dissenting.
I believe the trial court erred in granting Xerox’s motion for partial summary judgment as to punitive damages and respectfully dissent.
“Punitive damages may be recovered when it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire *85want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b).” (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 209 Ga. App. 826, 828 (2) (435 SE2d 54) (1993). Viewing the evidence most favorably to Bradford as the non-movant, Elsberry v. Ivey, 209 Ga. App. 620 (1) (434 SE2d 158) (1993), McCormick was traveling between 70 and 80 mph in a 55 mph zone in wet conditions when his van crossed the grass median which divided the highway and struck Bradford’s vehicle. On deposition, McCormick did not deny speeding or crossing the median, although he could not recall exactly what happened just before or after the collision. In Harrison v. S & B Trucking, 179 Ga. App. 291, 292 (1) (346 SE2d 101) (1986), we held a jury was authorized to award punitive damages where the driver exceeded the speed limit and collided with the plaintiff despite an opportunity to avoid the collision. We stated that “[a] jury may find that evidence of illegal and excessive vehicle speeds, in conjunction with the other facts . . . , provides proof of an entire want of care and indifference to consequences authorizing punitive damages.” (Citation omitted.) Id. Similarly, in Day v. Burnett, 199 Ga. App. 494, 496 (2) (405 SE2d 316) (1991), we held punitive damages were authorized where the defendant followed too closely, traveled too fast for conditions and failed to maintain a proper lookout for traffic. See also Rider v. Taylor, 166 Ga. App. 474, 475 (1) (304 SE2d 557) (1983). “The cardinal rule of the summary judgment procedure is that the court can neither resolve facts nor reconcile the issues but only look to ascertain if there is an issue. The party opposing the motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Powell v. Ferreira, 198 Ga. App. 465 (402 SE2d 85) (1991). A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether McCormick’s actions in exceeding the speed limit, driving across the median, and driving on the wrong side of the road showed one or more of the criteria for the award of punitive damages set forth in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). In my opinion, the fact that the standard has changed from a “preponderance of the evidence” to “clear and convincing evidence” does not remove the issue from the province of the jury. Therefore, I believe the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment for Xerox and respectfully dissent.
Decided December 20, 1994 Reconsideration denied January 17, 1995I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope, Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.
*86Funderburk, Day & Lane, J. Phillip Day, for appellant. Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild, William B. Hardegree, for appellee.