with whom Justice RABINOWITZ joins, dissenting.
The majority holds that prior to the sale of the oil and gas leases located within Ka-chemak Bay, the state had the obligation under AS 38.05.305 1 to study and review the proposed leases with the communities of Homer and Seldovia, and also with the Kenai Peninsula Borough. But then the majority goes on to hold that despite this requirement, and the failure of the state to comply with it, the decision that compliance with the statute was essential would have a solely prospective effect so as to apply only to actions arising out of occurrences after the date of this opinion. With this holding only, I dissent. In my opinion, the court’s decision should apply to the plaintiffs in this case, and thereafter prospectively.
The majority’s reason for holding its decision prospective is that once the oil and gas lease sales had been made, the new owners or lessors had a paramount interest in maintaining their rights to the land, and that the court has no desire to upset the settled transactions which were entered into in good faith.
I disagree that the oil company’s interest is paramount to the interest of the communities of Homer and Seldovia in being consulted and heard before the lease sales were made. Those communities, and in particular the fishermen plaintiffs in this case, have a vital interest in the rich fish*38ery resources in Kachemak Bay which may well be adversely affected by the exploration for and extraction of oil and gas from those waters. What the majority is holding, in reality, is that the state in this case may simply ignore the provisions of Sec. 305, which expressly prohibits the sale or lease of land adjacent to organized communities, such as Homer and Seldo-via, until there has been a joint study and review by the state in those communities. Of course, this holding would apply in the future, but the fact that it is applied here is, in my opinion, an unfortunate judicial condonation of arbitrary and capricious administrative action.
One attempted justification for the court’s holding as to prospectivity, is that the application of Sec. 305 represents a question of first impression in an area of statutory law “which admittedly was not as clear as it ought to have been.” In support of this proposition, the majority cites State v. Aleut Corporation, 541 P.2d 730, 740 n. 25, where it was stated:
It is open to the Division of Lands to diminish areas of vagueness and uncertainty inherent in the present wording of AS 38.05.305 through its rule-making power or by seeking amendatory legislation.
There may have been some uncertainty in the application of Sec. 305 in that case, which involved the question of whether certain unincorporated rural villages fell within the classification of an “other organized community”, within the wording of Sec. 305, or were “adjacent” to the lands that were sold. But there is no such uncertainty here. Homer and Seldovia have been incorporated municipalities for many years, and there is no question that Kache-mak Bay is immediately adjacent to those communities. I fail to see how Sec. 305 could be any more explicit and meaningful in its application to Homer and Seldovia than is obvious from its plain language.
The majority opinion, may be referring to another type of uncertainty in regard to Sec. 305, i. e., whether it was applicable to leases of oil and gas lands. The majority states that the defendant oil companies in this case were entitled to rely on the long standing interpretation of Sec. 305 by the Division of Lands, which was that Sec. 305 was not applicable to the sale of oil and gas leases. The court speaks of the state’s “interpretation” of that statute, which implies an uncertainty or ambiguity. But there simply is none and never was. Sec. 305, coupled with the definition of “lands” in AS 38.05.365,2 leaves no room for interpretation.
Those sections read together can have only one meaning — the one the court has stated it to have. This is not only true now, but was true from the time the statutes were enacted. The Division of Lands’ so called “long standing interpretation” was simply wrong from the beginning — a remarkable and unexcusable failure to read and understand plain English. There was no room for “interpretation”, because there was nothing to clarify the meaning of. When the transactions here took place, the oil company defendants had nothing to rely upon except the fact that the state’s failure to consult with the communities of Homer and Seldovia was a fatal flaw which would affect the validity of the sales of the oil and gas leases.
An additional justification for holding the decision to be purely prospective is that title conflicts would be engendered, and insurmountable problems for the state and numerous individuals would be created if every mineral lease or sale executed in the past became vulnerable to attack under the holding that Sec. 305 requires, before public lands can be leased and sold, that adjacent communities be first consulted. Possibly this could be true if the holding of the court were held to be entirely retro*39spective in effect. But this is not what I am urging. As I have stated, my position is that the plaintiffs in this case should receive the benefit of the court’s decision, since they brought the issue to the court’s attention, and thereafter the decision could be held to be prospective in effect.3 If this is done, the fears expressed by the majority as to conflicts and insurmountable problems have no foundation.
