dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which overrules Baker v. Nicholson and Burch v. Terrell, and also dissent from the majority’s interpretation of Code Ann. § 74-405 (b).
The majority opinion holds that the trial court need not make a specific finding that a parent responding to a petition for adoption is without justifiable cause in failing to communicate with or support his child for a period of 12 months, reasoning that because the phrase “without justifiable cause” was stricken from the language of the statute (Ga. L. 1979, pp. 1182,1187), there is no longer a requirement that the trial court make a finding in this regard when parental rights are terminated pursuant to an adoption. I do not agree.
Burch held that although the legislature deleted the phrase “without justifiable cause” from Code Ann. § 74-405 (b), where the trial court had made such a finding it is not deprived of its discretion to determine whether the parent’s action was in fact legally justifiable. In Baker, we interpreted this to mean that the trial court must make a finding of fact regarding justifiable cause in order to demonstrate a full exercise of its discretion when such an issue is raised by the natural parent. The majority opinion holds that we should overrule this requirement because it is not articulated in the statute.
In 1979 the legislature amended Code Ann. § 74-405 (b) (Ga. L. 1979,1182,1187) to provide: “Surrender or termination of parental rights . . . shall not be required as a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for adoption ... in the case of a parent who has failed significantly for a period of one year or longer... (1) to communicate, or to make a bona fide attempt to communicate with the child, or (2) to provide for the care and support of the child... and the court is of the opinion that the adoption is for the best interest of the child.”1 (Emphasis supplied.)
*460Pursuant to the language of the statute regarding “the best interest of the child,” the majority opinion has recognized a presumption in favor of the natural parent. According to the majority opinion, a finding by the trial court that the adoption is in the child’s best interest is “tantamount to a finding that the presumption in favor of the continued rights of the natural parent has been rebutted.” Thus, reasons the majority, it is not necessary to make a finding that a failure on the part of the natural parent is “without justifiable cause.” While we agree that a presumption in favor of the natural parent exists, we cannot agree that a finding that the adoption is in the best interest of the child obviates the need for a finding on the issue of a parent’s justifiable cause for failure to communicate with or support his child.
As the majority opinion points out, the law presumes that it is in the best interest of a child to be with his natural parent. This presumption can be rebutted under the provisions of Code Ann. § 74-405 (b) by showing that a parent has failed significantly for 12 months to communicate with or support his child. Once this prima facie showing is made, the majority’s position is that the presumption is rebutted and the adoption should be granted. However, the majority opinion goes on to say that “no trial court should grant and no appellate court should affirm an order of adoption where the uncontroverted evidence demands a finding that the natural parent was entirely blameless in failing to communicate with or to provide support for his child.” Thus, evidence of justifiable cause would be permissible as a defense to the petitioner’s prima facie showing, and in such a case, the presumption in favor of the natural parent would be unrebutted. The burden would then shift to the petitioner to present further evidence that the natural parent’s failure was not justified or at least that it was not credible and that the adoption should be granted. I do not disagree with this procedure.
While the majority opinion recognizes the presumption in favor of the natural parent and includes the defense of justifiable cause as a part of the judgment of the trial court in deciding whether the adoption is in the child’s best interest, the end result of the opinion is to dilute the defense and undercut the presumption. The majority would hold that once the trial court finds that the adoption is in the child’s best interest, it has automatically found that there was no justifiable cause for the parent’s failure to communicate with or *461support the child, and no specific finding need be made. I believe this holding is erroneous for a number of reasons.
First, the “any evidence” rule applies to appellate review of adoptions. Beverly v. Kennedy, 153 Ga. App. 149, 150 (264 SE2d 690) (1980). If there is any evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the adoption is in the child’s best interest, it will be affirmed. The danger in applying this rule without a requirement that a specific finding be made on justifiable cause is that the trial judge would have unrestricted discretion to determine what is in the best interest of the child. It is inconsistent to hold, on the one hand, that appellate review includes consideration of evidence on justifiable cause and the case is reversible if it is not considered, and on the other hand, to hold that the case will be affirmed if there is any evidence to support the judgment. How can an appellate court know whether evidence of justifiable cause has been considered by the trial court without some indication of this in the trial court’s findings of fact? If there is uncontroverted evidence of justifiable cause and there is no finding in this regard, under the majority’s view the appellate court must reverse. However, an appellate court cannot reverse if there is any evidence that the adoption is in the best interest of the child. Such an inconsistency may create confusion in the required standard of review to be followed by appellate courts, as well as confusion in guidelines for the trial courts making decisions in adoption cases.
