The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that all guidelines are advisory and that courts may issue below-guideline sentences based on policy disagreements with the crack/powder disparity. Nonetheless, the panel believes there are some exceptions to these rules. Because the panel opinion imposes impermissible limits on a judge’s discretion in applying the Sentencing Guidelines, I believe it is out of step with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Booker and Kimbrough.
I.
Several years ago, this court adopted the position that a judge could not consider the crack/powder disparity when making sentencing decisions. Our justification at the time was that the 100-to-l ratio appeared in the drug offense guideline by legislative decision, and that the court was not free to disagree with Congressional policy. See United States v. Miller, 450 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir.2006). Kimbrough rejected this line of reasoning and held that a judge could consider the crack/powder disparity to determine whether a sentence was greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 575, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007). But with this opinion, the court has essentially repackaged its arguments in Miller and applied it to the career offender guidelines, maintaining, once again, that a district court cannot take the crack/powder disparity into account.
To reconcile this decision with Supreme Court precedent, the panel attempts to distinguish the drug offense guideline, § 2D 1.1, from the career offender guideline, § 4B1.1, and exempt the latter from Kimbrough's broad pronouncement. For one, the panel relies on the fact that the disparity in § 2D1.1 does not result from a Congressional mandate, while the disparity in § 4B1.1 does. But this reads too much into the statute. The Congressional directive in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) directs the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a guideline that specifies sentences for career offenders “at or near the maximum term authorized” in the statute. We explained in Liddell that nothing in § 994(h) tells a court how to sentence a career offender, or requires it to adhere to the crack/powder disparity. As the panel notes, Kimbrough cites § 994(h) as an example of an express directive to the Sentencing Commission, but this does not mean that sentencing courts are similarly bound. 128 S.Ct. at 571 (“[CJongress has specifically required the Sentencing Commission to set Guideline sentences for serious recidivists ‘at or near’ the statutory maximum. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).”). At most, § 994(h) requires that those sentences be the starting point for a district court assessing the appropriate term of imprisonment. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (“[T]he guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”). I do not believe Congress *501limits the courts’ discretion through directives to the Sentencing Commission.
This does not “ignore” the argument that “[§ 994(h) ] ... reflects a Congressional policy” that binds sentencing courts, Op. at 498; it simply disagrees. The panel opinion assures us that § 4B1.1 is no less advisory than other guidelines, Op. at 499-500, but also maintains that a sentencing court cannot deviate from the career offender guideline for policy reasons. Op. at 496. I cannot reconcile these two positions. Section 994(h) is a comprehensive statute. It guides the formation of the guideline sentence and the category of defendants to whom it applies, stating specifically:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and—
(1) has been convicted of a felony that is—
(A) a crime of violence; or
(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46; and
(2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior felonies, each of which is—
(A) a crime of violence; or
(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46.
28 U.S.C. § 994(h). The panel cannot have it both ways. If courts cannot base sentencing decisions on disagreements with the 100-to-l ratio — which is implicit in the maximum terms referenced by § 994(h) — then, following the panel’s logic, disagreements with the severity of the sentences “at or near the maximum term” should also be off limits. So which part of the career offender guideline remains advisory? The panel recognizes that a sentencing judge may still exercise his discretion to issue a below-guideline sentence. Op. at 499-500. But, to me, this simply reinforces that judges may take into account their disagreement with the disproportionate sentences proposed for crack cocaine defendants. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the requirement that § 4B1.1 remain completely advisory.
If, for instance, a court were to consider a defendant’s history or the nature of his crime (factors permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)) in issuing a below-guideline sentence, would that determination amount to an unauthorized policy disagreement with the directive? Section 994(h) clearly specifies that defendants convicted of certain crimes (who meet other criteria) should be subject to a guideline range at or near the statutory maximum penalty, and a court that deviates from this range is essentially saying that the guideline sentence is too high. But surely the panel would not find this application of § 3553(a) objectionable. Alternatively, if a court wanted to rely on § 3553(a)(6) and issue a below-guideline sentence to avoid any “unwarranted sentencing disparities” between individual defendants, is it prohibited from doing so whenever the disparity originates from § 994(h)’s directive?
The problem with the panel’s reasoning is that it can be applied to prohibit any determination, individualized or otherwise, that a career offender’s guideline sentence is excessive — notwithstanding the fact that *502a sentencing court’s discretion to reach this conclusion is the prominent feature of an advisory rather than mandatory guideline. Booker requires that § 4B1.1 be no less advisory than other guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 266-67, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). And the panel’s holding cannot be reconciled with this principle, not when it circumscribes the discretion sentencing courts have normally exercised.
Indeed, I recognize that the impetus behind the panel’s interpretation of § 994(h) is the fear of rejecting Congressional policy, but this court has once again taken this principle too far. When Congress wanted to prescribe the factors courts should consider in making sentencing decisions, it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which states, in part: “[t]he court in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider .... ” (emphasis added). Similarly, when Congress wanted to make certain portions of the Commission’s policy statements binding on courts, it said so explicitly in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (prescribing conditions for modification of an imposed term of imprisonment). That statute states that for eligible defendants, “the court may reduce the term of imprisonment ... if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2003) (“[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection(a)(4) ....”) abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (setting mandatory maximum and minimum sentences for certain offenses). Congress has, and continues, to limit the courts’ sentencing discretion. In these instances, Congress speaks to the court and speaks clearly. It did not do so in § 994(h).
