dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that A.R.S. section 13-3102(F) applies to weapons carried in the fanny-packs at issue here. While I concede that the majority’s interpretation likely reflects that intended by the legislature, such an interpretation renders the statute unconstitutionally vague.
*262A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give a person of ordinary intelligence the ability to determine what the statute prohibits. State v. Takacs, 169 Ariz. 392, 394, 819 P.2d 978, 980 (App.1991). Although the majority has made a persuasive argument that the legislature did not intend to exempt weapons carried in these fanny-packs, the plain language of the statute reads otherwise. To interpret the statute contrary to its plain language would deprive these defendants of their right to due process of law.
Due process requires that criminal offenses be defined in terms of sufficient definiteness to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute because a person should not be required, at the risk of his liberty, to speculate as to the meaning of a criminal statute.
State v. Walton, 133 Ariz. 282, 288, 650 P.2d 1264, 1270 (App.1982) (citation omitted).
After establishing a general prohibition of concealed weapons, AR.S. section 13-3102 excludes from that prohibition weapons “carried in a scabbard or case designed for carrying weapons which scabbard or case is wholly or partially visible____” A.R.S. § 13-3102(F). The issue here is whether defendants’ fanny-packs are “case[s] designed for carrying weapons.” The common meaning of “case” is “a box or receptacle for holding something,” or “an outer covering or housing.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 170 (1979). The fanny-packs in this matter clearly fit that definition.
The majority would interpret “a case designed for candying weapons” to mean “a case designed for carrying weapons, which case must be readily identifiable as containing a weapon.” Such interpretation does not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what the statute prohibits.
To avoid confusion, the legislature ought to require that the holster, scabbard, or case be readily identifiable as containing a weapon. As presently written, however, the plain language of the statute includes these fanny-packs within the statutory exception.
I conclude, therefore, that AR.S. section 13-3102(F), as interpreted by the majority, is unconstitutionally vague and deprives defendants of due process of law. Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions.