dissenting in part.
I have reexamined the Preliminary Opinion and Order, my partial dissent from that order, and the court’s present amplification of its preliminary opinion. Nothing presented in the amplification has persuaded me now to take a different path.
First, I think it unclear just what test the court is adopting. The court cites and quotes with approval California cases that have shaped that state’s development of the constitutional distinction between revisions of and amendments to its constitution. California’s analysis does not focus on only one test, but rather on two: does the proposed enactment quantitatively or qualitatively revise the constitution? If a proposed enactment changes the substantial entirety of the constitution because of numerous deletions and alterations, quantitatively it may constitute a revision. On the other hand, if a proposed enactment accomplishes a far reaching change in the nature of government, qualitatively it likewise may constitute a revision even though the enactment is simple. California’s analysis does not entirely preclude some degree of subjectivity in its application, but realistically it could not. The California approach seems well suited to its purpose.
This court states that it “agree[s] with the reasoning of the California Supreme Court.”1 Yet in regard to Legislative Resolve No. 59, it states that “[w]e take a hybrid approach.”2 It concludes that Legislative Resolve No. 59 fails both the quantitative and qualitative tests.3 Applying California’s analysis, the proposal is a revision. While it may be correct to say that Legislative Resolve No. 59 fails both tests, I do not understand why this makes the test “hybrid.”
The court again refers to its “hybrid analysis” in its discussion of Legislative Resolve No. 71.4 It concludes that this proposal “is sufficiently limited in both quantity and effect of change as to be a proper subject for constitutional amendment.”5 This proposal offends neither of California’s tests, and would not be a revision in that state. Again I fail to understand what is hybrid about the analysis applied by this court.
The court uses the term “hybrid” again with respect to Legislative Resolve No. 74.6 It concludes that although reassignment of the power to reapportion the legislature is “significant,” it does not constitute a revision since it does not deprive the executive branch of a “foundational power.” 7 The court reasons: “As the quantitative effect of the proposal is minimal, the qualitative force of this narrow change would have to be greater to satisfy our hybrid test.”8 The court still has not articulated just what its “hybrid test” is, *990although it sounds suspiciously like a sliding comparative scale test of some sort.
The California analysis, with which this court has stated it agrees, does not test by comparing quantitative and qualitative criteria; each stands on its own merits. A proposed enactment could satisfy neither test, either test, or both tests. That does not make the test a “hybrid,” nor does it suggest some sort of sliding comparative scale. This court’s failure to carefully articulate the test it is adopting is unfortunate.
This court’s analysis is not constrained by contrary findings or analysis by the superior court. Although the superior court was asked to adopt California’s Raven v. Deukmejian9 analysis, it declined to do so. It concluded that looking to “the historical context of constitutional amendments in Alaska” was the correct analytical approach. The superior court concluded that “a lot of these amendments add[] to rights rather than detract[ ] from them, ... then on the flip side the same constitutional amendment could detract from [them].” A revision would not be necessary; an amendment would suffice. Thus the record and briefing-are virtually barren of any presentation of the quantitative or qualitative impact of Legislative Resolve No. 74. Nonetheless, this court declares the quantitative effect to be “minimal” and the qualitative effect “narrow.” 10
It is valuable to compare Legislative Resolve No. 74 with Legislative Resolve No. 59 and Legislative Resolve No. 71. Legislative Resolve No. 59 amends article I of the Alaska Constitution by adding section 25, which, in sixty-five words or less, limits the rights of prisoners. This court has identified eleven constitutional provisions that will be actually or potentially affected by Legislative Resolve No. 59.11 It concludes that this proposed enactment is not a permissible constitutional amendment, foundering on both quantitative and qualitative grounds.12 Since I agree that the proposal founders on quantitative grounds, I need not address the remainder of the conclusion. Suffice it to say, however, that its application appears relatively simple.
Legislative Resolve No. 71 amends article I of the Alaska Constitution by adding section 26, which, in forty-five words or less, defines marriage. This court concludes that this proposed enactment is a permissible constitutional amendment, not a revision, since it is limited “in both quantity and effect of change.”13 Again, I agree.
Legislative Resolve No. 74 is altogether another matter. It explicitly amends article VI of the Alaska Constitution by revising sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11, and by repealing sections 5 and 7; article XI by revising section 3; article XIV by repealing it; and article XV by adding section 29. It implicitly amends article VI of the Alaska Constitution by adding to the powers of the Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court. As noted, this is brushed aside by the court as quantitatively “minimal.”14 While some of the amendments are procedural in nature, others alter the core of the reapportionment/redistricting process as it has been known in Alaska since statehood.
