specially concurring.
While I concur with the majority that the grant of summary judgment by the trial court was appropriate, I believe that Third & Catalina’s constitutional claims are time-barred. I therefore would not reach their merits. E.g., Patterson v. Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, 177 Ariz. 153, 159, 865 P.2d 814, 820 (App.1993) (court will avoid constitutional questions when other legal principles are controlling).
When the Phoenix City Council enacted the ordinance requiring all commercial highrise buildings to install fire sprinklers, 22 buildings were affected, including the building owned by Third & Catalina Associates. The ordinance provided that the building owners were to submit a plan for compliance and a schedule for completion by February 1, 1988, and that all work on the installation was to be completed by December 31, 1994. Third & Catalina requested and received a 45-day variance to extend the time to submit its plan until March 15, 1988. It then submitted an apparently incomplete plan, which was rejected. It subsequently took no further action to comply or to challenge either the rejection of its plan or the ordinance for two years. Only after a criminal prosecution was initiated against Third & Catalina for its failure to comply did the company initiate an administrative challenge to the application of the ordinance to its building.
In March 1990, Third & Catalina requested a “modification, variance or amendment” of the ordinance from the fire marshal, claiming that installation of a sprinkler system would be cost prohibitive. It stated that, in order to install a system, it would first have to abate the asbestos in the building and that the costs involved would render the building valueless.4 In a statement of “Unnecessary Personal Hardship,” Third & Catalina asked the fire marshal that it be granted relief from the requirements of the ordinance, in other words, a total exemption.
The fire marshal denied the request. Third & Catalina appealed this decision to the fire chief, who upheld the fire marshal, and then to the Fire Safety Advisory Board. The Board allowed Third & Catalina several months to try to work out an acceptable plan with the Fire Department, but when none was forthcoming, it also affirmed the determination of the fire marshal. Third & Catalina then appealed to the Phoenix City Council, which unanimously determined that the evidence supported the prior administrative determinations, and therefore upheld the denial of an exemption for Third & Catalina’s building. Third & Catalina finally filed a complaint in the trial court challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance.
The ordinance was enacted on July 22, 1987; the complaint was filed almost five years later, on July 6, 1992. There exists a four-year statute of limitations, Ariz.Rev. StatAnn. section 12-550; Ranch 57 v. City of Yuma, 152 Ariz. 218, 731 P.2d 113 (App. 1986), and so the issue is whether the running of the statute was tolled while an administrative redress was sought. I think not. The requested variance from the City of Phoenix Fire Prevention Code could not in any sense have been considered “minor,” the only type of variance available, and the constitutional issues never could have been resolved by the city’s administrative bodies but' only by the courts. In neither circumstance could there have been an administrative remedy. Therefore, no administrative remedy *211need have been pursued and its pursuit thus could not have served to toll the running of the statute. In fact, the record gives the impression that delay until the lease expires in 2003 is the strategy.
Pursuant to Article 1, section 1.2(h)(a) of the City of Phoenix Fire Prevention Code (“Fire Code”), the fire marshal only is authorized to grant “a minor variance” to a party demonstrating that a Fire Code provision causes “an unnecessary personal hardship substantially limiting the preservation and enjoyment of property rights.” Such a minor variance may not be granted if it would be materially detrimental to persons working in the vieinity or to public welfare in general, or if the variance is not in harmony with the Fire Code’s purpose of safeguarding life and property from fire. See Fire Code, Art. 1, sec. 1.2(h). The fire marshal’s determination regarding a minor variance may be appealed to the fire chief, the Fire Safety Advisory Board, the city council and finally to the courts. Id.
