concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that, given the circumstances of the present case, the trial court committed plain error by permitting Dr. Rousso to testify that her “diagnosis was [PB] was sexually abused by [the defendant]” and that defendant is, therefore, entitled to a new trial. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of pertinent law concerning pornographic videotapes to the facts of this case. Furthermore, I make no comment on defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on unconsciousness/diminished capacity.
The majority cites State v. Smith, 162 N.C. App. 514, 523, 568 S.E.2d 289, 295, disc. review denied, appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 623, 575 S.E.2d 757 (2002) for the proposition that, because defendant did not provide the pornographic videotapes to PB or use the pornographic videotapes to seduce PB, evidence concerning the pornographic videotapes is inadmissible. However, careful analysis of Smith reveals that it neither establishes such a broad and blunt rule, nor could it have.
*267In Smith, the defendant was convicted of sexual offenses involving his twelve-year-old stepdaughter. At trial, the State introduced evidence tending to show that defendant possessed pornographic magazines and videos at home and at work. This Court held that, because there was no nexus between Smith’s possession of pornography and the offenses for which he was being tried, the trial court erred in admitting such testimony. Smith, 152 N.C. App. at 521-22, 568 S.E.2d at 294. This result is entirely logical, as the facts set forth in that case indicate that the materials Smith possessed were general in nature and were not involved in the commission of the offenses with which he was charged.
In reaching this conclusion, this Court provided an analysis which included a discussion of two previous decisions in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that evidence of a criminal defendant’s possession of pornography was admissible. In one of those cases, State v. Rael, 321 N.C. 528, 533-34, 364 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1988), the Court ruled that evidence of pornographic pictures and movies was admissible to corroborate the four-year-old victim’s testimony that the defendant showed him these items during the commission of the alleged sexual offenses. In the other case, State v. Williams, 318 N.C. 624, 632, 350 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1986), the Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant’s insistence that his daughter attend and watch an x-rated film with him was admissible in the defendant’s trial for raping his daughter; the Court found that this evidence was relevant to show the defendant’s “preparation and plan to engage in sexual intercourse with her and assist in that preparation and plan by making her aware of such sexual conduct and arousing her.”
The analysis in Smith also discusses several cases from this Court holding that evidence of deviant behavior, which is unrelated to the commission of a sex offense, is not admissible. See State v. Doisey, 138 N.C. App. 620, 626, 532 S.E.2d 240, 244-45 (2000) (evidence that the defendant placed a camcorder in a bathroom used by children and others which taped the activities in the bathroom was not properly admitted to show design or scheme to take sexual advantage of children); State v. Hinson, 102 N.C. App. 29, 36, 401 S.E.2d 371, 375 (1991) (evidence that the defendant possessed photographs depicting him in women’s clothing, dildos, lubricants, vibrators and two sexually-oriented books, was not properly admitted to show proof of intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and absence of mistake, in sexual offense case involving seven-year-old victim); State *268v. Maxwell, 96 N.C. App. 19, 24, 384 S.E.2d 553, 556-57 (1989) (evidence that the defendant frequently appeared nude in front of his children and fondled himself in presence of his adopted daughter was not properly admitted to show defendant’s plan or scheme to take advantage of his adopted daughter, where there was evidence that defendant regarded nudity as “normal” and the only testimony involving defendant fondling himself in front of his adopted daughter also revealed that defendant attempted to hide this behavior from her).
Relying on these cases, this Court gleaned the rule that evidence of a defendant’s “mere possession” of pornography is not relevant where, as in the Smith case, the pornography is general in nature, is not in any way related to the offense, and is not used in the commission of the offense: “[EJvidence of defendant’s possession of pornographic materials, without any evidence that defendant had viewed the pornographic materials with the victim, or any evidence that defendant had asked the victim to look at pornographic materials other than the victim’s mere speculation, was not relevant to proving defendant committed the alleged offenses in the instant case and should not have been admitted by the trial court.” Smith, 152 N.C. App. at 522-23, 568 S.E.2d at 294-95. Stated differently, the evidence of pornography in Smith was not relevant under the Rules of Evidence, directly or as interpreted in Rael and Williams.
However, I do not agree with the majority that Smith establishes a far broader rule which proscribes admission of the evidence at issue in the case sub judice. Rather, in my view, Smith and the cases it cites require the courts to review each piece of evidence in the context of the case in which it is presented. In the instant case, I conclude that the evidence of defendant’s possession of pornography is probative of a matter at issue in defendant’s trial.
“As a general rule, evidence of a defendant’s prior conduct, such as the possession of pornographic videos and magazines, is not admissible to prove the character of the defendant in order to show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Smith, 152 N.C. App. at 521, 568 S.E.2d at 294 (citing N.C. R. Evid. 404(b)). “However, such evidence of prior conduct is admissible so long as it is relevant to some purpose other than to show the character of the defendant and the defendant’s propensity for the type of conduct for which he is being tried.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Rael and Doisey). “Examples of such proper purposes include ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment, or accident.’ ” Id. (quoting N.C. R. *269Evid. 404(b)). Thus, as the majority properly notes, “[o]nly those acts which follow the rationale of [Rule 404(b)], with a relevant purpose other than to show that defendant had the disposition to commit the alleged crime, are admissible under the rule.”
In the instant case, the evidence with respect to pornographic videotapes falls into two categories: (1) the photographic depictions on the sleeve of a pornographic videotape possessed by defendant entitled “Little Pussy”2 and (2) testimony by PB’s mother that defendant possessed three or four pornographic videos, including the one at issue. In my view, neither is made inadmissible by operation of Rule 404(b).