This court cites carefully selected language from Legislature of the State of California v. Eu,15 to support its assertion that the executive branch must be deprived of a “foundational power” before a proposed enactment constitutes a revision rather than an amendment.16 That is not what Eu says:
By contrast, Proposition 140 on its face does not affect either the structure or the foundational powers of the Legislature, which remains free to enact whatever laws it deems appropriate. The challenged measure alters neither the content of those laws nor the process by which they are *991adopted. No legislative power is diminished or delegated to other persons or agencies. The relationships between the three governmental branches, and their respective powers, remain untouched.[17]
Citing Raven, Eu observes that “a qualitative revision includes one that involves a change in the basic plan of California government, i.e., a change in its fundamental structure or the foundational powers of its branches.” 18 Later, Eu again observes that “[o]ur prior decisions have .made it clear that to find such a revision, it must necessarily or inevitably appear from, the face of the challenged provision that the measure will substantially alter the basic governmental, framework set forth in our Constitution.”19
Neither Eu nor any other California case requires that the branch of government to be affected by a proposed enactment be deprived of a foundational power before the proposal constitutes a revision rather than an amendment. Rather, Eu ⅛ language is much less demanding. Its qualifiers are “affect,” “alter,” “change,” “diminishf],” and “delegate[].”20 In Eu, the California Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he relationships between the three governmental branches, and their respective powers, remain untouched.” 21
This court acknowledges that “[t]he Framers of the Alaska Constitution gave the power to reapportion the legislative districts to the executive branch, to be used as a check against legislative power,” citing a statement in the Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention that “[S]tudents and writers seem generally in accord that reapportionment ... has been neglected where it has been left to legislators.”22 The court advances no reason why the executive branch should now be deprived of this check on legislative power, so debated in the Constitutional Convention, and so unique in American government. Nor does the court take issue with the statement I made in my dissent to the Preliminary Opinion and Order that
[t]he chief executive’s constitutional powers, including the power over reapportionment, were among the most debated, if not the most debated, issues at Alaska’s Constitutional Convention.... [N]ot only will the “amendment” divest the chief executive of much of the constitutional power that office has held since statehood, and invest the legislature with a constitutional power heretofore unknown to it, but also it will bring the judiciary into the reapportionment process in a manner which is potentially highly political.[23]
This court recognized the uniqueness of Alaska’s constitutional reapportionment scheme over thirty years ago in Wade v. Nolan:24
Before attempting to discuss [whether the acts of the Governor and his advisory Reapportionment Board in reapportioning the Senate were authorized by the Alaska Constitution] it is well to explain the origin of a unique feature of the reapportionment provisions of the Alaska Constitution. Whereas, traditionally, reapportionment had been made the responsibility of state legislatures, the Alaska Constitutional Convention purposely avoided placing any authority or responsibility for reapportionment in the legislature. The Convention was aware of the notorious and frequent failure or downright refusal of state legislatures to comply with their constitutional or statutory duty to reapportion. The Alaska Convention’s reason for placing reapportionment responsibility in the Governor was well stated by its Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage, Elections and Apportionment, John S. Hellenthal....
