Tawanna R. Applewhite (Petitioner) was employed by Alliance One International, Inc. f/k/a Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., Inc. (Respondent-Employer) beginning on 22 August 2003. Petitioner last worked for Respondent-Employer as a general laborer on 21 September 2005, when Petitioner was discharged for having three attendance infractions within a twelve-month period.
Petitioner filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Employment Security Commission (the Commission). The adjudicator determined that Petitioner had been discharged for misconduct and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Petitioner appealed, and the appeals referee concluded that Petitioner had been discharged for substantial fault and was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for nine weeks. Petitioner appealed to the Commission, which affirmed.
Petitioner does not challenge the Commission’s findings of fact. Pursuant to the Commission’s findings, Petitioner was notified of Respondent-Employer’s plant rules and regulations, which subjected employees to the following progressive disciplinary action: “First offense — written warning, second offense — written warning, third offense — dismissal. Three infractions in a twelve-month period will result in termination.” Respondent-Employer’s policy specifically provided that employees were subject to discipline for “excessive absenteeism, tardiness or excessive breaks[.]”
Petitioner received her first written warning on 21 February 2005 for taking excessive break time. Petitioner received her second written warning on 5 April 2005 for excessive tardiness. Specifically, Petitioner was tardy by 30 minutes on 18 March 2005; by 2-1/2 hours on 29 March 2005; by 1-1/2 hours on 4 April 2005; and by 1-1/2 hours on 5 April 2005. In finding of fact nine, the Commission found:
[Petitioner’s] final infraction occurred on September 21, 2005. She was issued a third written warning and discharged for taking *273an excessive break on that day. [Petitioner] took an excessive break by returning from lunch late. [Petitioner] was fifteen minutes late returning to her work area. [Petitioner] was late on that occasion due to illness. [Petitioner] had become sick, and needed to go to the bathroom before returning to her work area.
The Commission concluded that Petitioner was discharged for substantial fault and that Petitioner was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for nine weeks.
Petitioner appealed the Commission’s decision to Superior Court, Wilson County, which found that “the Commission correctly interpreted and applied the proper provisions of the law to [the] facts[.]” The superior court entered an order affirming the Commission’s decision. Petitioner appeals.
Petitioner argues the superior court erred by finding that “the Commission correctly interpreted and applied the proper provisions of the law to [the] facts[.]” Petitioner argues that finding of fact nine supports the conclusion that Petitioner was discharged through no fault of her own. We agree.
“The scope of our review is to determine whether the facts as found by the [Commission] are supported by competent evidence and if so, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” Fair v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 159, 161, 437 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1993), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 315, 445 S.E.2d 394 (1994). “If the findings of fact made by the [Commission] are supported by competent evidence then they are conclusive on appeal. However, even if the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, they are presumed to be correct if the petitioner fails to except.” Id. (citations omitted). In the present case, because Petitioner does not challenge the findings of fact, those findings are conclusive. See id. Accordingly, the sole question is whether those findings of fact support the Commission’s conclusion that Petitioner was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation.
Petitioner was disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14(2a). This statute provides that an employee shall be disqualified for benefits for a period of between four and thirteen weeks if the employee is unemployed because the employee was discharged “for substantial fault on his part connected with his work not rising to the level of misconduct.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14(2a) (2005). This statute further defines “substantial fault” as follows:
*274Substantial fault is defined to include those acts or omissions of employees over which they exercised reasonable control and which violate reasonable requirements of the job but shall not include (1) minor infractions of rules unless such infractions are repeated after a warning was received by the employee, (2) inadvertent mistakes made by the employee, nor (3) failures to perform work because of insufficient skill, ability, or equipment.
Id. (emphases added). An employee is generally presumed to be entitled to unemployment compensation, and the employer bears the burden of establishing that an employee is disqualified. Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 373, 376, 289 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1982). “The essence of [N.C.]G.S. § 96-14[2a] is that if an employer establishes a reasonable job policy to which an employee can conform, her failure to do so constitutes substantial fault.” Lindsey v. Qualex, Inc., 103 N.C. App. 585, 590, 406 S.E.2d 609, 612, disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 196, 412 S.E.2d 57 (1991). As to whether an employee has the ability to conform to a particular policy, “[a]n employee has ‘reasonable control’ when [the employee] has the physical and mental ability to conform [the employee’s] conduct to [the] employer’s job requirements.” Id.
In the present case, even assuming, arguendo, that Respondent-Employer’s policy was reasonable, we hold that Petitioner did not have reasonable control over the action that violated the policy. Petitioner received her third and final infraction, which caused her discharge, on 21 September 2005 when she was fifteen minutes late returning to her work area after lunch. The Commission found that she was late solely “due to illness.” As our Court recently reiterated in James v. Lemmons, 177 N.C. App. 509, 629 S.E.2d 324 (2006), “an employee does not have reasonable control over failing to attend work because of serious physical or mental illness.” Id. at 520, 629 S.E.2d at 332 (citing Lindsey, 103 N.C. App. at 590, 406 S.E.2d at 612). In James, the claimant violated her employer’s attendance policy because of illness, and our Court held that the claimant did not have reasonable control over her actions. Id. at 519-20, 629 S.E.2d at 332.
In the present case, Petitioner violated Respondent-Employer’s policy “due to illness. [Petitioner] had become sick, and needed to go to the bathroom before returning to her work area.” Because Petitioner did not have reasonable control over this failure to conform to Respondent-Employer’s policy, Petitioner’s behavior “cannot rise to the level of substantial fault.” James, 177 N.C. App. at 520, 629 S.E.2d at 332. As such, the Commission’s findings of fact do not *275support its conclusion of law that Petitioner was discharged for substantial fault. Petitioner’s partial disqualification for unemployment compensation was not appropriate.
We reverse the superior court’s order and remand. On remand, the superior court shall enter an order reversing the Commission’s decision, and remand this case to the Commission for entry of a decision consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Judge ELMORE concurs. Judge TYSON dissents with a separate opinion.