United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America Local 586 v. National Labor Relations Board

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree that Macerich’s efforts to impose content-based restrictions (rules 1, 2, and 4) on speech do not survive strict scrutiny. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Macerich’s admittedly content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions (rules 3, 5, and 6) are unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) because the California courts have approved the challenged restrictions. The federal courts may not ignore state case law balancing the freedom of expression under the state constitution against state property laws; particularly where there is no federal right to engage in the particular expressive activity on private property.

In labor relations, “[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.” NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96, 77 S.Ct. 643, 1 L.Ed.2d 676 (1957) (emphasis added). We accord considerable deference to the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB” or “Board”) interpretation of the NLRA as long as it is “rational and consistent” with the statute. NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir.1999). We uphold decisions of the NLRB on appeal if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and if the agency correctly applied the law. Retlaw Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 172 F.3d 660, 664 (9th Cir.1999). It is well-settled that the NLRB is bound by state law when determining the right of nonemployee union representatives to access an employer’s private property. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n. 21, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535, 112 S.Ct. 841, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992). Therefore, it follows that if California courts hold that a time, place, or manner restriction is permissible under California law, then the NLRB should be entitled to rely on those cases when attempting to deter*974mine if a maE has violated NLRA section 8(a)(1).

A. California courts properly apply intermediate scrutiny to content neutral restrictions on free speech on private property.

A content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” and “leave open ample alternative channels for the communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). “A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). Whether a regulation leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information requires analyzing if the message “could not be communicated in other ways” and the barriers to conveying the intended message. Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). “[A]n incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible under [United States v.] OBrien[, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)], so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985). “The validity of such regulations does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests.” Id.

There is no federal right to engage in First Amendment activity that is unrelated to the business of a privately owned shopping center. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972). California has chosen to provide additional protection for expressive activity in private shopping malls under article I, section 2 of the California Constitution. Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal.4th 850, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 172 P.3d 742, 749-50 (2007). California courts have concluded, however, that shopping malls may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon speech. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979); see also Fashion Valley Mall, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 172 P.3d at 754 (reaffirming that “[sjhopping malls may enact and enforce reasonable regulations of the time, place, and manner of such free expression to assure that these activities do not interfere with the normal business operations of the mall ... ”). California law allows content-neutral regulation of speech by municipalities and private actors if the regulations are narrowly tailored to protect a proper municipal or private interest. See In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845, 64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353, 355-56 (1967) (discussing balancing use of property for municipal or private purposes and the First Amendment). Because California courts apply the exact same scrutiny to time, place, and manner restrictions on First Amendment activity as federal courts, the NLRB is entitled to rely upon a California court’s determination that restrictions similar to those imposed by Macerich are proper methods of protecting private property rights under state law.

B. The majority’s decision fails to give proper deference to the mail’s time, place, and manner regulation of the wearing and carrying of signs.

Macerich has not imposed a complete ban on the use of signs, but rather has a rule that “[pjarticipants may not carry or *975wear any signs, posters or placards.”1 Macerich allows posters, placards, displays and signs that are smaller than 22 inches by 28 inches and are affixed to a table “so as not to endanger any person or property, block the view of any tenant’s store or display, or directly compete with Center activities or the business displays or logos of Center tenants.”

California courts have recognized that private property owners have different interests than municipalities for the purposes of balancing those interests against First Amendment rights. In re Hoffman, 64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d at 355 n. 3. Private property owners have an interest in avoiding interference with the commercial purposes of property.2 Id. at 356-67. This includes an “interest in controlling litter and traffic,” Savage v. Trammell Crow Co., Inc., 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 273 Cal.Rptr. 302, 307 (Cal.App.1990), and consideration of “whether the number and/or size of signs, posters or placards will interfere with and/or directly compete with business displays or logos.” H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov’t, 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, 238 Cal.Rptr. 841, 856 (Cal.App.1987) (“H-CHH”) disapproved on other grounds by Fashion Valley Mall, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 172 P.3d at 754 n. 12. Under California law, “the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’ ” Savage, 273 Cal.Rptr. at 307 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897).

In this case, restricting the union members from wearing signs or carrying pickets promotes Macerich’s substantial interest in making sure that protesters do not block access to stores or the sight-lines for store displays or impede foot traffic. That interest “would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Id. As already noted, California courts have stated that commercial property owners may “consider ] whether the number and/or size of signs, posters or placards will interfere with and/or directly compete with business displays or logos.” H-CHH Assocs., 238 CaLRptr. at 856.