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*992A reading of the Convention minutes in relation to the reapportionment provisions makes it abundantly clear that it was the specific intent of the Convention to grant no authority to and to place no responsibility in the legislature with respect to reapportionment. In a clear and clean-cut departure from tradition, all of the authority and responsibility for reapportionment granted or assigned was placed in the Governor, assisted by a Reapportionment Board, including the authority to make minor changes in Senate Districts.[25]
The court quotes Hellenthal at length, including his reference to other variations of a plan.26 Hellenthal concludes with the statement that “the best thought seemed to indicate that the people would be best helped if [reapportionment] were an executive function .... But it is the inaction of the legislature, as testified to by the universal history of the 48 states, that we’re trying to overcome.”27 There is virtually no textual support for this court’s assertion that some Framers believed “assigning the power to an independent board would be a rational, relatively uncontroversial alternative.”28
In my dissent from the court’s Preliminary Opinion and Order, I remarked that
[t]he proposed constitutional “revision” regarding prisoners affects a narrow class of persons comparatively few in number. Yet because it implicates numerous state constitutional provisions, and divests prisoners of state constitutional protections, we conclude that it is a constitutional “revision” that cannot be brought before the voters as a constitutional “amendment” initiated by legislative action.1 On the other hand, we conclude that the proposed change regarding reapportionment, which fundamentally redistributes among all three branches of government constitutional power previously held by the chief executive alone, impacts all voters within the state, and restructures the manner by which the voters are grouped together to elect their legislators, is a mere constitutional “amendment” undeserving of the politically impartial deliberation inherent in the constitutional convention process. The irony is remarkable.[29]
Juxtaposing these two proposed enactments today produces no less irony than it did eleven months ago when the Preliminary Opinion and Order were entered. The landscape so carefully crafted by the Alaska Constitutional Convention’s Committee on Suffrage, Elections and Apportionment has been fundamentally and dramatically “affected,” “altered,” and “changed.” The executive branch’s power has been “diminished” by being “delegated” to a board of significantly different composition than that which heretofore was constituted. Legislative Resolve No. 74 does not leave the relationships between the three respective branches of government, and their respective powers, “untouched.” The contrary is plainly evident. Legislative Resolve No. 74 is just as plainly a constitutional revision. The substance of Legislative Resolve No. 74 should have to undergo the deliberative scrutiny to which the issue was subjected in anticipation of statehood. To proclaim that this is a “narrow” enactment, as does this court, is to reduce reapportionment to the trivial. Years of reapportionment litigation, and hundreds of pages of Alaska Supreme Court orders and opinions, demonstrate just how important the-issue is, and how wrong this court is to hold otherwise.
*993APPENDIX
DISCUSSION
1. Challenged in this ease are three ballot propositions to amend the Alaska Constitution which by legislative resolve are to be placed before the voters in the November 1998 general election. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the State defendants and the Legislative Council and entered final judgment on September 8, 1998. Because of the immediate need to decide what the general election ballot shall contain we granted expedited consideration. For the reasons set forth below we conclude that (1) Legislative Resolve No. 59 (relating to prisoners’ rights) may not appeal1 on the ballot, (2) Legislative Resolve No. 71 (limiting marriage) may appear on the ballot, but the second sentence of the proposed amendment should be deleted, and (3) Legislative Resolve No. 74 (relating to reapportionment) may appear on the ballot.
2. The Alaska Constitution recognizes two types of constitutional change. The constitution may be amended or it may be revised.
a. Amendment. There are two methods of amendment. The method relevant here is by legislative proposition which is passed by two-thirds of the members of each legislative house and adopted by a majority of the voters. Alaska Const, art. XIII, § 1. A constitutional convention may also propose amendments. These become effective if they are ratified by the voters. Alaska Const, art. XIII, § 4.
b. Revision. There is one method of revision. The constitution may be revised only by a constitutional convention ratified by the voters. Alaska Const, art. XIII, § 4.
3. All three ballot propositions are challenged on the ground that they are inappropriate as amendments under article XIII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. Appellants argue that the changes the propositions seek to accomplish can only be effected, if at all, by the constitutional process of revision.
4. Case law is evidently unanimous in support of the view that there is a distinction of substance between the concepts of amendment and revision and that some proposed constitutional changes can only be accomplished by revision. McFadden v. Jordan, [32 Cal.2d 330] 196 P.2d 787 (Cal.1948); Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501 (Fla.1958). The proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention indicate that the framers of our constitution were in accord with this view. 2 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 1247, 1251, 1275 (January 5, 1956).
5. The line between changes which are permissible as amendments and those which must necessarily be revisions cannot be drawn with precision. In general, changes which are “few and simple and independent” can be considered amendments, whereas “sweeping change” requires the revision process. See State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864, 879 (Ala.1983) (Torbert, C.J., concurring); Jackman v. Bodine [43 N.J. 453] 205 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J.1964), both quoting sections from Judge John A. Jameson, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions (4th ed. 1887). McFadden is instructive on the distinction between amendment and revision. We quote it at some length because it was decided by a distinguished court only a few years before the Alaska Constitution was written. Quoting from an earlier case, the McFadden court discussed revisions made by a convention in which “the entire sovereignty of the people is represented_” McFadden, 196 P.2d at 789.
The character and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that body is freed from any limitations other than those contained in the constitution of the United States.... The very term [‘^constitution” implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term “amendment” implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.
