dissenting.
The dispute here centers upon the interpretation to be given a certain provision of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq. The provision in question is OCGA § 33-34-2 (8) which defines “occupying” as “to be in or upon a motor vehicle or engaged in the immediate act of entering into or alighting from the motor vehicle.”
As is pertinent here, no-fault benefits are recoverable for accidental bodily injury sustained by a person other than the named insured, such as appellant here, “while occupying the owner’s motor vehicle if the accident occurs within the United States of America . . . [or] . . . as a result of being struck by the owner’s motor vehicle while a pedestrian in this state.” OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (2) and (3). “Motor vehicle” *466includes the subject trailer here. OCGA § 33-34-2 (6). “ ‘Accidental bodily injury’ means bodily injury . . . arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. . . .” OCGA § 33-34-2 (1). “ ‘Operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle’ means operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle [and] . . . does not include . . . conduct in the course of loading and unloading the vehicle unless the conduct occurs while occupying it.” OCGA § 33-34-2 (9).
Appellant does not argue on appeal that he was a pedestrian at the time of his injury so as to be entitled to no-fault benefits under the statute. Accordingly, the discussion here is limited to whether, under the facts in this case, he was occupying the vehicle so as to be entitled to benefits as the result of his injury. As noted above, occupying a motor vehicle for no-fault purposes means “to be in or upon a motor vehicle or engaged in the immediate act of entering into or alighting from the motor vehicle.” Appellant does not contend that he was either about to enter into or alight from the trailer. Rather, he premises his right to recover benefits on the fact that his right hand was engaged in holding open the ratchet latch which was a part of the trailer and that the upper part of his body was bent so that his head was “inside” the trailer; thus, he argues, he was “occupying” the motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute.
The situation in this case is substantially the same as that in Transus, Inc. v. Garrett, 173 Ga. App. 498 (326 SE2d 852) (1985). In that case Transus was making a delivery of a 55-gallon drum of chemicals to Garrett. Garrett was injured while aiding Transus’ driver in unloading from its truck. Garrett testified that he was standing on the ground and had never been on the truck. This court held that Garrett was thus not occupying the truck so as to be entitled to the payment of no-fault benefits from Transus. While in the case at bar a part of appellant’s body was within the air space of the trailer’s structure and he also was holding onto a portion of the trailer, these facts establish only that appellant was in physical contact with the motor vehicle itself, not that he was “in or upon” and thus “occupying” the vehicle at the time of his injury. Accord Ferguson v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 369 SW2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). See Kelley v. Integon Indem. Corp., 253 Ga. 269 (320 SE2d 526) (1984); Clinton v. Nat. Indem. Co., 153 Ga. App. 491 (2) (265 SE2d 841) (1980). Compare Leverette v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 157 Ga. App. 175 (276 SE2d 859) (1981). In my view the trial court did not err in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment, thus denying appellant any recovery of no-fault benefits for his injury. See Jones v. Continental Ins. Co., 169 Ga. App. 153 (312 SE2d 173) (1983). See also Cole v. Allstate Ins. Co., 173 Ga. App. 454 (326 SE2d 817) (1985); Ga. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 172 Ga. App. 164 (2) (322 SE2d 296) (1984).
*467Decided March 12, 1986 Rehearing denied April 1, 1986 William L. Skinner, for appellant. Michael T. Thornton, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Sognier and Judge Benham concur in this dissent.