concurring and dissenting in part.
The insured under this policy is being sued by the estate of his former employee. The issue we must decide is whether the insurance policy contained a provision that would cover the insured under Arkansas law. I concur with the majority except as to whether there is insurance coverage to the truck owner, Rocky Harrell, on the basis of Floyd Meeks’s status as a temporary employee. I conclude that no exclusion applies to Harrell’s insurance policy regarding Meeks.
The truck owner and policyholder Harrell would not receive liability insurance coverage if a regular employee operated the Harrell-owned truck in these circumstances.
However, it is conceded that insurance coverage would apply if a third party had furnished Harrell with a temporary driver-employee, but coverage would not apply if Harrell himself hired a temporary driver-employee. Such a result is anomalous and the distinction does not make sense.
If one reads the insurance policy carefully, one is struck by the ambiguity contained in the pertinent policy language. The policy language is as follows:
‘Temporary worker’ means a person who is furnished to you to substitute for a permanent ‘employee’ on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. (Emphasis added).
The focus is on the language following the first “or.” This provision may be read so that:
‘Temporary worker’ means a person who is furnished to you to substitute for a permanent ‘employee’ on leave or [furnished] to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions.
Alternatively, this provision may be read so that:
‘Temporary worker’ means a person to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions.
When one examines this temporary worker provision, one is struck by the uncertainty of its meaning.
The majority applies Missouri and majority law to read “furnish to” as unambig*878uous, requiring a third party to furnish a substitute for a permanent employee and to furnish a temporary employee.5 However, other judges have read the provision differently.6
It is the insurance company that should make its language clear, and if it does not do so, it must suffer the consequences of its ambiguous language. Reasonable judges, as well as reasonable persons, may read the temporary worker clause differently, some to require third party involvement and some not to require such third party action. This is sufficient for me to dissent from today’s ruling.
. Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am. v. Mandrill Corp., 243 Fed.Appx. 961, 967-68 (6th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); AMCO Ins. Co. v. Dorpinghaus, No. 05-1296, 2007 WL 313280, at * 15 (D.Minn. Jan. 12, 2007); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Gardner, No. 04-1858, 2005 WL 664358, at *7 (E.D.Pa. Mar.21, 2005); Gavan v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 242 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Mo.2008) (en banc); Carl’s Italian Rest. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 183 P.3d 636, 639-40 (Colo.Ct.App.2007), cert. denied, No. 08SC23, 2008 WL 2008622 (Colo. May 12, 2008) (en banc); Brown v. Ind. Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528, 537-40 (Ky.2005); Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 836 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (2005); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 83 Conn.App. 526, 850 A.2d 1047, 1057 (2004).
. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Ross, 413 F.Supp.2d 740, 744-45 (N.D.W.Va.2006); Nick’s Brick Oven Pizza, Inc. v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 19 Misc.3d 736, 853 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2008); Nat’l Indem. Co. of South v. Landscape Mgmt. Co., 963 So.2d 361, 364 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2007).