*994Id. (quoting Livermore v. Waite, [102 Cal. 113] 36 P. 424, 425 (Cal.1894)). The court held that the measure in question was so “far reaching and multifarious” that it was reviso-ry rather than amendatory in nature. Id. at 788. The court listed numerous sections of the constitution which the measure in question would affect. Id. at 794-96. This review demonstrated
the wide and diverse range of subject matters proposed to be voted upon, and the revisional effect which it would necessarily have on our basic plan of government. The proposal is offered as a single amendment but it obviously is multifarious. It does not give the people an opportunity to express approval or disapproval severally as to each major change suggested-
Id. at 796-97. In Adams v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 824 (Fla.1970), the court opined that amendment as distinct from revision authority “includes only the power to amend any section in such a manner that such amendment if approved would be complete within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose.” Id. at 831.
6. The above authorities are quoted merely to suggest factors that should be considered in determining whether a proposed constitutional change is amendatory or revisory. In making such a determination, respect for the legislature and the electoral process requires that courts should decline to order a measure removed from the ballot except in clear cases. See Meiners v. Bering Strait Sch. Dist., 687 P.2d 287, 296 (Alaska 1984).
7.Legislative Resolve No. 59. This measure proposes to amend the Alaska Constitution by adding a new section to article I providing as follows:
Rights of Prisoners. Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, the rights and protections, and the extent of those rights and protections, afforded by this constitution to prisoners convicted of crimes shall be limited to those rights and protections, and the extent of those rights and protections, afforded under the Constitution of the United States to prisoners convicted of crimes.
1998 Legislative Resolve No. 59 (HCS CSSJR 3). All provisions of the Alaska Constitution granting prisoners’ rights not granted under the federal constitution are superseded or amended by this measure. Numerous provisions of the Alaska Constitution are either actually or potentially affected. Changed or potentially changed would be such constitutional guarantees as the right of all persons to equal rights, art. I, § 1; freedom of religion, art. I, § 4; freedom of speech, art. I, § 5; the right to petition government, art. I, § 6; the right to due process of law, art. I, § 7; .protections from double jeopardy and self-incrimination, art. I, § 9; the right to counsel, art. I, § 11; protection from excessive bail, excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment, art. I, § 12; the rights which flow from the principle of reformation, art. I, § 12; the privilege of habeas corpus, art. I, § 13; protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, art. I, § 14; and the right to privacy, art. I, § 22.
8. Legislative Resolve No. 59 is similar in character to the ballot measure involved in Raven v. Deukmejian, [52 Cal.3d 336, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326] 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal.1990). The measure in that case provided in part that the California Constitution “shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States.... ” Id. [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d] at 1086. The California Supreme Court concluded that this measure “would be so far reaching as to amount to a constitutional revision....” Id. We reach the same conclusion in this case. Legislative Resolve No. 59 would eliminate the independent force and effect of so many provisions of the Alaska Constitution with respect to the rights of prisoners that it is beyond the limits of the amendatory process of article XIII, section 1.
9. Legislative Resolve No. 71. This measure would amend article I of the Alaska Constitution by adding a new section to read:
*995Marriage. To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman. No provision of this constitution may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit marriage between individuals of the same sex.
1998 Legislative Resolve No. 71 (HCS CSSJR 42). The appellees contend that the meaning of this measure is that only marriages between one man and one woman may be given official status and recognition. Appellants contend that it has broader implications. They argue that the first sentence necessarily amends the Alaska Constitution in three respects: changing the equal rights clause, ait. I, § 1; the civil rights clause, art. I, § 3; and the privacy section, art. I, § 22. They contend that the second sentence divests the judiciary of the power to interpret the constitution. Further, they argue that the second sentence “permits the criminalization of homosexual relationships ...” and may modify the free exercise of religion clause of article I, section 4 “because some religions ... perform same sex marriages today.”
10. In our view the first sentence of the resolve is not so broad in scope that it is impermissible as an amendment. It potentially affects the meaning of the equal rights clause contained in article I, section 1. Article I, section 3 is not affected, for it does not specify sexual preference as a suspect classification. Further, it is unclear whether the right to privacy is affected, for the first sentence is concerned with recognition of marriage as an official relationship, not with private relationships. Moreover, the content of the sentence is simple to express and understand. It relates to only one subject and does not substantially affect numerous other sections of the constitution.
