concurring in the judgment only.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we should affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this fraud case because, with his extended employment as Vice President of Customer Service, Cramp cannot make a case that Georgia-Pacific never intended to allow him to work in that position. I cannot fully concur with the opinion, however, because the majority overstates its position. One can sue for the benefits one has earned even when one *42is an at-will employee. Therefore, even an at-will employee should be able to sue for fraud if the fraud occurred before the at-will employee was terminated. See Parker v. Crider Poultry, 275 Ga. 361, 362-363 (2) (565 SE2d 797) (2002).
Decided March 3, 2004. Betts & Katz, David E. Betts, Stephen M. Katz, for appellant. Troutman Sanders, Alston D. Correll III, for appellees.Otherwise, this court would be allowing an employer to induce an individual to give up a substantial benefit or relocate, all the while intending to terminate the employee as soon as the employee agreed to the relocation or waiver of benefits. See E. D. Lacey Mills, Inc. v. Keith, 183 Ga. App. 357, 359-360 (2) (359 SE2d 148) (1987). Deliberate fraud should not be sanctioned by this court, even implicitly.
Accordingly, I must concur in the judgment only.