dissenting.
I concur in Division 1 but not in Division 2 and consequently, I respectfully dissent. Since the conclusion I reach is that a new trial must be given, I do not reach the other enumerations of error.
*864Decided November 12, 1992 — Reconsideration denied December 17, 1992 Jimmy D. Berry, Mitchell D. Durham, for appellant. David McDade, District Attorney, Scott K. Camp, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.Defendant enumerates as error the failure to abide by USCR 31.3. Defendant did object at trial to the admissibility of a number of incidents which were outside the scope of the indictment because he had no notice from the State that they would be introduced as similar occurrences. The indictment expressly encompassed the entire statute of limitation for the three acts charged and of course was limited to acts within one county. The incidents objected to were beyond this scope.
Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 mandates specifically detailed prior notice of the State’s intention to seek the admission of transactions which are not covered in the indictment. The surprise which the rule seeks to avoid was thus thrust upon the defendant. He is entitled to a new trial, Story v. State, 196 Ga. App. 590 (396 SE2d 547) (1990), because the State has not shown that its violation of the rule did not harm defendant. See Baker v. State, 193 Ga. App. 498, 500 (2b, 3) (388 SE2d 402) (1989). Cf. Todd v. State, 189 Ga. App. 538 (1) (376 SE2d 917) (1988).