The majority concludes that the ban on wearing or carrying signs does not leave open ample alternatives for communication, speculating about the adequacy of various alternatives including Macerich’s allowance of two signs attached to a table. The Supreme Court, however, requires us to give deference to reasonable determinations that substantial interests are best served by the restriction at issue. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (“The Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the city’s reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume would be best served by requiring band-shell performers to utilize the city’s sound

*976technician.”).3 In fact, the Court has stated that the “less restrictive-alternative analysis has never been part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 787, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court went on to conclude that it is error to “sift[ ] through all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating [activity] in order to determine whether the city’s solution was ‘the least intrusive means’ of achieving the desired end.”4 Id.

The proper analysis is whether Mace-rich’s rules “foreclose an entire medium of public expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138. (9th Cir.2005) (quotations omitted). “In the ‘ample alternatives’ context, the Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment requires only that the government refrain from denying a ‘reasonable opportunity’ for communication.” Id. at 1141 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)). Foreclosing one narrow form of expression while allowing “myriad and diverse” alternatives for reaching the intended audience does not violate the First Amendment. One World One Family Now v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.1996).

The majority assumes that picketing includes the right to wear or carry signs. The Board, however, has noted that “picketing does not require the holding of a sign.” Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 287 NLRB 570, 573 (1987) (citing United Mine Workers of Am., District 12, 177 NLRB 213, 218 (1969)). I cannot find any authority that defines picketing to necessarily include the carrying or wearing of signs. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (noting ordinance stated that pickets “need not be carrying a sign”). Macerich’s rule forbidding the wearing or carrying of signs did not ban “picketing.”5

*977Indeed, I conclude that Macerich’s rule foreclosed only one method of “picketing” and did not categorically deny the unions of their ability to express their dissatisfaction with the use of non-union labor.

Macerich’s rules left open ample alternative means for the unions to communicate their message to the mall patrons. The union could have used a table with two signs staffed by members, and Macerich’s rules allowed union members to carry clipboards and leaflets with additional information for mall patrons. The majority mentions that Local 586 representatives went to Arden Fair Mall wearing shirts that said “Do Not Patronize Arden Fair Mall — Unfair to Carpenters,” but fails to note that there is no evidence that Arden Fair Mall ejected the union representatives for wearing those shirts. Union members were free to wear or carry signs on the public sidewalks surrounding the malls’ parking lots. The union had “myriad and diverse” alternatives for communicating their messages to mall patrons.

As the majority acknowledges, under California law, “the adequacy of alternative channels is not measured by the fondest hopes of those who wish to disseminate ideas.” Savage, 273 Cal.Rptr. at 308 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 295, 104 S.Ct. 3065). Although no California case has expressly approved of a rule banning the wearing or carrying of signs, an intermediate court has noted that commercial establishments are free to establish restrictions on the size and number of signs, placards, and posters. H-CHH Assocs., 238 Cal.Rptr. at 856. Thus, the California cases indicate that the California Supreme Court would uphold a commercial property owner’s right to ban the wearing or carrying signs, placards, or posters as narrowly tailored and leaving ample alternative channels for communication and deny the petition. See Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1089 (discussing how to interpret state law).

C. The designated areas rule and the peak days restriction have been expressly approved by California courts.

In In re Hoffman, 64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d at 358, the California Supreme Court stated:

Reasonable and objective limitations can be placed on the number of persons who can be present for First Amendment activities at the same time, and the persons present can be required so to place themselves as to limit disruption. In areas normally subject to congestion, such as ticket windows and turnstiles, First Amendment activities can be prohibited. Persons can be excluded entirely from areas where their presence would threaten personal danger or block the flow of passenger or carrier traffic, such as doorways and loading areas.

In Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App.4th 996, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 838, 847 (Ct.App.1997) (“UNITE”), a California Court of Appeal held that “a shopping center is constitutionally empowered to enact a rule limiting expressive activities to a particular area.” The union wanted to distribute leaflets outside of Guess?, Inc. stores located in six different malls instead of in the designated areas provided by the shopping centers. Id. at 847-48. The state appellate court rejected the union’s “most effective point of persuasion” argument, concluding that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Pruneyard, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d at 347, approving of time, place, and manner restrictions “to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations” allowed the restriction of nonemployee union protesters to designated areas of the shopping center.6 UNITE, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d at 849.

