dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I am not persuaded that it was harmless error to allow the police officer to testify that, because defendant exhibited characteristics consistent with a drug courier profile, it was his expert opinion that defendant was smuggling cocaine. To the contrary, in my view, such testimony affected a substantial right of the defendant and, thus, was prejudicial error.
Here, defendant’s guilt or innocence hinged on whether the admissible evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that the bag he was carrying contained cocaine. In light of defendant’s denial of such knowledge, the officer’s testimony cannot be considered as without significance.
Initially, the majority finds that the police officer’s conclusion that the defendant was carrying drugs was harmless error because there exists “overwhelming” evidence of defendant’s guilt independent of the drug profi-ler’s testimony. However, that incriminating evidence is inextricably interwoven with the drug profiler testimony and is tainted thereby. Harmless, or not, such testimony cannot be used to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, this same testimony is characterized by the majority as being susceptible to alternative inferences without the need for explanatory expert testimony. That characterization suggests that, at best, the drug profile testimony may be sufficient to meet a preponderance standard of proof, but is certainly not probative beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to a related contention, defendant’s expert was prepared to give a cultural explanation for all the indicators relied upon by the prosecution’s expert in concluding that defendant was a drug courier. In my view, since the damaging expert testimony based upon the drug courier profile had been presented, the door had been opened for this opposing expert testimony and fundamental fairness required its admission. See People v. Miller, 890 P.2d 84 (Colo.1995)(The concept of “opening the door” represents an effort by the courts to prevent one party in a criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by a selective presentation of facts, that without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression).
For the type of error that is at issue here, if there is a reasonable probability from review of the entire record that the defendant could have been prejudiced by the error, then it may not be characterized as harmless. Key v. People, 865 P.2d 822 (Colo.1994).
The appropriate inquiry is not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict without the improperly admitted evidence, rather, the proper focus is whether the error substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings. People v. Carlson, 712 P.2d 1018 (Colo.1986). In my view, the testimony and the conclusion of the police officer as an expert based on the drug profiler type evidence clearly and prejudicially implicated substantial rights of the defendant, see CRE 103(a) and Crim. P. 52(a), and the prejudice was aggravated by the denial of the right of defendant to present exculpatory testimony. *15Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.