delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The People bring this interlocutory appeal from a suppression order entered by the *1060Yuma County District Court.1 The order suppressed the results of a blood alcohol test performed on the defendant, Ranee Randall Reynolds. Because the district court applied the correct legal standard and the record supports its order suppressing the test results, we affirm.
I
On June 12, 1993, at approximately 3:00 a.m., defendant Reynolds was involved in a single vehicle traffic accident in Wray, Yuma County, Colorado. There were no witnesses to the accident. According to Reynolds’ statement given to police after the accident, he was driving his GMC pickup truck when it struck a guardrail and caught fire. Reynolds and his passenger escaped from the vehicle, however, they were both injured and required medical attention for burns and other non-life threatening injuries.
While Reynolds was in the hospital emergency room receiving medical treatment, Officer Williams of the Wray Police Department approached Reynolds and questioned him regarding the accident. Officer Williams asked Reynolds if he had been drinking alcohol. Reynolds replied that he had consumed three beers that night between the hours of 6:30 and 8:30 p.m., more than six hours before the accident. Officer Williams then asked Reynolds to submit to a blood alcohol test. Reynolds declined to be tested, stating that he did not like needles. Officer Williams then ordered a medical staff member to draw Reynolds’ blood, and provided that staff person with a DUI blood testing kit.
Reynolds’ blood was drawn without his consent and tested. The results of the blood tests proved positive as to alcohol. As a consequence, Reynolds was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol,2 driving with excessive alcoholic content,3 vehicular assault,4 and reckless driving.5
Reynolds filed a motion to suppress all statements made by him to law enforcement officers and all physical evidence seized, including the test results. The district court ordered the suppression of Reynolds’ blood tests, finding that Reynolds’ blood had been drawn without probable cause. The court denied suppression of Reynolds’ statements, however, finding them voluntarily and knowingly made. The People filed this interlocutory appeal seeking review of that portion of the court order suppressing the test results taken from the blood withdrawn without Reynolds’ consent.
II
In People v. Sutherland, 683 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Colo.1984), we adopted the four-part test set forth in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and enumerated the criteria that must be established before a blood sample may be obtained involuntarily from a putative defendant:
First, there must be probable cause for the arrest of the defendant on an alcohol-related driving offense. Second, there must be a clear indication that the blood sample will provide evidence of the defendant’s level of intoxication. Third, exigent circumstances must exist which make it impractical to obtain a search warrant. Fourth, the test must be a reasonable one and must be conducted in a reasonable manner.
Sutherland, 683 P.2d at 1194.
In addition to the four requirements set forth in Sutherland, we have held that because of the “special insult to human dignity” involved when police seek evidence in body apertures or bodily fluids, special rules restrict internal searches, i.e., intrusive searches by which police “attempt[ ] to find evidence within the body.” People v. *1061Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 257, 557 P.2d 399, 406 (1976). Those rules require that the officer must have probable cause to believe and there must exist a “clear indication” that relevant evidence will be obtained through such an intrusive search. Hence, we concluded that, while probable cause to suspect guilt of a crime was the proper standard to support an arrest, “an additional standard had to be met to justify extracting [a citizen’s] blood ... for testing.” Id. In typical alcohol or drug cases, the clear indication requirement is easily satisfied by observations of the defendant’s speech, breath, appearance and conduct. Id., 192 Colo, at 259, 557 P.2d at 407 n. 13.
Ill
While we have held that “arrest is not a precondition to obtaining a blood sample from a person suspected of committing an alcohol-related felony offense,” Sutherland, 683 P.2d at 1196, the threshold requirement, that of probable cause, must be met. Id. Thus, as our precedent instructs, we begin our review by first determining whether the probable cause requirement has been met.
A
We have previously found that probable cause exists to obtain blood samples from defendants without a warrant or the defendant’s consent where defendants have been observed to show obvious signs of intoxication and where the defendant’s reckless conduct which has been observed by police officers or other witnesses is reasonably inferred to be alcohol-related. At the same time, however, we have also noted that evidence of drinking on the day of the suspected illegal conduct, alone, will not establish probable cause and “could support no more than a mere suspicion that [the defendant] might have been intoxicated several hours later.” Williams, 192 Colo, at 259, 557 P.2d at 407.
