concurring.
I concur in the result of the majority’s opinion.
I. Facts
On 15 December 1998, Judge Dickson held a hearing on the petition to adjudicate the children abused and neglected. At the hearing, respondent, represented by Attorney William Brown, called the children to testify. Judge Dickson found that none of the children could testify because of the detrimental effect on the children to face their father. Respondent appealed. Attorney Brown also represented defendant on his first appeal to this Court. On 4 April 2000, this Court held:
Because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in denying respondent father’s request to call the children as witnesses, we must reverse the adjudication order in this case and remand the matter to the District Court for a new hearing at which the competence of the children to testify, should they be called as witnesses, shall be determined in accordance with G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601. In the event the children’s mental condition does not render them incompetent to testify, and they are called as witnesses, the trial court shall take appropriate measures to mitigate, insofar as possible, any harmful effects to them of being required to testify.
In re Faircloth, 137 N.C. App. 311, 318, 527 S.E.2d 679, 684 (2000).
*578More than ninety days after this Court’s mandate issued, DSS petitioned on 3 August 2000 for termination of respondent’s parental rights without calendaring the hearing on remand on the petition to adjudicate the children abused and neglected. On 6 September 2000, respondent requested that William Brown be appointed his counsel for the termination of parental rights cases. This request was granted.
On 19 March 2001, Mr. Brown filed a motion for Judge Dickson to recuse himself claiming that: (1) Judge Dickson was the presiding judge over the abuse and neglect matter; (2) Judge Dickson’s “judgment in [that matter] was overturned by the North Carolina Court of Appeals”; (3) the matter was set for termination of parental rights on 23 March 2001; and (4) Judge “Dickson may have pre-conceived judgment in this matter.” On 7 May 2001, Mr. Brown filed a motion to withdraw as counsel at the request of his client.
Neither of these motions were calendared for prior hearing nor were the children subpoenaed to testify at the termination proceeding. Respondent has been incarcerated since 8 January 1998. He was brought from North Carolina Central Prison for the hearing on termination of his parental rights.
At the hearing, the trial court heard respondent’s pending motions. Judge Dickson stated “Mr.. Brown, you have motions?” Mr. Brown responded:
Your honor, my first motion is for me to withdraw. Within the confines of this courtroom, in front of this judge, Mr. Faircloth has on many occasions expressed his displeasure with my representations, saying there’s a conflict and that inadequate representation. I also received a letter from him on 5/19, and without breaching the lawyer-client privilege, it is simply, among other things, saying that he’s displeased with my representations, that he feels that I am inadequately representing him, your honor.
Mr. Faircloth agreed there was a conflict of interest and stated: “I asked this man to file motions. I asked him to file subpoenas. I asked him to do things that he should have been doing. He ain’t even done — he ain’t even tried to fight the case. Even on appeal, that I was supposed to have went before another — on another, a new trial. I ain’t been to no new trial yet. That been over two, three years. That’s my constitutional right, to have another trial.” Judge Dickson denied Mr. Brown’s motion to withdraw and ruled that the “motion *579to have Mr. Brown removed as counsel orally made by the Respondent Father is denied.” Mr. Faircloth became angry and argumentative by this ruling.
Mr. Brown then presented the motion to recuse based upon respondent’s belief “that [Judge Dickson] may have a preconceived idea as to how to rule on this case.” Mr. Faircloth stated to Judge Dickson “You biased and you’re prejudiced, and you need to get the f — k off my d — n case.” In response, Judge Dickson stated “This Court has no preconceived opinions in this matter. This is a different matter from the matter previously heard by this Court. The motion to recuse is denied.” Respondent became more argumentative and profane and was removed from the proceeding and transported back to prison.
II. Motion to Recuse
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides in pertinent part:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) He has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . .
Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(C) (2002). “The burden is on the party moving for recusal to demonstrate objectively that grounds for disqualification actually exist.” State v. Kennedy, 110 N.C. App. 302, 305, 429 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1993) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The moving party may carry this burden with a showing of substantial evidence that there exists such a personal bias, prejudice or interest on the part of the judge that he would be unable to rule impartially or a showing that the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would question whether the judge could rule impartially.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). “[W]hen the trial judge found sufficient force in the allegations contained in defendant’s motion to proceed to find facts he should have either disqualified himself or referred the matter to another judge.” Bank v. Gillespie, 291 N.C. 303, 311, 230 S.E.2d 375, 380 (1976).
“Bias or prejudice does not refer to any views a judge may entertain toward the subject matter involved in the case.” Kennedy, 110 N.C. App. at 305, 429 S.E.2d at 451. “[T]he fact that a trial judge has repeatedly ruled against a party is not grounds for disqualification of that judge absent substantial evidence to support allegations of inter*580est or prejudice.” Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 506, 239 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1977), cert. denied, 394 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978).
Here, the only allegations in support of respondent’s motion to recuse is that Judge Dickson presided over the prior abuse and neglect proceeding which was overturned on appeal and that “Judge John W. Dickson may have a pre-conceived judgment in this matter.” Previously holding a hearing on abuse and neglect is not grounds for disqualification in the present action. Id. Without further allegations of bias or prejudice, the trial court did not err in denying respondent’s motion to recuse.
HI. Motion to Withdraw
Parents in a termination of parental rights action are guaranteed the right to appointed counsel if they are found indigent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109. “Although the right of an indigent defendant to have competent counsel is unquestionable, cf. State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 371, 230 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1976), an accused does not have the right to have the counsel of his choice appointed for him, nor the right to insist that his attorney be dismissed and new counsel appointed merely because the defendant becomes dissatisfied with the attorney’s services. Id." State v. Tucker, 111 N.C. App. 907, 908, 433 S.E.2d 476, 477, disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 564, 439 S.E.2d 160 (1993). “A trial judge is only constitutionally required to appoint substitute counsel when the initial appointment has not afforded defendant his constitutional right to counsel.” Id.
Here, Mr. Brown moved to withdraw as counsel for respondent based on the request of respondent. The trial court was not required to appoint substitute counsel in place of Mr. Brown. Judge Dickson specifically told respondent “You can either have Mr. Brown or you can proceed without an attorney. That is your choice, Sir. I am not going to appoint another attorney to represent you.” Respondent did not request to proceed pro se; he stated: “I wish to have me another attorney.” The trial court did not err in denying the motion for Mr. Brown to withdraw as counsel for respondent.
IV. Termination Hearing
The trial court found eight separate statutory grounds for termination. Respondent made a blanket assignment of error as to all of the findings and conclusions but failed to argue against four of the statutory grounds in its brief: (1) respondent leaving the children in *581foster care for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the petition for termination being filed without paying a reasonable portion of cost of care although physically and financially able to do so, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3); (2) respondent willfully abandoning the children for at least six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7); (3) respondent being incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the child such that the children are dependent within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) and there is a reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6); and (4) the parental rights of respondent with respect to Amanda had been involuntarily terminated and respondent lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(9).
Only one statutory ground need exist for a trial court to terminate parental rights. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-llll(a). By failing to argue error in the findings or conclusions that these statutory grounds exist, respondent has abandoned these issues on appeal. N.C. R. App. R 10(a), 28(a).