dissenting.
I believe the City’s zoning ordinance is an unconstitutional encroachment upon federal law. Accordingly, I dissent.
1. Federal preemption occurs when a federal law conflicts with a state law, including zoning ordinances and other laws created by *489municipalities. See Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988). In such cases, if the two conflicting laws cannot be reconciled to serve the full purposes and objectives of Congress in passing the federal law, the supremacy clause dictates that the state law must give way to the federal law. States do not have the constitutional power to legislate in federally preempted areas of law. Id. at 1523-1524.
At issue before us is a conflict between a City of Bainbridge zoning ordinance and 42 USC § 5403 (d), which provides:
Whenever a Federal [mobile] home construction and safety standard established under this chapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any [mobile] home covered, any standard regarding construction or safety applicable to the same aspect of performance of such [mobile] home which is not identical to the Federal [mobile] home construction and safety standard.
This statute clearly evidences congressional intent to “preclude [ ] states and municipalities from imposing construction and safety standards upon mobile homes that differ in any respect from those developed by HUD.” (Emphasis omitted.) Scurlock, supra.
The evidence presented in this case demonstrated that modular homes, which are prefabricated, but are not built on a chassis, could be placed in an R-2 zoning district if they bore a Department of Community Affairs (“DCA”) certification sticker; that a DCA sticker certifies that a modular home is built in accordance with the Georgia Industrialized Building Act; and that, aesthetically, as long as a “skirt” is placed around a mobile home, there is very little, if any, difference between a modular home and a mobile home. There was also evidence that modular homes bearing a DCA sticker are safer than mobile homes bearing a HUD sticker; and that the City adopted its ordinance restricting mobile homes to mobile home parks and subdivisions for safety purposes. In this regard, the city manager testified that the City would not permit a mobile home with only a HUD sticker in an R-2 zoning district; but it would permit a mobile home with a DCA sticker in such a district because it would have been “built stronger and safer.”
In Scurlock, a City of Lynn Haven zoning ordinance permitted mobile homes that met the City’s building codes to be placed anywhere within city limits; mobile homes with only a HUD sticker, however, were restricted to licensed trailer parks. The City argued that the ordinance passed constitutional muster because mobile homes were built to a lesser standard and were less safe. The court *490determined that the City’s rationale for limiting the siting of mobile homes was impermissible because safety standards for such homes were preempted by federal law. The court reasoned that if HUD has set the standard for safe construction, a municipality cannot create barriers to the full implementation of that standard. Id. at 1524-1525.
Like the zoning ordinance in Scurlock, supra, the purpose and effect of the zoning ordinance in this case are to limit the siting of mobile homes based solely on their manner of construction. Because this zoning rationale impedes the full implementation of federal building standards, the City’s zoning ordinance is unconstitutional.
True, on its face, the zoning ordinance appears to restrict the location of mobile homes appropriately. However, as noted above, the City enacted, and intends to enforce, its ordinance on the basis of construction and safety concerns. Thus, the ordinance was enacted as a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the HUD safety and construction standards,33 and to frustrate the federal objective,34 to wit: the regulation of mobile home safety standards.
When all is said and done, it is clear that in enacting its ordinance the City was motivated by a desire to legislate in the mobile home safety arena; and the City’s interpretation of the ordinance gives it that effect. The ordinance should not be saved simply because it appears to be regular on its face. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S. 222 (105 SC 1916, 85 LE2d 222) (1985) (although law disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes appears neutral on its face, it will be held to violate equal protection if its original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate and it continues to have that effect).
*491Decided March 10, 2003 Reconsideration denied April 11, 2003. Gilbert J. Murrah, for appellant. Kirbo & Kendrick, Bruce W. Kirbo, for appellee.2. In Cannon v. Coweta County, 260 Ga. 56 (389 SE2d 329) (1990), this Court held that an ordinance restricting the placement of mobile homes exceeds the police power if it is enacted to protect property values. Unlike the ordinance in Cannon, the ordinance in this case was enacted for safety reasons. Thus, this case does not present a Cannon issue, and I see no need to debate its merits at this time.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this dissent.
Compare Texas Manufactured Housing Assn. v. City of Nederland, 101 F3d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1996).
In determining preemption vel non, it is the practical impact of the ordinance that counts. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 105-106 (112 SC 2374, 120 LE2d 73) (1992). See also Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 651-652 (91 SC 1704, 29 LE2d 233) (1971), in which the Supreme Court observed:
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine . . . that state law may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration. Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state interest or policy - other than frustration of the federal objective - that would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law. . . . [A]ny state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.
In this case, the articulated purpose of the ordinance was one which frustrates the federal objective. When pressed at oral arguments, counsel for the City was unable to provide any rationale other than safety for limiting the placement of mobile homes.