*978The state court concluded that “a center can impose reasonable and objective limitations on the number of persons who can be present and those persons can be required to be in an area so as to limit disruption.” Id. at 848. As a result, the state appellate court held that several rules, including rules restricting petitioning activity to two designated areas in the malls, were valid time, place, and manner restrictions under California law. Id. at 848 — 49.

This case is no different, and if the restriction of petitioning activity to two designated areas is acceptable under California law, the NLRB must follow California law.7 Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 538, 112 S.Ct. 841. California courts have balanced the expressive rights of unions under the California Constitution against property owners’ rights under state property law. This is a question of state law that we are not free to reject. West v. AT & T, 311 U.S. 223, 236, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940) (“[T]he highest court of the state is the final arbiter of what is state law. When it has spoken, its pronouncement is to be accepted by federal courts as defining state law .... ”); see also Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1095 (noting that if California provides additional protection, it does so by modifying state property law).

The majority’s reliance on the unavailability of the sidewalks and entrances immediately outside the stores to conclude that Macerich’s restrictions are not narrowly tailored is also not supported by California law. See Lushbaugh v. Home Depot U.S.A., 93 Cal.App.4th 1159, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 707 (Ct.App.2001) (noting designated areas may be located away from motorized traffic, foot traffic, and entrances).8 Furthermore, California courts have concluded that the additional protection of speech in shopping malls under state law does not include a right to conduct activity at the most effective point of persuasion. UNITE, 65 Cal.Rptr. at 849 n. 4 (collecting cases). The Board properly relied on UNITE in its decision; therefore, the Board’s decision is “rational and consistent” with California law.9 Cal-kins, 187 F.3d at 1085.

Similarly, California courts have upheld so-called “peak days” restrictions in H-CHH, 238 Cal.Rptr. at 858 (approving of ban on heavy traffic days if the dates are set forth in writing); UNITE, 56 Cal. *979App.4th 996, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d at 850 (approving of “holiday blackout periods” ranging from 25 specific days to the period between the weekend before Thanksgiving through January 2 of the next year); and Costco Cos., Inc. v. Gallant, 96 Cal.App.4th 740, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 344, 353-54 (Ct.App.2002) (affirming restrictions on expressive activity on 34 busiest days). Indeed, Macerich’s rule restricting expressive activity on 30 peak business days, accompanied by the list of unavailable dates, is more lenient than the restriction approved by the state court in Costco Cos, Inc. by four (4) days. In UNITE, the state appellate court approved restrictions on expressive activity spanning between the weekend before Thanksgiving through January 2nd, a period of forty-two (42) days. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 535, 112 S.Ct. 841, as well as our own precedents, mandate that we accept state law and uphold the Board’s determination that Macerich’s peak days limitations are a valid time, place, and manner regulations.

The majority attempts to distinguish the California cases by stating that they do not discuss whether the rules are narrowly tailored. Both UNITE and II-CHH contain numerous citations to In re Hoffman, Savage, and other California cases specifically applying intermediate scrutiny to time, place, and manner restrictions. In fact, UNITE specifically refers to other portions of the days limitations under a “content neutral” analysis as being “narrowly drawn” and then approves the blackout periods as “[ejqually appropriate” under California law. UNITE, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d at 850. It is clear that the California courts in UNITE and H-CHH were applying intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral restrictions. We are not free to ignore clear state law precedents simply because their analysis was not as explicit as we would like. Even if UNITE and H-CHH fail to discuss intermediate scrutiny with sufficient clarity, the majority completely ignores the state court’s analysis in Costco that:

Costco’s regulation is narrowly tailored because it protects Costco’s substantial interests in the smooth operation of its stores on those days, which represent less than 10 percent of a calendar year, when those legitimate interests are most vulnerable to the disruption which expressive activity has from time to time engendered at Costco’s stores. Because the 34-day ban is content neutral and leaves more than 300 other days during the calendar year in which expressive activity is permitted, it satisfies the remaining requirements of a valid regulation of time, place, and manner.

