(concurring and dissenting):
The majority opinion is premised upon the view that FullerAhrens had constructive notice of the Department’s easement to install a 140' (length) by 18" (diameter) reinforced concrete pipe across the property of Fuller-Ahrens. The majority supports this holding by referring to the Department’s right-of-way deed which makes reference to the 1956 condemnation plans.
The law imputes to a purchaser of real estate notice of the recitals contained in any properly recorded writing which forms a link in his chain of title. Carolina Land Co. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98, 107, 217 S.E. (2d) 16, 20 (1975); Moyle v. Campbell, 126 S.C. 180, 193, 119 S.E. 186, 190 (1923); National Bank of Newberry v. Livingston, 155 S.C. 264, 268, 152 S.E. 410, 412 (1930). A person who is ignorant of facts for which the presumption of constructive notice arises does not have constructive notice of such facts. Williams v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 187 S.C. 103, 115, 196 S.E. 519, 524 (1938). To afford notice of a provision in a recorded instrument, the language must be so intelligible and significant that it would naturally raise a well-grounded suspicion in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, or a person of ordinary diligence and understanding, sufficient to suggest an inquiry that would lead to a knowledge of the facts. Floyd County Board of Education v. Johnson, 260 S.W. (2d) 217, 218 (Ky. 1953).
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I do not view the plans as indicating the alleged easement. While the plans have the notation “Place 140' 18" R.C. Pipe,” the arrow from the notation points to broken lines within the right-of-way area, not to an area outside the right-of-way and on *184Fuller-Ahrens’ property. The broken lines within the road right-of-way are approximately 140' to 150' in length. Thus, the notation could just as well refer to the then existing pipe under U.S. Highway 76 plus such additional pipe as to make the total length of the 18" pipe 140 feet.
Moreover, on a motion for summary judgment, the documentary evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Fuller-Ahrens. Baughman v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 306 S.C. 101, 115, 410 S.E. (2d) 537, 545 (1991). Viewed in that light, the recorded documents simply do not provide a reasonably prudent person notice that the Department had acquired a 140' easement across Fuller-Ahrens’ property. At a minimum the plans are ambiguous. I would not hold as a matter of law the plans furnished constructive notice.
As pertains to the trial judge’s holding that FullerAhrens’ action is barred because its predecessor in title had actual notice of the existence of the easement, the record supports this holding. In his affidavit, Gerald Shealy, former Resident Maintenance Engineer for Richland County, states that for more than twenty years water from the frontage road has been collected in a catch basin, conveyed by pipe underneath the frontage road, “and past the frontage road through the property now owned by the FullerAhrens Partnership for a distance of approximately 140' [where] it is discharged onto the property owned by the Fuller-Ahrens Partnership.”
We have reviewed that part of the record of the 1956 condemnation proceeding which is available on appeal. At that proceeding, Eugene R. Patterson, attorney in fact for the son of Andrew Patterson, the owner of the property, discussed at length an “outfall ditch” and the effect the dumping of additional water from the construction would have on his father’s property.
There are also several affidavits to the effect that since Fuller-Ahrens blocked the pipe in question, the surrounding area has encountered serious flooding.
The law imputes knowledge when opportunity and interest, coupled with reasonable care, would necessarily impart it. Nettles v. Childs, 100 F. (2d) 952, 957 (4th Cir. 1939). Where there are circumstances sufficient to put a party upon inquiry, *185he is held to have notice of everything which an inquiry, properly conducted, would disclose. City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Club, 205 S.C. 495, 509, 32 S.E. (2d) 777, 782 (1945). “Actual notice may be inferred from circumstances. That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice.” Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471, 29 S.E. (2d) 419, 424 (Ct. App. 1944); see Orphanoudakis v. Orphanoudakis, 199 Va. 142, 98 S.E. (2d) 676, 681 (1957) (means of knowledge coupled with duty of using means is equivalent to knowledge itself); 58 Am. Jur. (2d) Notice § 14 (1989).
I would hold that the uncontradicted assertion by Gerald Shealy that the pipe has been dumping water onto the subject property for more than 20 years, and the testimony of Patterson that he expected additional water to be dumped on the property as a result of the highway construction, together with evidence of the great amount of water actually discharged onto the property necessarily must have supplied the previous owners adequate notice of the existence of the pipe installed by the Department.
Because Fuller-Ahrens’ predecessors in title had actual notice of the existence of the pipe for more than six years prior to the commencement of this action, I would hold FullerAhrens’ action is barred by the statute of limitations.