11. More problematical are two aspects of the second sentence of the measure. The appellants argue that the second sentence may be interpreted to permit the prosecution of individuals because they are involved in marriage-like relationships which are not officially sanctioned, and may tend to inhibit, because of this risk, religiously sanctioned marriage ceremonies. The appellees counter that the second sentence is superfluous. They argue that it is intended to say no more than that other provisions of the Alaska Constitution must be harmonized with the first sentence. Appellees suggest that this court could make it clear that the proposed amendment is not intended to interfere with or criminalize private or religiously recognized same-sex partnerships by issuing an interpretation to that effect in this case. At oral argument the appellees acknowledged that this court has the power to order the deletion of the second sentence, but questioned the need for this action since the sentence is merely surplusage. We believe that there is such a need. We do not believe that language which is surplusage should be part of the constitution. Of special concern is the possibility that the sentence in question might be construed at some future time in an unintended fashion which could seriously interfere with important rights. As decades pass, the legislative history of the resolve may fade from memory. Further, court decisions lack the permanency of constitutional language and may be overruled. The objective of the second sentence — harmonization of other provisions of the constitution with the meaning of the first sentence — will be achieved in any event, for a specific amendment controls other more general provisions with which it might conflict. Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 758 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Alaska 1988); State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Alaska 1983). Impelled by these considerations we believe that deletion of the second sentence is appropriate.
12. Legislative Resolve No. ⅞. This measure would amend article VI of the Alaska Constitution concerning the apportionment of House and Senate districts. Currently reapportionment is a function performed by the Governor. Under the proposed amendment the function would be performed by a board consisting of five members, two appointed by the Governor, one appointed by the presiding officer of the Senate, one by the presiding officer of the House of Representatives, and one by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 1998 Legislative Resolve No. 74 (SCS CSHJR *99644). It is our view that this resolve reflects an appropriate exercise of the amendatory power. While the change is an important one, it is simple to express and understand. It is complete within itself, relates to only one subject, and does not substantially affect numerous other sections of the constitution.
13. The appellants also argue that the three ballot propositions should be considered in the aggregate to be beyond the constitutional amendatory process. We reject this argument, for the measures lack substantial relationship to each other and are proposed for separate and independent approval. Cf. Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501 (Fla.1958) (discussing “daisy chain” argument).
14. In addition to the point that the measures are beyond the amendatory process, the parties raise two other process-related issues which are appropriate for decision pri- or to the election. These are whether the propositions violate a constitutional one-subject requirement and whether the Lieutenant Governor’s summary is fair and impartial. The Legislative Council also objects to the summary as not fair and impartial. We have examined these claims and find them to be without merit. However, the final sentence of the summary regarding marriage must be deleted in conformity with our decision regarding that measure.
15. Appellants’ remaining claims are inappropriate for a pre-election challenge.
ORDER
1. Legislative Resolve No. 59 shall not be placed on the ballot.
2. The second sentence of the amendment proposed by Legislative Resolve No. 71 shall not be placed on the ballot. To conform with this change the last sentence of the Lieutenant Governor’s summary shall be deleted.
3. Legislative Resolve No. 74 shall be placed on the ballot.
4.An opinion will follow.
Entered at the direction of the court.
. Op. at 987.
. Op. at 987.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Op. at 988.
. Id.
. Id.
. 52 Cal.3d 336, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077 (1990).
. Op. at 987.
. Op. Appendix at 995.
. Op. at 987.
. Id.
. Op. at 987.
. 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309 (1991).
. Op. at 987-988.
. Eu, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d at 1318.
. Id. (citing Raven, 52 Cal.3d 336, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077).
. Id. 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d at 1319 (citations omitted).
. Id. 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d at 1318-19 (emphasis added).
. Id. 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d at 1318 (emphasis added).
. Op. at 988 and note 59.
. Op. Appendix at 997.
. 414 P.2d 689 (Alaska 1966).
. Id. at 694-95.
. Id.
. 3 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (PACC) 1859 (January 11, 1956).
In concluding that Legislative Resolve No. 74 is an "amendment” and not a "revision,” the court observes that "[w]hile the change is an important one, it is simple to express and understand. It is complete within itself, relates to only one subject, and does not substantially affect numerous sections of the constitution.” Except for the "does not substantially affect” phrase, which relates to the numerous constitutional provisions that will be affected, what could be more easily expressed and understood than that the rights of prisoners under the Alaska Constitution shall be limited to those afforded by the Constitution of the United States?
. Op. at 988, note 62.
. Op. Appendix at 997.