specially concurring.
When reduced to its essence, today’s decision stands for the unassailable proposition that a plaintiff who obtains a judgment in the small claims department cannot later seek a greater judgment in the district court upon the same claim. The doctrine of claim preclusion is controlling. However, in light of the unique circumstances presented in this case, a reader of our decision might wonder whether rigid application of the doctrine has produced an injustice. After all, the larger judgment sought here is for a liability admitted by the defendants upon information unavailable when the plaintiff initially chose the small claims forum. Why, then, should the plaintiff continue to suffer the consequences of that choice? I write separately to address this question.
In Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct.App.1983), we noted that the doctrine of claim preclusion serves three fundamental purposes.
First, it “[preserves] the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results.” 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403, at 12 (1981). Second, it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Id. at 13-16.
In this case, the defendants’ private interest in repose arguably is diminished by their commendable act of admitting liability. However, the remaining purposes of claim preclusion — avoiding the anomaly of inconsistent results and avoiding the burdens of separate lawsuits on the same claim — are pertinent here. These purposes can be served only if a duly entered and unappealed judgment is accorded finality, subject to the carefully limited relief available under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 81(i), quoted in our lead opinion, provides the avenue for relief. A small claims judge may vacate a judgment “upon the grounds provided by Rules 60(a) and (b), I.R.C.P. or for other good cause shown____” The small claims judge in this case implicitly exercised his power under Rule 81(i) when he set aside the original judgment for the defendants and entered judgment for the plaintiff in an amount equal to the court’s then-existing jurisdictional authority. The plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the amount of the second judgment, could have invoked the same rule to request that this judgment also be vacated so an amended claim, exceeding the jurisdiction of the small claims department, could be filed in the district court. But the plaintiff did not follow this course. Rather, the plaintiff, after allowing approximately eight months to elapse, simply filed a new complaint on the same underlying claim. That pleading, in form and in substance, sought no relief from the extant judgment. Indeed, it contained no mention of any prior adjudication.
Had the plaintiff sought and obtained relief from ,the second judgment, as authorized by Rule 81(i), there would have been no prior adjudication giving rise to the doctrine of claim preclusion. But by allowing that judgment to stand, and by suing for another, larger judgment, the plaintiff asked our judicial system to do precisely what the doctrine of claim preclusion forbids — enter successive, inconsistent judgments upon the same claim. Consequently, the magistrate division of the district court had no alternative but simply to dismiss the complaint.
I am authorized to say that Judge SWANSTROM and Judge HURLBUTT share the views expressed in this opinion.