concurring:
With a degree of apprehension, I concur in the opinion written by my brother, Rose.
A tax exemption is provided to recognized religious societies or corporations by the legislature in deference to the public benefits derived from the encouragement of religion. See, e.g., State ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 115 N.E.2d 65 (Ohio App. 1953); First Unitarian Soc. v. Hartford, 34 A. 89 (Conn. 1895). In the instant case, there is no contention that respondents are not entitled to the exemption provided by the statute. We may therefore properly conclude that respondents are conferring a legitimate benefit on the citizens of Nevada by virtue of the activities and principles peculiar to their organization.
My somewhat less than enthusiastic concurrence with today’s ruling stems from the fact that determinations concerning the extent of land exempt from taxation under NRS 361.125 are now *463left to human judgments and predilections rather than the law. Although those judgments and predilections are subject to court review, they are nevertheless unfettered by clear statutory mandate. I would prefer to have the legislative branch of government, after full debate and consideration of alternatives and consequences, resolve the types of issues presented by this appeal in the form of more comprehensive legislation.
As presently constituted, NRS 361.125(1) provides an exemption from tax for church improvements (primarily buildings) together with their furniture and equipment, and the “lots of ground on which they stand, used therewith and necessary thereto.” (Emphasis supplied). The real problem with the statute, as graphically demonstrated by this appeal, is that a determination of the meaning of the all-important term “necessary” is left to individuals within the Department of Taxation and outside the affected organization.
In the case before us, respondents may well have determined that the acreage used in their worship services is necessary to the full realization of the expectancies of their religious doctrine and principles. The record is bereft of concern regarding the bona fides with which respondents hold and use their land. There isn’t the slightest hint that respondents have acquired and maintained their property for pecuniary advantage or other purpose inconsistent with the statutory intent. Nor is there evidence that the property is used for other than church purposes or to generate rental income. Respondents suffer only from a judgment in conflict with their own, that the amount of land consecrated for their method of worship is unnecessary. We are thus left with Caesar determining both what is due Caesar and that which is due God. I would feel more comfortable with Caesar’s judgment if it could be validated by a clearly expressed statutory mandate from the elected representatives of the people.
I am nevertheless satisfied that under the current wording of the statute, the aforementioned procedure for determining the practical effect and scope of the statutory language must remain with the Department because religious organizations may not extend exemption privileges in the name of religion to unreasonable extremes. To the extent they may do so, their activities or holdings may be deemed to exceed the boundaries of public benefit. Still, I would prefer having those extremes defined by statute rather than individual fiat.
NRS 361.045 provides that all property within the state shall be subject to taxation “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law.” The statute at issue provides an exemption to lots of ground on which improvements owned by authorized religious organizations are situated, when they are used therewith and are necessary *464thereto. Unfortunately, determinations of both use and necessity are determined on an ad hoc basis by human agency rather than statutory specification. Although statutory parameters may be difficult to structure, it seems to me that the subject is of sufficient importance to warrant the attempt. In the meantime, I reluctantly concur in the expressions of my brother Rose because I am unable to conclude that he has assigned and unnatural meaning to the legislative intent as reflected by the present language of the statute.