specially concurring.
I agree with the analysis of the majority in this case. However, I feel the basic definitional and constitutional arguments raised by the parties and the district court merit further discussion by this Court.
First, under the statute for hospital care for the indigent sick, when we speak of residence, we speak of the residence of the patient. Residence of a newly born child is determined by reference to the location of his or her parents or guardians. The status of the parents as illegal aliens does not defeat the fact that they and their children are located in a particular place in the United States, in this case Blaine County, Idaho.
The basic common-law concept of residence, which has often been used interchangeably with domicile, is in fact distinct and more broad than the concept of domicile. Many years ago this Court noted that
“a residence is different from a domicil, although it is a matter of great importance in determining the place of domicil. The essential distinction between residence and the domicil is that the first involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which one has taken up his abode ceases. The other has no such intent; the abiding is animus manendi. One may seek a place for the purpose of pleasure, of business or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his domicil; if his intent be to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his residence.” Reubelmann v. Reubelmann, 38 Idaho 159, 164, 220 P. 404, 405 (1923) (citing Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 2920 (Rawle’s rev. 3d ed.)).
The concept of residence, although broad in its pure form, is malleable and capable of being limited in its application by statute — typically by the imposition of a requirement of presence within the state or a county for a specific number of months or years. The Idaho legislature has taken the term “residence” and limited it in many ways to serve the purposes of different statutes. This reveals an implicit belief by the legislature that the concept of residence in its pure form is too broad to serve the specific purposes and promote the specific policies of the various statutes. Since each statutory definition of residency is inexorably linked to the purposes and policies of the statute in which it appears, we cannot rely on the definition in one statute to interpret another, as the county in this case would have us do. The lack of statutory restraints on the definition of residency in the statute on indigent health care at issue must, therefore, be construed as legislative intent that the basic common-law concept of residency is adequate. Absent legislative direction, this Court in Cartwright v. Gem County, 108 Idaho 160, 697 P.2d 1174 (1985), necessarily imposed the least restrictive definition of residency as it is used in I.C. § 31-3404. We stated, “Residency, as used in the statute, requires physical presence coupled with an intent to remain, or an absence of intent to move elsewhere.” Id. at 161, 697 P.2d at 1175. Thus, with respect to this statute, “residency” can be read as virtually synonymous with “domicile.”
The county’s argument and the district court’s opinion are based on the premise that residency, even in its pure form, cannot exist if the person is not a United States citizen, or at least, a legal alien. However, the concepts of residency and domicile do not distinguish between persons who have legally or illegally entered the county. It is possible that the legislature could impose citizenship or legal alien-age as a requirement to attain residency in a particular statute. In this case, this could conceivably have been done by amendment to the statute.1 Even if it *416were, however, the patient in this case is a United States citizen and would satisfy that requirement. Every person born in the United States becomes a citizen thereof and needs no naturalization. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675, 18 S.Ct. 456, 467, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898). Karen Regalado’s citizenship cannot be divested simply because she resides with and is cared for by non-citizen parents.2
In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that the right of an illegal alien child to receive a free public education cannot be denied simply because of his illegal status. It is possible, however, that the high Court would not extend this equal protection analysis to include indigent medical care, as the county has pointed out. In fact, the Court did make a distinction when it said,
“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution. (Citation omitted). But neither is it some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education and maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction.” Id. at 220-21, 102 S.Ct. at 2396.
On the other hand, the Court seemed particularly concerned with the fact that the classification was of vulnerable and innocent children who were not accountable for their disabling status; but since they were undocumented, they were still subject to possible future deportation. The Court noted that, “Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental concepts of justice.” Id. at 220, 102 S.Ct. at 2396. Therefore, this class of illegal alien children can avail itself of equal protection guarantees in areas where their parents cannot; guarantees that children who are not illegal aliens enjoy. The standard of review employed by the Court was an “intermediate” one, allowing the disparate treatment of illegal alien children only if it furthers a “substantial state interest.” Id. at 230, 102 S.Ct. at 2401. Arguably, denying indigent medical care to these children would not be justified under this standard anymore than denying them an education. See, e.g., Darces v. Woods, 35 Cal.3d 871, 201 Cal.Rptr. 807, 679 P.2d 458 (1984) (excluding undocumented siblings from the definition of essential persons for AFDC purposes violated state’s constitutional guarantee of equal protection). In fact, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Plyler, found the court’s reasoning may be applicable in the welfare context and noted that “If the resident children of illegal aliens were denied welfare assistance, made available by government to all other children who qualify, this also — in my opinion — would be an impermissible penalizing of children because of their parents’ status.” Plyler, supra, 457 U.S. at 239, n. 3, 102 S.Ct. at 2406, n. 3 (Powell, J., concurring).