117 Cal.Rptr.2d at 354.

We are bound by a state court’s interpretation of state law when reviewing the NLRB’s determination of whether there has been a violation of section 8(h)(1) of the NLRA when the NLRB must balance section 7 expressive rights against state property rights. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at 217 n. 21, 114 S.Ct. 771; Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1152; Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1088. We may not substitute our interpretations of California law for that of the California courts of appeal. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30, 630 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988) (noting state appellate court’s determination of state law is binding and must be given deference). “[O]nly state courts may authoritatively construe state statutes.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). “In the absence of convincing evidence that the state supreme court would decide differently, ‘a federal court is obligated to follow the decisions of the state’s intermediate courts.’ ” Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1494 n. 4 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting In

*980re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir.1990)). The majority’s opinion fails to give deference to state law, and appears to misuse the requirement of ample alternative channels to conduct a least-restrictive means analysis to invalidate content-neutral rules. In doing so, the majority disregards state cases approving the types of content-neutral restrictions Macerich imposed on expression for its malls, disapproves of the Board’s proper reliance on state law, and attempts to create expressive rights under California law at the expense of state property rights.

Accordingly, I dissent.

. Strangely, the majority omits the first part of the rule, which states, "[pjarticipants may hold clipboards and leaflets.”

. The majority claims that the state court decisions approving content-neutral restrictions on expressive activity do not include the right to exclude. California courts have repeatedly stated that unprotected interference with the operation of commercial property may result in expulsion. See In re Hoffman, 64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d at 357 (stating that “[h]ad petitioners in any way interfered with the conduct of the railroad business, they could legitimately have been asked to leave"); Slauson P’ship v. Ochoa, 112 Cal.App.4th 1005, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 686 (Ct.App.2003) (stating "our analysis starts with the fact that because the Mall is private property, Slauson did have the right to exclude persons from entering the Mall, and persons who entered the property without its permission were trespassing.”); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal.App.4th 106, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 721, 738 (Ct.App.2003) (noting failure to comply with rules triggers the owner's right to stop the activity).

. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished lower courts not to use the "ample alternative channels” requirement as a means of overturning regulations. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (reversing because "[t]he alternative regulatory methods hypothesized by the Court of Appeals reflect nothing more than a disagreement with the city over how much control of volume is appropriate or how that level of control is to be achieved”); Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897 ("The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests”); Clark, 468 U.S. at 299, 104 S.Ct. 3065 ("The Court of Appeals’ suggestions ... represent no more than a disagreement with the Park Service over how much protection the core parks require or how an acceptable level of preservation is to be attained. We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O'Brien or the time, place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authorily to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained.”).

. To the extent that the majority analyzes "numerous and less burden-some alternatives” to Macerich's regulations to conclude they were not narrowly tailored, this is an improper least-restrictive means analysis. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 787, 109 S.Ct. 2746.

. There is no absolute right to picket. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486-87, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (noting that picketing can be offensive and intrusive). The passage from the California Supreme Court’s decision in Fashion Valley Mall cited in support of a broader picketing right concerned content-based restrictions on picketing activity, not a content-neutral restriction. See Fashion Valley Mall, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 172 P.3d at 748 (discussing Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal.3d 653, 91 Cal.Rptr. 501, 477 P.2d 733, 741 (1970), which invalidated a rule that "all activity apart from regulated, mutually beneficial business promotions and displays, whether by tenants or strangers, is forbidden on the premises of the Center”).

. Although under the First Amendment the nature of the message may create a stronger interest in the symbolic location of the activity *978and the ability to reach a specific audience, see Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 747-52 (9th Cir.2004), California has not given additional protection to symbolic locations or more specific audiences (as opposed to mall patrons in general) to expressive activity on private commercial property. See UNITE, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d at 849 n. 4 (rejecting the most effective point of persuasion argument).

. To the extent the majority once again engages in an analysis of potential alternative regulations and relies upon the existence of less restrictive means to invalidate the restriction, their reasoning is improper under Supreme Court precedent. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 787, 109 S.Ct. 2746; Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897.

. The California appellate court in Lushbaugh specifically cited to Xiloj-Itzep v. City of Agoura Hills, 24 Cal.App.4th 620, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 879, 889-90 (Ct.App.1994), which applied the narrowly tailored test in upholding a ban on vehicle-addressed solicitation.

. The majority states that Macerich did not show that the demonstration violated a fire code. The Board specifically found that the designated area rule "assists the Respondent with complying with local fire codes.” The malls introduced evidence that local fire codes required eight to ten foot clearances around entrances, and that the sidewalks were not sufficiently large to accommodate those clearances. I am unable to locate any authority requiring that Macerich establish a fire code violation before the fire code can be a substantial interest under the narrowly tailored test.