dissenting.
Because I believe that Mac International exercised appropriate care and had no actual or constructive knowledge of the claimed defect, Mrs. Hallman failed to exercise ordinary care in traversing a static condition, assumed the risk of climbing the dimly lit stairs where she fell, and had equal knowledge of their condition, I respectfully dissent.
In addition to the facts set out by the majority, I believe the following facts are essential to analysis of this case. The hotel was not constructed by defendant Mac International, the owner of the property in 1998, but by Days Inn Corporation. It was not disputed that, at the time of Mrs. Hallman’s fall, in addition to the daily sweeping and quarterly pressure-washing, Johnson, the general manager of the property, personally walked the property two to three times a week, looking for any problems or defects. Also, Mac International has a technical advisor, an engineer, who visits the property at least twice a year to inspect and make recommendations, and he had done *731so before Mrs. Hallman’s fall. No recommendations regarding improvement of the stairs or exit were made. No prior complaints regarding this exit and steps had been received from any other guests or employees. The only reason a handwritten sign was on the exit door instead of a permanent red “Exit Only” sign was that the permanent one had recently been stolen. The main entrance to the property was a covered walkway around the corner from the exit at issue. Mr. and Mrs. Hallman exited their bus at the main entrance and left from the main entrance when they went to River Walk for dinner and walked past the exit where she later fell.
In order to show defendants were negligent, Hallman was required to present evidence that (1) the Days Inn had actual or constructive knowledge of the irregularities of the steps and entrance, and (2) she was without knowledge of these conditions or was hindered from discovering it by the defendants. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748 (493 SE2d 403) (1997).
In Division 1, the majority concludes, based solely on Flournoy v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 232 Ga. App. 791 (504 SE2d 198) (1998), that, because the steps were swept every day and pressure-washed quarterly, this, coupled with the expert’s testimony that the steps were out of code and a trip hazard, satisfied the first prong of Robinson, Mac International’s actual or constructive knowledge of the defect. In Flournoy, however, the hospital actually built the defective ramp and painted it with nonskid paint, indicating an awareness of the potential hazard. Flournoy, supra at 792.
Here, Mac International did not build the building and had in place a regular inspection procedure. There has, therefore, been no showing of actual knowledge of the defect. Lake v. Atlanta Landmarks, 257 Ga. App. 195, 196 (570 SE2d 638) (2002); Ballew v. Summerfield Hotel Corp., 255 Ga. App. 494, 495-496 (2) (a) (565 SE2d 844) (2002).
“Constructive knowledge can only be inferred with proof that the proprietor or its agent could have easily discovered and corrected the alleged hazard. Rodriquez v. City of Augusta, 222 Ga. App. 383, 384 (1) (474 SE2d 278) (1996).” Lindsey v. Ga. Bldg. Auth., 235 Ga. App. 718, 720 (1) (509 SE2d 749) (1998); Ballew, supra at 496 (2) (b).
The Hallmans do not dispute that Mac International had in place a regular inspection program which had never noted any problems with the exit and steps and that no one had ever complained about this exit and steps. Because Mac International had such an inspection program, which found no defects, no constructive knowledge has been shown by the Hallmans. Ballew, supra at 496 (2) (b).
The only problems mentioned by the Hallmans were a general unevenness of the steps, Mr. Hallman’s concern that the steps needed a center railing, and the dim lighting, which were all obvious to the *732Hallmans, making their knowledge equal to Mac International’s under the second prong, as discussed below, even if the first is satisfied.
Further, regarding what caused her fall, Mrs. Hallman deposed that “I don’t know what happened. I didn’t lose my balance. I had my glasses on.” Asked if she had an opinion as to the cause of her fall, she stated,
[y]es. After looking at the pictures and seeing the amount of shadows and remembering that night that there wasn’t a lot of lighting, my opinion is is [sic] that the fact that it wasn’t lit enough, it wasn’t — I don’t know. How do I want to phrase this? It just wasn’t very well lit. The small lighting [(a light added later)] wasn’t there. I didn’t see the handrails that night. I don’t remember reaching for the handrails that night. I remember the cobblestones down at River Walk were like slippery or damp with the humidity, because it was very humid. I guess all of these things would have contributed to the fall.
Therefore, even if a code violation, which is only negligence per se,1 could be said to have been shown and known to Mac International, there was no indication that the unevenness in the steps or the inadequate handrail height was the cause of Mrs. Hallman’s fall, entitling Mac International to summary judgment. Mitchell v. Austin, 261 Ga. App. 585 (583 SE2d 249) (2003) (failure to show that code violations caused or contributed to fall down steps entitled owner to summary judgment); Lindsey, supra; see Emory Univ. v. Smith, 260 Ga. App. 900, 902 (581 SE2d 405) (2003).
Even if these factors were the cause of Mrs. Hallman’s fall, she had equal knowledge of them.
A static condition is one that does not change and is dangerous only if someone fails to see it and walks into it. Becton v. Tire King of North Columbus, 246 Ga. App. 57, 59 (539 SE2d 551) (2000); Wright v. JDN Structured Finance, 239 Ga. App. 685, 686 (2) (522 SE2d 4) (1999); Poythress v. Savannah Airport Comm., 229 Ga. App. 303, 306 (3) (494 SE2d 76) (1997). “[If] nothing obstructs the invitee’s ability to see the static condition, the proprietor may safely assume that the invitee will see it and will realize any associated risks.” Poythress, supra. See also Ballew, supra at 497 (4); Hannah v. Hampton Auto Parts, 234 Ga. App. 392, 395 (506 SE2d 910) (1998).
Although acknowledging that this case involves a static condi*733tion, the majority merely finds that the conditions under which Mrs. Hallman fell are dissimilar from those in Tanner v. Larango, 232 Ga. App. 599 (502 SE2d 516) (1998), relied upon by Mac International regarding equal knowledge. It is unclear why this dissimilarity is dis-positive, because the unevenness, poor lighting, and shadows were as obvious to the Hallmans as the moss-filled gap between a sidewalk and parking lot was to Larango. Mrs. Hallman saw the unevenness of the steps, knew that the lighting was “dark and shadowy,” but nonetheless chose that doorway to enter, rather than returning to the main entrance from which they exited.
Decided February 20, 2004 Forbes & Bowman, Morton G. Forbes, Scot V. Pool, for appellants. Barnard M. Portman, for appellees.Here, Mrs. Hallman had just walked up the stairs without incident. As acknowledged by the majority, going up the stairs was, in the opinion of her expert, when one had a tendency to trip due to differences in the risers of the steps. There was no showing that the risk was the same going down the stairs as Mrs. Hallman was when she fell.
Hamilton v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 248 Ga. App. 245 (545 SE2d 375) (2001), and Murray v. West Bldg. Materials, 243 Ga. App. 834 (534 SE2d 204) (2000), are relied upon by the majority for the proposition that one trip over the static condition is not enough from which to presume a plaintiff’s knowledge of the hazard. As noted by the majority, however, Murray is physical precedent only and therefore not binding. Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). In Hamilton, the plaintiff originally traversed the parking lot containing the raised curb over which she tripped in daylight. It was pitch black when she tripped, because the owners of the restaurant had intentionally not yet turned on the parking lot lighting. As well, there was a question of whether traffic going through the drive-through lane distracted plaintiff. None of these factors are involved here.
For these reasons, I believe Mac International was entitled to summary judgment.
“Negligence per se is not liability per se.” Florence v. Knight, 217 Ga. App. 799, 800 (459 SE2d 436) (1995).