dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion by my brother Whichard. The majority is correct in its holding that Concord’s first valid attempt to annex the subject property was taken on 10 December 1987, however, that does not answer the entire case. Kannapolis has never filed a valid proceeding for the purpose of annexing the property in question. Its resolution of intent on 14 October 1987 was fatally defective. Kannapolis began its procedure pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A-49(j) which requires that the resolution of intent provide that the effective date of the annexation shall be at least one year from the date of passage of the annexation ordinance. Kannapolis concedes that it failed to include this statutory requirement in its resolution. The statutory procedure for involuntary annexation requires a one-year waiting period, and the statute clearly requires that such be stated in the resolution of intent.
Nevertheless, Kannapolis argues that it has substantially complied with the statute and that its error is not fatal. In re Annexation Ordinance, 255 N.C. 633, 122 S.E.2d 690 (1961). Kannapolis *520argues that the mistake is purely procedural because the annexation still does not take effect for one year and because the error did not materially prejudice anyone. I find that there is such prejudice, albeit the absence of prejudice does not in itself fulfill the requirements of substantial compliance. Id. The statute explicitly requires that the resolution of intent state that the annexation will not take effect for one year after the adoption of the ordinance. This is an essential condition of compliance with the statute, and its omission is a fatal error.
The purpose of requiring this information to be included in the resolution of intent is not to set a period of one year aside for the annexing municipality to think great thoughts about whether it should proceed with the annexation. This appears to be the principal argument of the majority. The purpose of requiring this information in the resolution of intent is so that the affected people living in the area to be annexed, and in the other areas of the municipality, may have an opportunity to review and study the issue and to attend any meetings to be held with respect thereto and to organize on their own such groups as they might care to either favoring or disfavoring such annexation. The resolution of intent is not something for the benefit of the governing body of the municipality but is for the purpose of providing information to the affected citizens and to the affected neighboring municipalities as to the impending annexation, thus allowing those affected parties to take such action as they think proper with respect to the proposed annexation. I cannot conceive how this is simply a technical or procedural error. It is the very heart and reason for requiring the passage of the resolution of intent. Plaintiff’s fatally flawed resolution of intent does not support the “prior jurisdiction rule.”
The majority attempts to justify Kannapolis’ proceeding by arguing that the notice in the ordinance is sufficient to substantially comply with the statute. This argument totally misses the mark. Once the ordinance is passed, affected parties have no recourse with the city. I do not know of any incidence in which a municipality has revoked an annexation ordinance.
The citizens affected by the annexation need to know the effective date so that they can take intelligent action to attack or support the passage of the proposed ordinance. They have no “ample time for action” once the ordinance is adopted. There is no need to lock the barn once the horse has departed.
*521Where a municipality embarks upon such a serious governmental function as the annexation of property, it is incumbent upon that municipality to comply strictly with the authorizing statute. This is because the statute sets out the best methods in which the citizens of the municipality may be advised as to the proposed action by the municipality. This is especially important in this case where Kannapolis seeks to annex Lake Concord, a watershed and impoundment facility, belonging to the City of Concord and included by Concord in its future planning as a water source for its citizens. By failing to follow the authorizing statute in this case, the general populace of affected parties has been deprived of information concerning this important and drastic action by their government. Governmental action without providing the citizens with proper information has been condemned in this country since the Revolution of 1776. A democratic government can only be sustained by an informed public. I vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Justice FRYE joins in this dissenting opinion.