I respectfully dissent.
Samuel Brownlee and Richard Jolly (collectively, “Landowners”) brought this action against the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (“OCRM”), after it denied their requests for construction permits to extend two private docks to a nearby river. Upon review, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ordered OCRM to issue the permits. On appeal, the Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel (the “Appellate Panel”) reversed the ALJ and reinstated the denial of the permits. The circuit court affirmed. Landowners appeal. I would affirm.
FACTS
Landowners have residential property on Johns Island that is adjacent to an unnamed tributary of the Bohicket River in Charleston County, South Carolina. Landowners’ ground is separated from the Bohicket River by the tributary and an expanse of marsh. Brownlee has a partially constructed dock that was originally permitted to the tributary, but which has not been completed. Jolly has a complete dock that extends to the tributary. This case arises out of Landowners’ desire to cross the tributary in order to reach the Bohicket River.
Landowners submitted permit applications to OCRM in 2001 requesting permission to extend their existing docks across the adjacent tributary and into the Bohicket River. Landowners’ applications were submitted along with applications filed by two other similarly situated neighbors.
The basis for the permits was Landowners’ belief that the location of a neighbor’s dock, owned by Lawrence Atkinson and constructed in 1991, was situated near the mouth of the tributary in such a way that the creek was no longer safely navigable.8 An upstream neighbor of the Landowners, Ed*130ward Mappus, objected to Landowners’ applications on the ground extension of the docks would create a barrier to his use of the tributary. Mappus stated he navigates in and out of the tributary for recreational purposes about thirty times per year.
OCRM determined authorization to extend the docks over the tributary would be counter to existing regulations and denied the applications. In letters sent in April 2002 informing Landowners of its decision, OCRM explained:
OCRM Regulations specifically state, “docks shall not impede navigation and they can only extend to the first navigable creek as evidenced by a significant change in grade.” OCRM staff performed a boat trip and found that the creek exhibits significant width (50’) and change in grade at your dock that exudes the very nature of a waterbody that is navigable. Furthermore, the creek has an established history of public use as evidenced by the 4 docks that currently access this creek.
OCRM cited several regulations, including former 23A S.C.Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(A)(2)(n) (Supp.2001),9 to support the denial of Landowners’ applications.
*131Landowners sought review of OCRM’s decision by the South Carolina Administrative Law Judge Division (now the South Carolina Administrative Law Court).10 A contested case hearing was held in November 2002. In his order dated March 7, 2003, the ALJ “conclude[d] that in order for a waterway to be legally navigable under Regulation 30-12A(2)(n), the navigation of the waterway must not be so impeded as to create a frequent hazard.” The ALJ determined the tributary is not a navigable waterway under Regulation 30-12(A)(2)(n) “due to a man-made impediment” — i.e., the Atkinson dock. The ALJ noted, however, that “[i]f the Atkinson dock is removed from its location in the mouth of the tributary, the impediment would no longer exist and the tributary would be navigable.” The ALJ reversed the decision of OCRM and remanded the case to OCRM to “either have the Atkinson dock removed from its current location and constructed as it was originally permitted or approve [Landowners’] permits to the Bohicket River.”
The ALJ subsequently amended his order on April 23, 2003, after OCRM filed a motion to alter or amend, clarifying that, “[t]hough the waters of the tributary in front of the [Landowners’] property are navigable, the waterway itself is not navigable because the mouth of the tributary cannot safely be entered at the ordinary stages of the tide.” The judge directed OCRM to grant Landowners’ application for permits to extend their docks to the Bohicket River.
OCRM appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the Appellate Panel, which reversed the ALJ, finding the judge erred in his conclusions of law. Specifically, the Appellate Panel found the ALJ “erred in his interpretation of 23A S.C.Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(A)(2)(n)” in determining what constituted a navigable waterway.
