concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that because Plaintiff failed to timely file an affidavit of indigency, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to proceed informa pauperis on appeal. However, I disagree with the majority’s analysis regarding Plaintiff’s right to proceed in forma pauperis in the proceedings below.
A trial court does not possess unfettered discretion in determining whether a person can sue as an indigent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110, authorizes an individual to sue as an indigent if the “person makes the required affidavit and meets one or more of the following criteria:
(1) Receives food stamps.
(2) Receives Work First Family Assistance.
(3) Receives Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
(4) Is represented by a legal services organization that has as its primary purpose the furnishing of legal services to indi: gent persons.
(5) Is represented by private counsel working on the behalf of or under the auspices of a legal services organization under subdivision (4) of this section.
*337(6) Is seeking to obtain a domestic violence protective order pursuant to G.S. 50B-2.”
In instances where an individual does not meet one of these criteria, “a.superior or district court judge or clerk of superior court may authorize a person ... to sue as an indigent if the person is unable to advance the required court costs.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110(a). Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110 limits the trial court’s discretionary authority for determining indigency to those instances where an individual fails to meet one of the six criteria.
In this case, Plaintiffs affidavit of indigency indicates her monthly income was $700.00 plus an additional $260.00 from another source of income, possibly welfare, food stamps, S/S, pension, etc. However, the Administrative Office of the Courts form AOC-CR-226 entitled “Affidavit of Indigency” does not allow a party to specify the nature of the other source of income; it simply states “Other Income (Welfare, Food Stamps, S/S, Pensions, etc.). Nonetheless, the trial court was on notice that one of the six criteria of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110 may have been implicated by this case. However, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law failed to address any of these factors.
Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Indigency also indicates her monthly expenses amounted to $716.60 and she owed $4,130.75 in hospital and medical bills unrelated to her claims in this action. Plaintiff also lives in subsidized housing. Accordingly, as Plaintiff appears to be unable to pay the costs of this action, I would remand for a determination of whether Plaintiff met one of the six criteria.
The majority, citing a portion of Perry v. Perry, 230 N.C. 515, 515-16, 53 S.E.2d 457 (1949), states our Supreme Court recognized that a party may not file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis “as a subterfuge to escape payment of costs which otherwise might be taxed against the [party].” In Perry, our Supreme Court opined:
The statutory provision for appeals in forma pauperis is to preserve the right of appeal to those who, by reason of their poverty, are unable to make a reasonable deposit or give security for the payment of costs incurred on appeal to this Court. It is not to be used as a subterfuge to escape payment of costs which otherwise might be taxed against the appellant.
Id. Thereafter, our Supreme Court considered the party’s monthly earnings in that case and remanded for further consideration by the *338trial court. Thus, the concern is whether a party truly has an inability to pay the costs of the particular action.
My research does not reveal a case in which the determination of whether a party may proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110 is conditioned upon when the party files the motion. Moreover, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110, governing suits by indigents, does not provide a time limitation; whereas, appeals by indigents do impose time limitations. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-228(bl) (requiring a person desiring to appeal a magistrate judgment as an indigent to file the appropriate documents within ten days of entry of the judgment); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-288 (imposing a 30 day time limit). In my opinion, the absence of a time limitation in N.C.G.S. 1-110, which governs moving to sue as an indigent, and the presence of a time limitation in moving to appeal as an indigent, is an indication that our General Assembly did not intend to limit the time period in which a party could move to sue as an indigent. Indeed, N.C. Const. Art. I, § 18 provides “all courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay.” Thus, to limit the filing of a motion to sue as an indigent to a certain time period, could restrict a citizen’s constitutional right of access to our courts.
Finally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110 is silent as to a party’s ultimate liability for costs. However, as early as 1884, in construing a prior law governing suits in forma pauperis, our Supreme Court stated “the change in phraseology, we think, was intended to declare that as he (the pauper plaintiff) paid none of the defendant’s costs if he failed, so if successful in his action, the defendant should be taxed with none of his costs.” Draper v. J.A. Buxton & Co., 90 N.C. 182, 185 (1884). As further stated by our Supreme Court, unless he is dispaupered, “a pauper neither recovers nor pays costs, in general.” Clark v. Dupree, 13 N.C. 411, 413 (1830). Thus, our Supreme Court enjoys a long history of ensuring the poor have access to our courts. Likewise, this Court should follow that history in answering the question of whether a party proceeding informa pauperis can be held liable for the costs of the action.
Finally, I agree with the majority opinion that Draper and Dupree addressed a different pauper statute. Nonetheless, the majority implicitly recognizes that the current statute is silent about a party’s ultimate liability for costs. It is well recognized that the legislature, not this Court, should determine the requirements and implications of *339filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. In the absence of a directive by our legislature, it is appropriate for this Court to rely on policy language from earlier cases of our Supreme Court that provide guidance for our decision-making process.
In sum, the trial court does not have unlimited discretion in determining whether a party may proceed informa pauperis. Rather, our General Assembly in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-110 has indicated that if a party meets one of six criteria, the party shall be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. The trial court’s discretion is limited to those instances where one of the six criteria is unmet. Moreover, our General Assembly has not imposed a time limitation upon filing a motion to proceed informa pauperis. Accordingly, I dissent.