interpreting the Act. We did not consider, as we do now, the probative value of the 1989 amendment on the issue — presented in this case for the first time — whether the short title and caption of the Act gave adequate notice of the scope of § 9-11-9.1.
Similarly, the Majority is off the mark in chastising the dissent for “ignor[ing] the rule of statutory construction that we must construe a statute as valid when possible.” Majority, pp. 822-823. Clearly, however, the dissent properly ignores rules of statutory construction because the issue presented by this case does not involve the construction of § 9-11-9.1 but whether the title of the Act gave adequate notice of the broad scope of that statute.
Furthermore, I would like to point out that the majority opinion *830is internally inconsistent. By concluding that it would be “manifestly unfair” to allow Reid Lutz’s complaint to be dismissed with prejudice because of the unclear state of this law, the majority is implicitly holding that the title of the 1987 Act did not give citizens, not even ones represented by able members of the bar, adequate notice. We reached a similar conclusion in Kneip v. Southern Engineering Co., 260 Ga. 409, 411 (4) (395 SE2d 809) (1990).
Decided March 8, 1993. Brannen, Searcy & Smith, Joseph J. Berrigan, Wayne L. Durden, for appellants. Wiseman, Blackburn & Futrell, James B. Blackburn, Jr., Douglas M. Robinson, Oliver, Maner & Gray, James L. Pannell, for appellee. Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Daniel A. Kent, Parker, Johnson, Cook & Dunlevie, Robert P. Constantine, Jr., Everett W. Gee III, Richard L. Greene, amici curiae.However laudable the purpose of reforming other types of malpractice actions, both good government and our state constitution require that the titles of our laws give citizens and their legislators adequate notice of the actual substance of laws to whose passage they give assent. We so held in the face of other praiseworthy provisions, in Fortson v. Weeks, supra, 232 Ga. 472, and Carsello v. State, 220 Ga. 90 (137 SE2d 305) (1964).
Since the citizens of Georgia and their legislators were not fairly apprised of OCGA § 9-11-9.1’s true breadth, I conclude that the application by our courts of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to other than medical professional malpractice actions, despite being warranted by the plain language of that provision, nevertheless is unconstitutional under the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. III, Sec. V, Par. III. Fortson, supra, 232 Ga. at 473, 474-475.
I, therefore, must respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in this case.
Ga. L. 1987, pp. 887-891.
Georgia was the first state to adopt a constitutional title and single-subject requirement. Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 10 (193 SE 869) (1937). As of 1982, forty-one state constitutions provided that an act shall not embrace more than one subject or object. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 17.01 (Sands 4th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992). Our provision had its genesis in the notorious Yazoo Land Fraud, in which an obscure legislative provision not indicated in the title of its statute authorized the sale of over 35,000,000 acres of land which now comprise the states of Alabama and Mississippi to certain land speculation companies for a mere $500,000 dollars, or less than two cents per acre. By an act of February 13, 1796, the Georgia Legislature tried to declare this egregious fraud null and void. The United States Supreme Court held that an innocent purchaser of the land held good title which could not be abrogated by the 1796 act. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810) (the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down a state law as unconstitutional). See generally Cady v. Jardine, supra.