Instead, § 994(h) spoke to the Sentencing Commission, and the Commission adopted the same approach in formulating guideline ranges in drug cases for both regular and career offenders. In fact, the Commission looked to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) when it created the drug offense guideline — the same statute on which the career offender guideline ranges for drug offenders rely. Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 567, 575 (“In formulating Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offenses ... the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take account of ‘empirical data and national experience.’ ”) (citing United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir.2007)); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 10 (2005) (“The Commission has used the sentences provided in, and equivalences derived from, the statute (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)), as the primary basis for the guideline sentences.”). Even so, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge had the discretion to depart from the drug offense guideline based on a policy disagreement with the then-existing 100-to-1 ratio. See Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 575-76. The disparity between the crack and powder cocaine advisory ranges in both §§ 2D1.1 and 4B1.1 originates from the same statute, and I see no functional difference between the two guidelines.
The panel opinion cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the discretion afforded to district courts when making sentencing decisions. On the contrary, it has thrust upon the courts yet another sentencing quagmire: a guideline that is supposed to be, but is not completely, advisory. It did so despite clear pronouncements in Booker and Kimbrough that all guidelines are advisory. For the reasons stated in those cases, I cannot agree with this outcome.
*503II.
It is clear that the issues raised in this case implicate significant questions of law that have divided judges both within our circuit and around the country. Contrary to the panel’s assertion, the only thing a survey of our sister circuits makes clear is that the relationship between § 994(h) and the career offender guideline is unsettled. The Sixth Circuit, for instance, addressed this same issue in United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323 (6th Cir.2009). There, the court held that a sentencing judge can disagree with the crack/powder disparity incorporated in § 4B1.1, just as it may disagree with the disparity in § 2Dl.l(c), and can take this disagreement into account when sentencing career offenders. Id. at 327-28. Its discussion rejected many of the same arguments the panel makes today. Indeed, the First and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Kimbrough provides no relief to defendants sentenced under § 4B1.1, see United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228-29 (11th Cir.2009), but the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have stated that sentencing courts are authorized to consider the crack/powder disparity when sentencing career offenders. Michael, 576 F.3d at 328; United States v. Clay, 524 F.3d 877, 878 (8th Cir.2008); see also United States v. Cole, No. 07-5563, slip op. at 6, 2009 WL 2590908, — Fed.Appx. - (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2009) (disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Harris).
Even among federal prosecutors, the panel’s position finds opposition. Notably, the government’s brief in this case expressly acknowledged that “[district courts are free to consider the crack cocaine versus powder cocaine disparity when sentencing defendants who are career offenders.” Brief of the United States at 14-15, United States v. Welton, No. 08-3799 (7th Cir. May 13, 2009). It simply argued that the district court did not err when it chose not to do so. Similarly, in United States v. Funk, the Department of Justice and the local United States Attorney conceded, in their response to the defendant’s petition for rehearing, that sentencing courts have the discretion to issue a below-guideline sentence based on a policy disagreement with the career offender guideline, despite the directive in § 994(h).2
While the law is in dispute, the effect of the career offender guideline on crack cocaine defendants is clear. And a district court would certainly be justified in finding that the guideline range results in a term of imprisonment that is greater than necessary for § 3553(a)’s purposes. Support for this position is well documented. The Sentencing Commission’s own reports had long questioned the propriety of the 100-to — 1 ratio that is still reflected in the statu*504tory maximum terms, and also in the career offender guideline. See United States Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing 132-34 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/chap4.pdf.
The Commission has acknowledged that when the 100-to-l ratio was implemented, the majority of crack cocaine defendants who received sentences greater than five years were low-level street dealers, and for no other drug are low-level dealers subject to such harsh sentences. Id. It also reports that the recidivism rates for defendants sentenced under the career offender guidelines based on prior drug trafficking convictions are much lower than those of other offenders who receive a criminal history category of VI or offenders with one or more violent offenses. Id. at 134. As a result, the Commission concluded that under the career offender guideline, a defendant’s criminal history category is a “less perfect measure of recidivism risk” when applied to defendants who qualify solely because of prior drug trafficking charges. Id. (emphasis added). These are all factors that may affect a district court’s analysis under § 3553(a), the consideration of which this court has now foreclosed.
The Supreme Court has made clear that sentencing judges retain wide discretion after they satisfy their initial obligation to calculate the advisory guideline range. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596. Kimbrough held that this discretion extended to policy disagreements with the crack/powder disparity, and the Supreme Court soundly reaffirmed this principle in Spears v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 840, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009). To me, the panel’s approach is inconsistent with Booker and Kimbrough. I share Judge Evans’s hope that Congress takes a close look at this issue. In the interim, in light of the lengthy sentences at stake, hopefully the Supreme Court will resolve this circuit split.
. The Sixth Circuit had originally held that a district court’s failure to include a defendant’s prior marijuana conviction in determining whether he was a career offender amounted to an unlawful rejection of Congressional policy. See United States v. Funk, 534 F.3d 522 (6th Cir.2008). However, the court later granted rehearing en banc and vacated the opinion following the government's concessions. In particular, the government stated:
Congress’s direction to the Commission in Section 994(h) does not, however, preclude sentencing courts from varying based on policy disagreements with the career offender guideline.... Thus, as with other guidelines, courts may vary from the range recommended by the career offender guideline based on policy considerations, including “disagreements” with the guideline.
Corrected Response of the United States to Defendant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8-9, United States v. Funk, No. 05-3708 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2008); see also Supplemental Brief for the United States at 13, United States v. Funk, No. 05-3708 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009).