Photographic Depictions on Sleeve of the Pornographic Videotape
The evidence in question with respect to the videotape involves a cardboard sleeve containing nude images of females who appear to be in their early teens; at least one female is partially clothed in a plaid skirt and small tank-top; some of the females are engaged in sexual acts with adult men. The sleeve also contains writing which characterizes the females’ bodies as “tight” and their genitalia as “bare”. Although the jury did not watch the videotape, it did view this cardboard sleeve.
The trial court, after considering the arguments of counsel, made a finding that the photographic depictions on the videotape sleeve had legal relevance and admitted the sleeve. Cursory examination of the exhibit reveals that a reasonable jury could properly infer that the photos on the sleeve depict young preteen girls. Defendant stood accused of sexually assaulting a young preteen girl. PB testified that defendant denied the inappropriate touching but told her that, if he had done it in his sleep, he was sorry. PB’s mother testified that defendant said something similar to her. Thus, there was some evidence of mistake, accident, or absence of intent. Defendant’s possession of the videotape, which was encased in a sleeve depicting photographic images involving “young girls” constitutes an “act” that can be probative of defendant’s sexual interest in young girls, which tends to prove intent, and/or absence of mistake or accident under Rule 404(b).3 Given the obvious connection between the photographic *270images and the issues presented to the jury, together with the allowances of Rule 404(b) and our responsibility to give deferential appellate review to evidentiary rulings, I cannot agree the court erred in admitting the photographic images on the sleeve of the videotape.4 See State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991) (“[E]ven though a trial court’s rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, such rulings are given great deference on appeal.”)
Testimony of PB’s Mother
Additional evidence was provided by PB’s mother, who testified to circumstances that established defendant was the individual who purchased and possessed the videotape at issue. To accomplish this, she necessarily had to explain how the videotape was maintained with several others in the household. In addition, the mother testified as to how she came into possession of the videotape; when she provided it to the District Attorney’s Office; and that the videotape was in fact the same one she had voiced concerns to defendant about in the past. On direct examination PB’s mother testified as follows:
Prosecutor: When he brought [the videotape] in the home, you questioned him about it. What did you say about it? What did you ask him about it?
Witness: I asked him wasn’t it about young girls.
Prosecutor: And what did he say to you?
Witness: Teenagers. He said, well, you have to be 18 to be in these kind of movies, it wasn’t teenagers, it was 18 and above.
She explained that she only provided the one videotape to the prosecutor because it was the only one that depicted such young girls; and that none of her children, including PB, were allowed to watch any of the videotapes and she never observed them doing so. PB’s mother also provided evidence that defendant obtained the videotape after he allegedly assaulted PB.
Thus, the record reveals that the clear import of all the testimony concerning the three or four videotapes was to establish that the *271pornographic videotape with the sleeve depicting young girls was, in fact, one of thé ones purchased and possessed by defendant. The whole point of allowing PB’s mother to testify that defendant possessed three or four pornographic videotapes was to establish the circumstances surrounding the videotape at issue; this does not violate the Rules of Evidence. Indeed, trial courts necessarily have discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, the extent to which jurors can properly be informed about where, how, and under what circumstances the accused possessed such photographic depictions. The trial court was not required, for example, to reduce the depictions to xeroxed images on paper and preclude any further information concerning their origin.
For the sake of clarity, I note that with respect to both the videotape sleeve which was shown to the jury and the testimony of PB’s mother concerning defendant’s possession of pornography, the purpose of admitting this evidence is not, as the majority contends, limited to showing that “defendant has the propensity to commit the offense for which he is charged.” Rather, the videotape with “young girls” on the sleeve, which defendant obtained after his alleged assault on PB, is probative that defendant’s alleged inappropriate touching of PB, a young preteen girl, was not done by accident, by mistake or with a lack of intent. The testimony of PB’s mother is probative of defendant’s ownership of the videotape, although her testimony made brief mention of additional pornography in defendant’s possession. Therefore, Smith, Doisey, and Maxwell, all of which dealt with other acts with no nexus at all to the offense for which those defendants were on trial, are not, as the majority contends, dis-positive here.
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the evidence presented concerning defendant’s possession of pornography is inadmissible.5 While generalized testimony that an accused possessed pornography might be legally unhelpful and violative of Rule 403 without some connection or association with a valid evidentiary issue for the trier of fact, the evidence concerning pornography at issue in the present case does not fall into such a category.
. Hereinafter “the videotape.”
. The majority posits that the jury should likely be instructed on unconsciousness/diminished capacity, but would nonetheless preclude evidence tending to show that the actions of defendant were associated with an exercise of volition.
. I cannot accept that visual depictions of young children possessed by those charged with sexual offenses are, ipso facto, inadmissible in prosecutions simply because they are part and parcel of a videotape. There is no authority to suggest that visual depictions — the gravamen of what the prosecutor sought to admit — cannot be probative in such prosecutions.
. Furthermore, I do not discern the necessity of addressing the issues concerning the mother’s testimony or the photographic depictions on the videotape sleeve, not only because defendant will receive the benefit of a new trial, but because defense counsel thoroughly cross examined PB’s mother concerning everything defendant now complains of on appeal. See State v. Alford, 339 N.C. 562, 570, 453 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1995) (holding that, even though defendant objected to evidence, he “waived his objection by later cross-examining [the witness] about this same evidence”).