In interpreting an ordinance or statute, we give words their ordinary or plain meaning, and we should not render words superfluous or insignificant by our interpretation. See, e.g., Arnold v. Arizona Department of Health Services, 160 Ariz. 593, 603, 775 P.2d 521, 531 (1989); Patterson, 177 Ariz. at 156, 865 P.2d at 817. The drafters of the Fire Code specifically included thé word “minor” in describing the type of variance that is subject to administrative review. This word has been defined as indicating a lesser size, extent or importance. See, e.g., Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2d ed., Unabridged (1987); Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 2d ed. (1983). Therefore, a minor variance would be a variance of little importance or extent, essentially one that would not alter or interfere with the ultimate purpose of the Fire Code. For example, a 45-day extension of time to submit an initial plan of compliance, such as the one sought by and granted to Third & Catalina in 1988, would be a minor variance from the Fire Code. However, the relief requested by Third & Catalina in 1990, essentially a total exemption from the city’s sprinkler requirements, can in no way be construed as a minor variance; it is directly contrary to the purpose of the Fire Code. In fact, counsel for Third & Catalina acknowledged at oral argument that the relief requested was indeed “substantial.”
Moreover, it is apparent from the record that Third & Catalina was on notice at the instigation of and throughout the administrative proceedings that it could not be granted relief of the type and extent it sought. At the fire marshal’s hearing on May 4, 1990, Third & Catalina’s counsel was told that the fire marshal only has authority “to provide some minor relief when it comes to code issues. And to state that you want relief from the total requirement of sprinklers in a building, that is not a minor variance from the code____” (Emphasis added.) Thus, because it is not minor, the type of variance requested by Third & Catalina—an exemption from the requirement that it install sprinklers in its building—is not even available under the Fire Code. Granting such relief would not only have been materially detrimental to both the persons working in or near the building and the general public welfare due to the increased risk of injury or death in the event of a fire, but it also would not have been in harmony with the protective purpose of the Fire Code. Nevertheless, Third & Catalina continued to pursue a nonexistent administrative remedy.
There is also an inconsistency in Third & Catalina’s argument regarding exhaustion of its administrative remedies. Generally, a party must exhaust its available administrative remedies in order to permit the appropriate administrative agency to make a factual record and apply its expertise to the particular situation. E.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 817, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972). However, there is a well-settled exception to this requirement; in a situation when the pursuit of an administrative remedy would be useless or futile under the circumstances, a party may bypass the administrative process altogether and bring its grievances directly to the trial court. Minor v. Cochise County, 125 Ariz. 170, 172, 608 P.2d 309, 311 (1980); Estate of Bohn v. Waddell, 174 Ariz. 239, 248, 848 P.2d 324, 333 (App.1992).
*212Third & Catalina claims that it wanted to pursue the administrative remedies available under the Fire Code, and that it was entitled to do so. However, Third & Catalina also claims that the administrative remedy was inadequate because it deprived Third & Catalina of constitutional due process in various ways, including that the hearings were not fair, that the administrative bodies never realistically considered its claims but only reviewed whether the prior bodies had sufficient evidence to support their determinations, that the process did not provide for full cross-examination of witnesses, and that it was not permitted enough time to present its grievances before the bodies. Third & Catalina in fact voiced its frustration with the administrative system during the entire process. These claims all point to the inescapable conclusion that, although going through the administrative process, Third & Catalina knew that it was inadequate to address the company’s concerns. With this cognizance, Third & Catalina should have proceeded to the trial court to contest the application of the ordinance under the exception to the rule of exhaustion. Indeed, it could have approached the court with its constitutional challenge contemporaneously with its insistent pursuit of administrative relief on the basis of hardship if only to present the constitutional issues to the appropriate tribunal for resolution and to avoid the running of the statute of limitation. It did not.
For the foregoing reasons, I do not believe that the statute of limitation was tolled during Third & Catalina’s foray into the administrative process.
APPENDIX A
City of Phoenix, Arizona
FIRE PREVENTION CODE
* SECTION 28.40 FIRE PROTECTION-EXISTING HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS
All commercial buildings having floors used for human occupancy located more than 75 feet above the grade at the lowest level of Fire Department vehicle access shall be protected throughout by an approved automatic sprinkler system installed in accordance with Section 14.4 of this Code.