In People v. Milhollin, 751 P.2d 43 (Colo.1988), we determined that probable cause existed to obtain a blood sample from the defendant for the purposes of testing it for alcohol based on statements by witnesses made to the investigating officer. In Milhollin, witnesses testified that they had seen the defendant driving his motorcycle at an excessive speed and in a dangerous manner. Id. at 48. Witnesses observed and related to the investigating officers that the defendant ran a red light and caused an accident which resulted in injury to the defendant and his passenger. Id. The investigating officer interviewed the defendant in the hospital two hours after the accident and noted that defendant “had the odor of an alcoholic beverage” and bloodshot eyes. Id. We found these facts, i.e., the statements of witnesses who observed erratic conduct bolstered by the arresting officer’s own observations of the defendant’s condition, sufficient to establish that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant on an alcohol-related offense. Id. In Milhollin, the physical symptoms of the defendant clearly indicated that a blood sample might provide evidence of his intoxication. Id.
Prior to our holding in Milhollin, in Sutherland, we determined that probable cause existed to obtain a blood sample from a defendant because the evidence then available to the arresting officer suggested the involvement of alcohol in the offense charged to the defendant. The undisputed evidence in Sutherland included: an automobile accident had occurred in which several persons had been killed and others injured; the vehicle carrying the defendant and a passenger was observed on the wrong side of the road at the time of the collision; the defendant stated to the officer responding to the accident that he was “too drunk to drive,” and indicated that his passenger had been the driver; the passenger of the vehicle reported that the defendant had been driving; and the officer noted the presence of alcohol on the breath of both the defendant and the passenger.
In both Milhollin and Sutherland, the defendants displayed physical symptoms or behavior indicative of intoxication. Furthermore, in both cases evidence existed indicating that the defendants had recklessly caused the accidents in which they were involved.
In this case, however, the People do not present witnesses or observations of the investigating officer that, independent of the *1062fact of the accident, provide evidence of the condition of Reynolds at the time of the accident sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the accident was alcohol-related, i.e., a factual basis to warrant a finding of probable cause as existed in Milhollin and Sutherland.
B
The district court found, and the record supports its determination, that the decision to obtain a sample of Reynolds’ blood was based solely on evidence that an accident had occurred in which Reynolds was involved and that Reynolds had admitted to drinking three beers some six to nine hours prior to the accident. Such evidence, while sufficient to create a “mere suspicion,” does not meet the standard of probable cause, i.e., facts available to a reasonably cautious officer to warrant his or her belief that an offense has been or is being committed, People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo.1982).
We are well aware of the possibility that in any given situation a nexus may exist between driving while drinking and automobile accidents. However, the occurrence of an automobile accident involving a person who had three beers more than six hours before the accident, while creating a suspicion that alcohol consumption played a role, does not alone provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable and prudent person to conclude the defendant was driving while intoxicated. Here, because there were no witnesses to the speed and direction of the pickup truck before the accident, there is no factual basis or evidence to conclude that Reynolds’ accident occurred as a result of his misconduct or due to his driving under the influence of alcohol. No evidence was presented to suggest that Reynolds had been driving recklessly or that he had engaged in any misconduct. There was no evidence offered that would rule out mechanical failure. In addition there were no facts to suggest that Reynolds was not forced off the road by circumstances beyond his control. Officer Williams testified that Reynolds had stated to him only that “he did not remember going off the road,” that “he was the driver of the vehicle,” that after hitting the guardrail, “the pickup caught on fire,” and that he and his passenger had a difficult time exiting the vehicle. The facts and circumstances known to Officer Williams do no more than provide a “mere suspicion” that Reynolds was involved in an alcohol-related offense.