Even if we were to accept the county’s interpretation that the Plyler analysis could not be extended to indigent medical care, that argument would be relevant only to the care provided to illegal aliens, such as Mr. and Mrs. Regalado themselves. Here, the care is being provided to a United States citizen. The statute allows us to look to the parents only as a reference in *417answering two questions: (1) what is the residence of the child? and (2) does the child qualify for indigency status? The statute cannot — and under no reasonable interpretation does it — transform a United States citizen into an illegal alien simply by this process of referencing to the parents.
Indeed, the parents benefit from being relieved of the obligation to pay for the hospitalization of their child, but no one will dispute that the child is the primary beneficiary of the life-saving medical care paid for under I.C. § 31-3501 et seq. A recent federal district court decision noted that “The mere fact that the parent’s circumstances determine eligibility [for Aid For Dependent Children] does not by itself mean that the parent is the primary beneficiary.” Ruiz v. Blum, 549 F.Supp. 871, 876 (S.D.N.Y.1982); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968).
The court in Ruiz also noted that if “a native born citizen who is otherwise eligible is denied, on the grounds of his mother’s [undocumented] status, day care services which are granted to all other eligible native born children, ... it clearly penalizes him solely by reason of his mother’s status.” Ruiz, supra, at 877. The classification the county would have us accept would be based solely on the status of the parents of a U.S. citizen. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that classifications based on alienage of a person, let alone alienage of a person’s parents, are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2124, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971).
“In undertaking this scrutiny, ‘the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.’ Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. [572] at 605, 96 S.Ct. [2264] at 2283 [49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976) ]. See In re Griffths, 413 U.S. [717] at 721-722, 93 S.Ct. [2851] at 2854-2855 [37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973)]. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand.” Nyquist, supra at 7, 97 S.Ct. at 2124.
A review of the record and arguments of this case reveals no substantial or compelling justification for the state3 to treat Karen Regalado differently from other U.S. citizen children based on the alienage of her parents. Thus, under either the intermediate test of scrutiny of Plyler, or the strict test of scrutiny under Nyquist, such a classification would be unconstitutional. I share the concern of Justice Powell when he noted in Plyler that “visiting ... condemnation on the head of an infant for misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust and contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrong doing.” Plyler, supra, 457 U.S. at 238, 102 S.Ct. at 2406 (Powell, J., concurring); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972).
In summary, therefore, with the proper light cast on the definition of residency and the equal protection guarantees implicated by this decision, I concur with the majority in reversing the holding of the district court.
. Such a requirement limiting benefits by restricting the definition of residency would, of course, be subject to constitutional scrutiny. It is helpful to note that the U.S. Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) found Arizona’s one-year durational residency requirement as a condition to receiving nonemergency indigent medical care to be an invidious classification impinging on the right of interstate travel *416and therefore unconstitutional. See also, Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1981), where the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Supremacy Clause to bar Maryland from denying aliens the ability to establish instate status for purposes of tuition at state universities.
. It is somewhat shocking that in its brief, the county begins its argument with a question, "What then does it gain us to consider Karen Regaldo’s citizenship in this litigation?" Then answers by saying, "Absolutely nothing.” Upon this faulty assertion the county proceeds to argue as if Karen and her parents were legally indistinguishable. For an exhaustive discussion of how the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not change the fundamental principle of citizenship by birth, see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898).
. The Court in Nyquist distinguished actions that states could take in classifying aliens from actions that Congress could take, noting "Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States." Id. at 7, n. 8, 97 S.Ct. at 2124, n. 8; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976).