All work required by this section shall be completed on, or before, December 31, 1994.
On or before February 1, 1988, the commercial building owners and/or representatives shall provide the Division of Fire Prevention with a formulated plan for compliance and a schedule for completion of the work required herein. The completion schedule shall indicate the work to be accomplished in each year and shall include benchmarks for specific work to be completed by December 31, 1990 and December 31, 1992 with work to be complete by December 31, 1994.
The priority within the first phase'shall be to provide automatic sprinkler protection to all hazardous areas of each high-rise commercial building as determined by the Fire Department.
The formulated plan shall be subject to review and approval by the Division of Fire Prevention. Work shall be reviewed for compliance with the approved schedule. After December 31, 1994, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to maintain or permit to be maintained a commercial building for human occupancy in which work is not complete.
* Added July 22, 1987, Ord. # 3037. City of Phoenix, Arizona Fire Prevention Code.
APPENDIX B
City of Phoenix, Arizona
FIRE PREVENTION CODE
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 1.2(h). APPEALS PROCEDURE.
(a) FIRE MARSHAL. The Fire Marshal or his designee may grant a minor variance to this code or ordinance provisions and amendments relating thereto when there exists an unnecessary personal hardship substantially limiting the preservation and enjoyment of property rights and resulting from a liberal interpretation of this Code or ordinance provisions and amendments relating thereto. This minor variance shall not be authorized unless it is found that:
(1) Authorizing of the minor variance is necessary for the preservation and enjoyment of substantial property rights; and
*213(2) Authorizing of the minor variance will not be materially detrimental or hazardous to the persons residing or working in the vicinity, to adjacent property, to the neighborhood, or the public welfare in general; and
(3) Granting of the minor variance will be in harmony with the purposes sought to be attained by this code or ordinance provisions and amendments relating thereto.
(b) CHIEF OF THE FIRE DEPARTMENT. Any person who claims that he has been aggrieved by the decision of the Fire Marshal may appeal to the Chief of the Fire Department or his designee within five (5) working days following the decision of the Fire Marshal.
(c) FIRE SAFETY ADVISORY BOARD. Any person may appeal from a decision of the Chief of the Fire Department to the Fire Safety Advisory Board when it is claimed that any one or more of the following conditions exists:
(1) The true intent of the Codes or ordinances described in this Code has been incorrectly interpreted; or
(2) The provisions of the Codes or ordinances do not fully apply; or
(3) A decision is unreasonable or arbitrary as it applies to alternates or new materials.
The applicant shall accompany his written appeal to the Fire Safety Advisory Board with a fee of $50, except that if the appeal is made by the owner of and pertains to a single family residence, the fee shall be $25. The Chief of the Fire Department shall deposit said sum in the general fund of the City.
(d) CITY COUNCIL. If the Fire Safety Advisory Board is dissatisfied with the decision of the Chief of the Fire Department after a hearing and recommendation by the Board, the Board may then appeal to the City Council whose decision shall be final.
If any person is dissatisfied with the final decision of the Chief of the Fire Department after hearing and recommendation by the Board, the Board may then appeal the Fire Chiefs decision to the City Council whose decision shall be final.
Following a hearing and recommendation by the Fire Safety Advisory Board, any person dissatisfied with the decision of the Board may then appeal to the City Council. An appeal to the City Council shall be made within ten (10) working days of the Fire Safety Advisory Board hearing. The time-frames stated above may be modified upon the showing of good cause.
(e) COURT REVIEW. Any persons aggrieved by a decision of the City Council, may at any time within 30 days after the filing of the City Council’s decision in the office of the Chief of the Fire Department, file an appeal with the Superior Court of the County by following the various methods of appeal or review procedures in Arizona as set forth by the applicable statutes of the State of Arizona.
. Third & Catalina originally had chosen asbestos-containing Monokote fire retardant rather than the asbestos-free but more expensive alternatives of concrete or gypsum board.