I dissent.
On February 8, 1950, Lair brought an action against the Goldbergs and on March 26, 1951, he secured a judgment for $4,144.22. In the meantime, on April 13, 1950, and July 26, 1950, the United States filed notices of tax liens against Lair in Los Angeles County. Thereafter the Goldbergs purchased three judgments against Lair and another claim against him that was subsequently reduced to judgment. None of these judgments were entered, however, until after the notices of the tax liens were filed. Had Lair's creditors sought to enforce their claims against Lair instead of selling them to the Gold-bergs, they could not have reached Lair’s claim against the Goldbergs until the tax liens had been satisfied. (United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50-51 [71 S.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed. 53]; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 [75 S.Ct. 239, 99 L.Ed. -]; United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 [75 S.Ct. 247, 99 L.Ed. -].) In such case, the United States would have been free to enforce its liens against Lair’s property by collecting the judgment in his favor against the Goldbergs. The question presented, therefore, is whether the Goldbergs can defeat this right of the United States by purchasing claims against Lair that but for the purchase would be subordinate to the tax liens. In my opinion, they cannot do so.
It is true that the Goldbergs did not have actual knowledge of the tax liens at the time they purchased the claims against Lair and that in the absence of federal legislation their right to setoff would not be prejudiced by an assignment without notice of the judgment against them. (Harrison v. Adams, *30520 Cal.2d 646, 649 [128 P.2d 9]; Code Civ. Proc., § 368.) It bears emphasis, however, that the Goldbergs did not pay their judgment creditor without notice of the tax liens against him. Instead, they purchased claims against their creditor that were subordinate, whether they knew it or not, to the tax liens, and there is no reason why these claims should have greater value against the United States in the Goldbergs’ hands than they had in the hands of the Goldbergs’ assignors.
Citing Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney, 112 F.2d 690, United States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149, United States v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F.2d 538, United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, and United States v. Bank of United States, 5 F.Supp. 42, the majority opinion holds, however, that the right to setoff must be determined by state law and that the Goldbergs may not be placed in a worse position toward their creditor because the United States has intervened. The cited cases considered situations in which the right to setoff arose before the tax liens were perfected or in which the delinquent taxpayer at no time held an enforcible claim against his alleged debtor. It is settled, however, that once the tax lien has been perfected it may not be displaced by operation of state law (Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338, 340 [63 S.Ct. 302, 87 L.Ed. 312]; United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 [74 S.Ct. 367, 98 L.Ed. 520]; United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 214 [13 S.Ct. 846, 37 L.Ed. 705]) and that the interests of the United States may not be prejudiced by the assertion of subsequently acquired rights of third parties against the tax delinquent. (United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50-53 [71 S.Ct. 111, 95 L.Ed. 53]; Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267-268 [66 S.Ct. 108, 90 L.Ed. 56]; United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 965; Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415, 417; Citizens State Bank of Barstow v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380, 383-384; In re Dartmont Coal Co., 46 F.2d 455, 457; United States v. Graham, 96 F.Supp. 318, 321, affirmed, 195 F.2d 530; United States v. Rosenfield, 26 F.Supp. 433, 436.)
The fact that the Goldbergs did not have actual knowledge of the tax liens when they purchased the claims against Lair does not render the enforcement of the tax liens against them inequitable. The Goldbergs’ indebtedness to Lair was an asset that the United States was entitled to levy upon for the payment of taxes due. As noted above, the Goldbergs did not pay the judgment in ignorance of the tax liens but instead *306purchased claims against Lair. That the value of these claims was problematical was apparent from the fact that Lair’s creditors were willing to sell them for approximately one third of their face value and the Goldbergs could easily have determined from an examination of the records that they were subordinate to the tax liens. Under these circumstances it cannot reasonably be said that the United States attempted to prejudice the Goldbergs’ position toward their creditor by asserting its tax liens. Instead, because they failed to investigate the sonrces of information available to them, the Goldbergs have been permitted to succeed in defeating the enforcement of the tax liens by advancing claims that were subordinate to them.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.