dissenting.
Because I find that Williams was not an invitee of CAU at the time of the shooting, I must respectfully dissent. Clearly, Williams was an invitee while he attended a workshop and ate a snack at the CAU student center. And, clearly, Williams continued to be an invitee as he left the workshop and student center. However, Williams admits in his deposition that he walked back to his residence hall on another campus, but, instead of going inside the residence hall, he waited on the public sidewalk directly across from his residence hall to meet some friends. According to Williams, he sat on the front lawn of 642 Beckwith, a faculty house owned by CAU. Williams admits he did not know who lived at the property and had never attended any function at the property. And, there is no dispute that Williams was not invited onto the property and did not have permission to be on the property. The friends stood and sat socializing on the public sidewalk and lawn outside the CAU property for approximately 45 minutes prior to the assault at issue in this case. And, there is no question that the third-party criminal committed the assault while standing on the public sidewalk. Based on these facts, I believe that Williams had clearly exceeded the scope of his CAU invitation at the time and place of the assault.
Although the majority finds that CAU owed Williams a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches of 642 Beckwith safe, OCGA § 51-3-1 only requires a landowner to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe where he “induces or leads others to come upon his premises.” Here, Williams admits that he was not an invitee of642 Beckwith. He merely stopped in front of this address to socialize with friends.
Moreover, even if we accept the majority’s view that Williams was an invitee and that CAU owed him a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises and approaches safe, Williams has failed to show that CAU breached its duty in this case. The street where the assault occurred is an open, public city street, and there is no evidence that CAU had any authority or right to control in any way who made use of the street. Here, the third party “shooter” had free access to the street and, unless and until he violated the law, CAU had no control *184over the shooter’s actions. The fact that a random act of violence by a third party occurred is not sufficient standing alone to show that CAU breached any duty it may have owed to Williams. In addition, the shooter was the sole proximate cause of Williams’ injuries and damage, and such an act may have occurred even with the most reasonable safety precautions in place. Absent evidence showing that CAU breached any duty it owed to Williams, the trial court erred in denying CAU’s motion for summary judgment.
Decided November 1, 2007 Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Theodore Freeman, Donald J. Grate, for appellant. Gregory B. McMenamy, Jr., for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.