dissenting. As I appraise it, the testimony in question was properly admitted for the jury to determine what was the consideration of the deed, whether it was natural love and affection, or whether it was the grantee’s promise to pay certain expenses of the grantor and his wife. This inquiry did not violate the parol evidence rule.
*483I regard the decisions cited in the Court of Appeals opinion as sustaining its conclusion and as controlling upon the issue now before us.
The Cottle case, 192 Ga. 704, supra, is cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that "Where the consideration in a deed is expressed merely by way of recital, it is permissible to show by parol testimony that the true consideration is in fact different from that expressed in the instrument,” as distinguished from where it is expressed as' a term or condition of the deed. It should be noted that the consideration in the deed in question here was expressed merely by way of recital, "for and in consideration of the sum of natural love and affection,” (sic), not a term or condition.
In the Thompson case, 100 Ga. 771, supra, the deed recited a consideration of "love and affection,” but it was sought upon the trial to show by parol that there was also a valuable consideration, to wit, rendition of services both before and after the execution of the deed. This court ruled in headnote 3 that, "Although the consideration of a deed was expressed as being for love and affection, it is nevertheless competent to support it by evidence which tended to show that there was an additional valuable consideration moving the grantor to its execution.”
In the Farrar Lumber Co. case, 170 Ga. 37, supra, the record in the clerk’s office shows that the deed recited "for and in consideration of the natural love and affection we have for the heirs of Mrs. Georgia Ann Goswick,” but that there was a valuable consideration not shown by the deed, namely, promise of payment of certain debts and expenses. Thereupon, this court in Division 3 held, "The court did not err in permitting the defendant to introduce evidence tending to show that a deed, which was apparently a voluntary conveyance upon the sole consideration of love and affection, was really based upon a valuable consideration . . .”
It thus appears from each of those two cases that the consideration was expressed by recital, not a term or condition; and, of decisive significance, that in each, the consideration was only love and affection, not a valuable consideration. Hence, in each there was no additional burden or obligation placed upon the grantee by the showing as to the valuable consideration.
*484The Thompson and Farrar Lumber Co. cases are full bench and unreversed and, in my view, are binding precedents to be followed here over the later cases of Stonecypher, Cottle and Awtrey. The facts in the later cases are quite different.
In the Stonecypher case the consideration was stated to be monetary. The parol evidence sought to show the additional consideration was an agreement to purchase other property, hence the engrafting of "a new condition or covenant which imposes an additional obligation.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the Cottle case, the consideration was expressed as the assumption by the grantee of the grantor’s debt which the grantee promised to pay. The parol evidence sought to show that the grantor had agreed to make the payment in question. This court held the evidence was inadmissible since it would vary the terms of the deed and "the consideration was not merely stated by way of recital, but was made the essence of the contract.” P. 713.
In the Awtrey case, the consideration for the deed was expressed as a monetary one, but the grantor later sought to show that the grantee promised to pay her one-half of the net proceeds of the property when it was ultimately sold. This court quoted headnote 3 of the Stonecypher case, supra, and stated that "The complainant in the present case sought to engraft upon her written quitclaim deed an oral contract which would impose an additional affirmative obligation upon the defendant, the grantee in the deed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus it would appear that where, as here, there are no essential terms or conditions as to a valuable consideration expressed in the deed, introduction of parol evidence of the promise to render services should not be prohibited as an attempt to impose additional affirmative obligations upon one of the parties thereto.
For the foregoing reasons I regard the judgment of the Court of Appeals as correct and would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Justice Felton joins me in this dissent.