dissenting in part.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which concludes.that G.S. 113-229(e) authorized the denial of a dredge or fill permit upon a finding that the value and enjoyment of riparian owners’ property will be affected not by the dredging and filling itself but by the nature of the project which the dredging and filling is designed to facilitate.
There is scant mention in the majority opinion of the evidence offered before the Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission) and the real basis for the objection of the appellant Rugumak, Ltd. This evidence is adequately summarized in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The application for the dredge and fill permit was made by the Broad and Gales Creek Community Association for the purpose of constructing a public boat launching ramp. Thirty-four witnesses, living in the area of the ramp, appeared to support the project. Rugumak, Ltd., offered four witnesses, each of whom owned a one-fourth undivided interest in the Rugumak property adjacent to the proposed ramp. One of these expressed concern about people parking on his property and littering in the area. Another stated that she was worried about the litter and feared early morning noise which would preclude her sleeping late. Another witness testified that she was afraid of “some of the characters . . . that would come in and use [a public ramp]” and that the dogs in the neighborhood “would bark like mad” when strangers came in. Another witness expressed concern about losing her privacy. She said the boat ramp “will ruin what used to be private sunbathing and swimming” and that the noise would be detrimental to the enjoyment of her property. There was some concern about drainage and erosion problems on a dirt road leading to the ramp although all conceded that the Association had adequately maintained the road in the past. None of these four witnesses lived full time on the property. They vacationed there periodically.
There was no evidence that the dredging and filling operation itself would have any adverse effect on the enjoyment or value of the riparian owners’ property. While the majority notes that “the application states that the fill from the dredging operation would be placed on the roadbed leading to the site of the boat ramp” and there was some evidence that the roadbed was *285eroding, there is no evidence that placing the fill on the road would exacerbate the erosion. Indeed, the likelihood is that this would tend to combat whatever erosion preexisted this proposed dredging and filling operation.
It is clear that the objections of the riparian owners were not to the dredging and filling operation itself. Their objection was to the installation of a public boat ramp on Broad Creek. It is also clear that the Commission did not direct its attention to the effect of the dredging and filling; it denied the permit because of what it perceived to be the additional congestion, noise, and litter which would be caused in the area by a public boat ramp. In doing this, I believe the Commission exceeded its statutory authority.
G.S. 113-229(e) provides, in pertinent part:
“The Department may deny an application for a dredge or fill permit upon finding: (1) that there will be significant adverse effect of the proposed dredging and filling on the use of the water by the public; or (2) that there will be significant adverse effect on the value and enjoyment of the property of any riparian owners; or (3) that there will be significant adverse effect on public health, safety, and welfare; or (4) that there will be significant adverse effect on the conservation of public and private water supplies; or (5) that there will be significant adverse effect on wildlife or freshwater, estuarine or marine fisheries. In the absence of such findings, a permit shall be granted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I am satisfied that the limiting language —“of the proposed dredging and filling” — was intended by the Legislature to apply not only to finding (1) but also to findings (2), (3), (4), and (5). The inquiry should be addressed to the effect of the proposed dredging and filling itself, not, as here, to the effect of whatever ultimate project the dredging and filling is designed to facilitate. This is so because the Marine Fisheries Commission’s (and now the Coastal Resources Commission’s, see G.S. 113-229(f) (Supp. 1979)) expertise lies in the management of our estuarine resources. The Commission is not, as the majority notes in other portions of its opinion, a super zoning commission with authority to regulate generally the use of land. The majority itself notes, “the statute concerns what landowners may do as far as dredging and filling [in estuarine waters], which belong to the people of this State, *286G.S. 113-131, and not what they may or may not do on their own land.” I thoroughly agree. The difficulty here is, however, that the Commission undertook to determine what the Broad and Gales Creek Community Association could do with its own property.
The gravamen of Rugumak’s objection is that the use contemplated by the Community Association, to-wit, a public boat ramp, would constitute a private nuisance. If this is so, adequate redress lies in the courts. It does not, I submit, lie with the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development.
For this reason, I vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.