Furthermore, although Reynolds admitted to drinking six to nine hours prior to the accident, that as well does not provide a sufficient basis to suspect that Reynolds was intoxicated at the time of the accident. In Williams we found:
[T]he evidence of the defendant’s drinking on the day of the shooting could support no more than a mere suspicion that she might have been intoxicated several hours later when the blood and urine tests were ordered.... The slight liquor smell on her breath may have indicated that alcohol had been consumed, but, by itself, did not clearly indicate intoxication. To justify an internal search without consent or a warrant, there must be a ‘clear indication’ that the defendant was intoxicated. But here there was mere suspicion uncorroborated by any of the familiar signs of intoxication.
Williams, 192 Colo, at 258-59, 557 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added). Hence, an accident involving a person who admits to having imbibed an alcoholic beverage six to nine hours before will not, alone, support a conclusion that probable cause exists.
In this case, any suspicion Officer Williams may have had that Reynolds was intoxicated was not corroborated by observations of a witness or by his own observations of any of the familiar signs of intoxication. Williams testified at the suppression hearing that he did not observe Reynolds to have any odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, or slurred speech. Under these circumstances where no evidence was presented suggesting that Reynolds had driven recklessly and no physical symptoms or indications were observed suggesting that Reynolds was intoxicated, we must agree with the finding of the trial court that Officer Williams did not have probable cause to order a blood test without Reynolds’ consent.
*1063C
The People contend that “all of the facts known” to Officer Williams prior to his requesting that the nurse extract Reynolds’ blood, combined with “his experience and training” establish sufficient probable cause to justify the internal search. We agree that due consideration must be given to a law enforcement officer’s training and experience in determining the significance of an officer’s observations in the context of probable cause. Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 392 (Colo. 1994); People v. McCoy, 870 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Colo.1994); People v. Edwards, 836 P.2d 468, 472 (Colo.1992). Nevertheless, is it not the mere fact of an officer’s experience or training that creates probable cause. It is, instead, the reasonable conclusions resulting from the nexus of such training and the officer’s observations or information provided by others. In this case, we test those conclusions based upon observations of Officer Williams and others of conduct related to the familiar signs of intoxication, none of which existed here. Moreover, without witnesses, events or acts observed by the officer must ultimately meet the necessary standards of probable cause by establishing a factual basis which would warrant a belief that the defendant is intoxicated. Roybal, 655 P.2d at 413; Williams, 192 Colo, at 257, 557 P.2d at 407. No such belief is warranted on this record.
Officer Williams testified that, in his experience,6 drivers “tend to be misleading” about how much they have had to drink. However, Officer Williams had no factual basis upon which to corroborate his assumption as applicable to this defendant at this particular time. He testified that although he usually based his opinion regarding whether a driver had been drinking on “the odor of alcohol” on their breath, he did not detect any odor of alcohol on Reynolds’ breath. In the present case, Officer Williams’ suspicion that Reynolds may have been “misleading” about his alcohol consumption was not supported by more than his experience as to persons other than Reynolds. Moreover, the record does not indicate evidence either from witnesses or based on Reynolds’ conduct which would have provided a clear indication that Reynolds was intoxicated. Reynolds exhibited no objective signs of intoxication that were observed by Officer Williams or any other person, and no evidence was presented suggesting that Reynolds had recklessly caused the accident in which he was involved.
IV
In sum, because the trial court applied the correct legal standard and the record supports its conclusion that the blood samples were taken from the defendant without probable cause, we affirm the district court’s order suppressing the test results.
VOLLACK, J., dissents, and ROVIRA, C.J., joins in the dissent. ERICKSON, J., does not participate..We have jurisdiction over this matter under § 16-12-102(2), 8A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.) and C.A.R. 4.1.(a). That statute and our rules allow the prosecution to obtain a ruling granting a motion made in advance of trial by the defendant to suppress evidence or an extra-judicial confession or admission.
. § 42-4-1202(l)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1993).
. § 42-4-1202(1.5), 17 C.R.S. (1993).
. § 18-3-205(l)(b)(I), 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).
. § 42-4-1203, 17 C.R.S. (1993).
. Officer Williams testified that prior to June, 1993, he had investigated between nine to twelve cases involving alcohol-related traffic offenses.