Landowners thereafter appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the Appellate Panel. The circuit court concluded the Appellate Panel was “within the scope of [its] authority [in] setting forth [its] own interpretation of the regulations” and *132noted it “agree[s] with [the Appellate Panel’s] interpretation that Reg. 30-12 prohibits the crossing of navigable waterways unless there is an obstruction, which prohibits navigation at most stages of the tide cycle.” This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case has had a contested case hearing as well as several levels of appellate review. Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),11 the ALJ presided as the fact finder. See S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-600(B) (Supp.2005); Brown v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 520, 560 S.E.2d 410, 417 (2002). The proceeding before the ALJ was in the nature of a de novo hearing, including the presentation of evidence and testimony, rather than an appellate proceeding. See Brown, 348 S.C. at 512, 560 S.E.2d at 413.
The Appellate Panel reviewed the decision of the ALJ in an appellate capacity pursuant to section l-23-610(D) of the South Carolina Code. S.C.Code Ann. § l-23-610(D) (2005).12 The Appellate Panel’s review was confined to the record before it. Id.
The circuit court’s review is the same as this Court’s under section l-23-380(A)(6) of the South Carolina Code. See S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (2005)13; Brown, 348 S.C. at 512, 560 S.E.2d at 413. This Court may reverse a decision of an administrative agency if the agency’s findings or conclusions are “(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected by other error of law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (f) arbitrary *133or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (2005); see also Weaver v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 368, 374, 423 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1992).
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Independent Fact Finding
Landowners contend the circuit court erred by failing to reverse the Appellate Panel for improperly engaging in independent fact finding and for characterizing the alleged fact finding as the correction of “legal error.”
In reviewing the final decision of the ALJ pursuant to section l-23-610(D), the Appellate Panel sits as a quasi-judicial tribunal and is not entitled to make findings of fact. See Brown, 348 S.C. at 520, 560 S.E.2d at 417. Under this standard, “[t]he [Appellate] Panel can validly reverse the ALJ based on an error of law ... or if his findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Dorman v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 350 S.C. 159, 165, 565 S.E.2d 119, 122 (Ct.App.2002).
The evidence presented at the contested case hearing before the ALJ indicates navigation between the tributary and the Bohicket River was possible, but made more difficult by the Atkinson dock and other dangerous conditions. Based on this evidence, the ALJ initially found the tributary was not navigable, although the tributary would be navigable if the Atkinson dock were removed. In his final order upon OCRM’s motion to alter or amend, the ALJ found: “Though the waters of the tributary in front of the [Landowners’] property are navigable, the waterway itself is not navigable because the mouth of the tributary cannot safely be entered at the ordinary stages of the tide.” The ALJ ordered OCRM to issue the permits.
The Appellate Panel found the ALJ misinterpreted what constitutes a navigable waterway under Regulation 30-12(A)(2)(n) and reversed the ALJ’s ruling. Specifically, the Appellate Panel determined the ALJ erred in concluding “in order for a waterway to be legally navigable under Regulation 30-12(A)(2)(n), the navigation of the waterway must not be so impeded as to create a frequent hazard” and in concluding the *134tributary “currently is not a navigable waterway1” based on the fact “that the mouth of the tributary cannot be consistently navigated safely at the ordinary stages of the tides because of the Atkinson dock.”
I agree with the Appellate Panel’s determination that the ALJ erred in his interpretation of what constitutes a navigable waterway under the aforementioned regulation. The mere fact that an artificial structure, such as Atkinson’s dock, impedes navigation does not make the waterway nonnavigable. I find no compelling reason to reverse the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in upholding the Appellate Panel’s decision. See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 363 S.C. 67, 75, 610 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2005) (“Courts defer to the relevant administrative agency’s decisions with respect to its own regulations unless there is a compelling reason to differ.”); Dorman, 350 S.C. at 163-65, 565 S.E.2d at 121-22 (holding the portion of the Appellate Panel’s order “on OCRM policy underlying navigation and construing its regulation was proper”; the Appellate Panel had found the ALJ misinterpreted “navigation” in the agency regulations to include disputes between neighbors or conflict with nearby docks, whereas OCRM had interpreted its own regulations and determined that any navigational issues between docks is a private property owner issue); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 8 (2000) (“As a general rule a stream or other body of water is not rendered nonnavigable because of occasional difficulties attending navigation.... So, a stream may be navigable despite the obstruction of falls, rapids, sand bars, carries, or shifting currents. Artificial obstructions which are capable of being abated by the due exercise of public authority do not prevent a stream from being regarded as navigable .... ” (footnotes omitted)).