In determining whether to apply a decision prospectively, the courts have considered various criteria, as the majority has pointed out in its reliance on our decision in Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974). But I believe the question can best be dealt with and decided by simply considering the elements of hardship and basic fairness or justice.4
I fail to see why the defendants will suffer any serious hardship by applying the court’s decision to the plaintiffs in this case, and thereafter prospectively. Since Sec. 305 was not complied with, the sale of the oil and gas leases was invalid and of “no legal force and effect”.5 By setting aside the sale, and reimbursing the oil company defendants the monies they paid for the leases, the defendants are left in essentially the same position they would have occupied had the sales not taken place. And it is significant to note, as the majority has pointed out on the laches question, that there has been no serious prejudice to the defendants by reason of plaintiffs’ delay in bringing this action. This is by no means a case where application of the majority’s decision to the plaintiffs here would cause “injustice and oppression so great as to be intolerable.”6
On the question of justice, I submit that basic fairness requires the application of the court’s decision to the plaintiffs in this case. Sec. 305 was clearly violated. It is also clear that adherence to the requirements of this statute was essen: tial to cause the lease sales to be effective. The plaintiffs are the ones that have gone to the trouble and expense of bringing this matter to the attention of the judiciary, and of obtaining a decision that justified their action. It is hardly fair in these circumstances to place the plaintiffs in the position of unselfish public-spirited citizens, whose only object was to help enforce the law solely for the utilization of future litigants.7 The majority is in effect advising the plaintiffs that they were correct; that the requirements of Sec. 305 ought to have been followed, but were not; that the communities of Homer and Sel-dovia ought to have been consulted before the lands in Kachemak Bay were leased or sold, but were not — but that despite all of this, the plaintiffs have no recourse at all in having the law complied with for their benefit. In effect, the majority is telling the plaintiffs they have won the battle— but have lost the war.
This decision appears to me to be inconsistent with the majority’s expressed concern, on the laches question, regarding the assurances made by the state, time and time again, which underplayed the importance of the lease sale itself to its citizens of the Homer area, giving them a false sense of security; and the plaintiffs’ fruitless efforts to make their views known to the state. Obviously, if Sec. 305 had been complied with, the plaintiffs would *40have had the opportunity to air their views. It is not too much to require that in a spirit of fair play, the citizens of Homer and Seldovia should be given the opportunity to be heard on the question of whether there should be oil and gas development in the waters of Kachemak Bay prior to the state’s determination of that question. This not only would be in compliance with the law, as declared by the court, but would be in keeping with the philosophy of the Alaska Constitution, where it is provided in art. VIII, sec. 10 that—
No disposals or leases of state lands or interests therein, shall be made without prior public notice and other safeguards of the public interest as may be prescribed by law.
I would reverse and grant the relief sought by the plaintiffs in their complaint, which is to set aside the sales of the oil and gas leases to the oil company defendants.
. AS 38.05.305 provides:
Except for land disposed of under §§ 315-325 of this chapter, no land in or adjacent to an incorporated municipality or other organized community may be sold or leased, or a renewal lease issued, until the proposed use of the land has been studied and reviewed jointly by the director and local authorized planning agencies.
. AS 38.05.365, entitled “Definitions”, provides in pertinent part:
. . . (16) ‘state lands’ or ‘lands’ means all lands, including shore, tide and submerged lands, or resources belonging to or acquired by the state; (emphasis added).
. This is what was done in State v. Aleut Corporation, 541 P.2d 730, 740, n. 25 (Alaska 1975), and in the ease relied upon by the majority to support its holding of sole pro-spectivity — City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 211 (Alaska 1962).
. See Warwick v. State, 548 P.2d 384, 393-94 (Alaska 1976), and at 395-96, the quotation from Justice Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process.
. State v. Aleut Corporation, 541 P.2d 730, 740 (Alaska 1975).
. Warwick v. State, 548 P.2d 384, 395-96 (Alaska 1976) quoting from Justice Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 146-49 (1921).
. See People v. Bitch, 1 Cal.3d 159, 113 Cal.Rptr. 158, 527 P.2d 361, 372 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Justice Mosk). And see also our recent opinion in Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 883 (Alaska 1976).