Second, the majority opinion, while recognizing that a parent’s justifiable cause for failure to communicate with or support his child is a material issue in the granting of an adoption (albeit “subsumed” into the “best interest of the child” language), then holds that there is no need for the trial court’s findings to reflect that it considered this material issue. Again, how can an appellate court know if such evidence was considered and rejected, or considered and found wanting, if there is no finding to this effect? Under the majority’s reasoning, if there is uncontroverted evidence that the natural parent has a justifiable reason for his failure to communicate with or support his child, the appellate court must reverse, unless there is any evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the adoption is in the best interest of the child. Once again, I find confusion and inconsistency in the majority’s requirements. A finding by the trial court regarding justifiable cause would not only clarify the decision of the trial court, but give appellate courts a more precise decision to review.
“Where the trial court fails to make findings, or to find on a material issue, and an appeal is taken, the appellate court will normally vacate the judgment and remand the action for appropriate findings to be made” 5A Moore, Federal Practice Par. 2718,52.06 [2], *462(2d Ed. 1953). [cases cited].’ Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775 (186 SE2d 154).” Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. J. B. Forrest & Sons, 132 Ga. App. 714, 720 (209 SE2d 6) (1974). Since the gravamen of appellant’s defense in the instant case is his justifiable cause for failure to communicate with or support his child, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are deficient by failing to resolve a material issue. See White v. Johnson, 151 Ga. App. 345, 349 (259 SE2d 731) (1979). It cannot be doubted seriously that the issue of justifiable cause should be included in the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law where such a defense is raised, and where evidence on this material issue is presented.
Third, the facts in the instant case illustrate the deficiency of a failure to find justifiable cause. According to the majority opinion, the appellant has the benefit of a presumption that it is in his child’s best interest not to terminate appellant’s parental rights and grant the adoption. Appellee presented evidence that appellant had failed to communicate with or support his child in the 12 months preceding the adoption petition. Appellant then presented evidence that he had been told by the child’s mother that she didn’t need support from appellant, that she did not want appellant around in any way, and that she had denied appellant his visitation rights. Such evidence has been held to be justifiable cause for failure to communicate with and support a child. See Crumb v. Gordon, 157 Ga. App. 839 (278 SE2d 725) (1981); Richey v. Cothran, 140 Ga. App. 580 (231 SE2d 572) (1976). These allegations were not denied by appellee; i.e., they remain uncontroverted. No findings of fact were made regarding this evidence. Rather, the trial court simply found that appellant had “failed significantly” for a period of 12 months to communicate with or support his child and that the adoption was in the best interest of the child.
If we apply the majority’s reasoning, we must reverse because there is uncontroverted evidence that appellant was justified in failing to communicate with or support his child. I believe the case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court, not only because the evidence fails to support the judgment, but also because there was no finding with regard to a material issue in the case.
While the majority has implicitly restored the “without justifiable cause” standard via the “best interest of the child” language of the statute, it has at the same time sufficiently undercut the requirement so as to make it meaningless. Therefore, I would restore the standard explicitly and give our trial courts clear and consistent guidelines to follow in making decisions regarding adoptions where parental rights are terminated.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge *463Banke join in this dissent.
I note that under our Juvenile Court Code which provides for termination of parental rights (Code Ann. Ch. 24A-32), a wanton or wilful failure to support is *460required. In Chancey v. DHR, 156 Ga. App. 338, 340 (274 SE2d 728) (1980), we specifically overruled cases where parental rights were terminated solely upon a determination that such action was in the best interest of the child, without any evidence of parental fault or incapacity.