II. Equal Protection
Landowners additionally assert' the circuit court erred in failing to find OCRM’s failure to grant their application for dock permits denied them equal protection under the law. See U.S. Const. Amend. 14, § 1; S.C. Const. Art. 1, § 3. Landowners maintain other similarly situated persons in the vicinity and elsewhere have been granted the relief they seek.
*135“In reviewing the final decision of an administrative agency, the circuit court sits as an appellate court.” Brown, 348 S.C. at 519, 560 S.E.2d at 417. “Consequently, issues not raised to and ruled on by the agency are not preserved for judicial consideration.” Id. “Likewise, issues not raised to and ruled on by the ALJ are not preserved for appellate consideration.” Id. “While it is true that ALJs cannot rule on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation or statute, ALJs can rule on whether a law as applied violates constitutional rights.” Dorman, 350 S.C. at 171, 565 S.E.2d at 126.
In this case, the ALJ did not make a specific finding in his original order as to whether OCRM’s denial of the dock permits constituted a violation of Landowners’ equal protection lights. Moreover, this issue was neither raised in a post-trial motion nor considered in the ALJ’s post-trial order. In addition, this issue was neither raised to nor ruled upon by the Appellate Panel. In fact, the record indicates that the issue concerning the violation of Landowners’ equal protection rights was expressly raised for the first time to the circuit court. The issue, therefore, of whether Landowners’ equal protection rights were violated is not preserved for appellate review. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) (“It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.”); DuRant v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 361 S.C. 416, 424-25, 604 S.E.2d 704, 709 (Ct.App.2004) (determining an equal protection claim not raised to and ruled upon by the ALJ was not preserved for appellate review); see also State v. Sowell, 370 S.C. 330, 635 S.E.2d 81 (2006) (holding the appellate court erred in deciding an issue not raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge); Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58, 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (stating an issue not expressly ruled upon by the circuit court was not properly before the appellate court).
I would affirm.
. By letter dated September 4, 1991, the South Carolina Coastal Council, the predecessor to OCRM, denied an ''as-built" permit sought by Atkinson. The Coastal Council explained, "[Tjhe location of the dock is *130substantially different from that shown on the original permit” and "this location presents a hazard to navigation both in its proximity to the mouth of the tributary and in its channelward extension.” Atkinson was advised in the letter that an enforcement action would be commenced to bring the dock into compliance. On November 22, 1991, the Coastal Council issued an Administrative Order finding the Atkinson dock was not in compliance with the permit and instructing Atkinson to relocate the dock within thirty days. The record does not reflect that any enforcement action was ever taken and the location of the dock has not changed.
. OCRM cited former Regulation 30-12(A)(2)(n) as follows:
Docks must extend to the first navigable creek with a defined channel as evidenced by a significant change in grade with the surrounding marsh. Such creeks cannot be bridged in order to obtain access to deeper water. However, pierheads must rest over open water and floating docks which rest upon the bottom at normal low tide will not normally be permitted.
The version of the regulation cited by OCRM was in effect at the time the permit applications were considered. The regulation was subsequently amended, however, and is found in its current form at Regulation 30-12(A)(l)(n). See 23A S.C.Code Ann. Regs. 30-12(A)(l)(n) (Supp.2005).
. The name was changed by Act No. 202, effective April 26, 2004. See Civil Action No.: # 2001-CP-32 — 0711 Carolina Water Serv., Inc. v. Lexington County Joint Mun. Water & Sewer Comm’n, 367 S.C. 141, 625 S.E.2d 227 (Ct.App.2006), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. SunCom, 369 S.C. 91, 631 S.E.2d 529 (2006).
. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 1-23-10 to -660 (2005 & Supp.2005).
. This section was amended by 2006 South Carolina Laws Act 387 (H.B.3285); however, the applicable language at all times pertinent to the present appeal is found in section l-23-610(D) (2005).
. This section was also amended by 2006 South Carolina Laws Act 387 (H.B.3285); however, similar to the above, the applicable language at all times pertinent to the present appeal is found in section 1 — 23— 380(A)(6) (2005).