(dissenting). When is a patient or his estate liable for his care and treatment in Central State Hospital? The statute provides for such patient liability “in any charitable or curative institution of the state.” 1 Central State Hospital is such institution 2 but not as to all commitments made to it.3
When is the Central State Hospital a “charitable or curative institution of the state” and when is it not so? In the Treglown Case, this court construed “the nature and purpose of the commitment in a particular case.” 4 In each category of cases at least the court “. . . must inquire into the exact purpose and nature of the commitment made to determine whether sec. 46.10 (2), Stats., applies. ...” 5
As to three categories of commitments in criminal cases, this court has held no liability on patient or parent for maintenance costs at Central State Hospital. The three categories and no-liability holdings are: (1) “no estate liability for maintenance at Central State Hospital when the patient was committed for observation to *206determine his sanity to stand trial;” 6 (2) “no estate liability for maintenance at Central State Hospital when the patient was committed after having been sentenced to prison and while serving his term;”7 and (3) no “parental liability for maintenance costs at Central State Hospital for a minor child committed because of his acquittal based on insanity at the time of the commission of an alleged crime.” 8
However, as to the type of commitment involved in the case before us, this court in Treglown expressly held that the patient or his estate was liable for maintenance costs at Central State Hospital. The exact and express holding was: “(2) estate liability for maintenance at Central State Hospital when, on a finding of present insanity, proceedings are stayed and the patient has been committed until able to stand trial.” 9
As authority for thus holding an estate liable under circumstances identical with those presented by this appeal, this court in Treglown cited an earlier case, Guardianship of Radoll,10 and said of it:
“In Guardianship of Radoll, Radoll was charged with assault while armed with intent to murder. He was committed to Central State Hospital for a period of observation not to exceed thirty days. At the termination of this observation period, he was returned to court, adjudged insane. All proceedings were stayed and he was committed to the Central State Hospital for the criminally insane until he recovered and could face trial. The State Board of Control filed claim for care and maintenance at the hospital of the incompetent. Once again, this court stated that the guardian was not liable for care and support of the ward during the observation period. Once again, this court stated that the guardian was liable where, upon a finding of present insanity, *207the trial was postponed and the incompetent was confined in the Central State Hospital for the insane until he recovered and could face trial.” 11
The “Once again” reference in Treglown is to still an earlier case, Guardianship of Sprain,12 where this court upheld a trial court’s ruling that an estate was not liable for maintenance costs at Central State Hospital for the period of observation as to competency to stand trial; but also upheld the trial court’s approving charges against the estate for the period of hospitalization . . following his being found insane and his re-commitment to the Central State Hospital for hospitalization as insane.” 13
In holding the patient or his estate liable in the situation now before us, the Treglown decision emphasizes that, in such situation, recovery of the patient is the “sole test for return to the court to face further proceedings.” 14 This return to court upon recovery is *208compared to civil commitments where “. . . [r]ecovery from mental illness is the sole test for release.” 15 Provisions for the return to court of the patient in the case before us are termed “less flexible,” but “the clear test is the recovery of the patient. ...” 16 As to both situations, it is “. . . release as soon as recovery or the welfare of the patient permits [that] establishes the nature and purpose of the confinement: treatment for the illness involved.” 17 It is the commitment for treatment with recovery the prerequisite to release that, as Treg-lown expressly holds, renders the patient or his estate liable for maintenance costs “. . . when, on a finding- of present insanity, proceedings are stayed and the patient has been committed until able to stand trial; . . .” 18
The plurality opinion finds in Treglown, and in Radoll and Sprain, both cited and relied upon in Treglown, “. . . a consistent rationale — if the individual is committed to a state institution as the result of criminal proceedings, neither he nor his estate is liable to the Department of Health & Social Services. . . .”
*209How can that be said of Sprain where the court “. . . approved charges against the estate for the period of confinement following his being found insane and his re-commitment to the Central State Hospital for hospitalization as insane?” 19
How can this be said of Radoll, where this court held “. . . that guardian was liable where, upon a finding of present insanity, the trial was postponed and the incompetent was confined in the Central State Hospital for the insane until he recovered and could face trial?” 20
How can this be said of Treglown where this court held that there was “. . . estate liability for maintenance at Central State Hospital when, on a finding of present insanity, proceedings are stayed and the patient has been committed until able to stand trial ... ?” 21
The concurring opinion recognizes only Radoll as holding there is estate liability for treatment at Central State Hospital under a commitment, following a finding of present insanity prior to trial of a criminal charge. It would overrule that case and reverse its holding. But it would do more. It would destroy the emphasis upon the purpose of the commitment — i.e., treatment until recovery — which Treglown finds to identify and equate this pretrial commitment for treatment and a civil commitment for the same purpose. Clearly, Sprain, Radoll and Treglown are judicial constructions of a particular statute. “Public policy” is a doubtful basis for changing the construction given a statute by this court. This court repeatedly stated: “. . . It is established that when a court places a certain construction upon a statute, such construction becomes part of the statute, and subsequent *210legislative inaction can be deemed to be approval of such construction. . . 22
This court having construed and applied the statute (sec. 46.10 (2), Stats.) to the exact situation presented by this appeal, the writer would change neither that clear construction nor that equally clear application. The writer would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Han-ley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.
See. 46.10 (2), Stats., providing in material part: “(2) Any . . . patient in any charitable or curative institution of the state ... in which the state is chargeable with all or a part of the patient’s maintenance, . . . shall be liable for such patient’s maintenance not exceeding the actual per capita cost thereof . . . and the department may bring action for the enforcement of such liability . . . .”
Treglown v. H&SS Department (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 317, 321, 156 N. W. 2d 363.
Id. at page 321, stating: “. . . it appears clear that the Central State Hospital at Waupun cannot be thus designated as a ‘charitable or curative institution’ in all situations, regardless of the nature and purpose of the commitment in a particular case. Neither can the Central State Hospital be found to be not a ‘charitable or curative institution’ in all cases and situations. In each category of cases at least, the court must inquire into the exact purpose and nature of the commitment . . . .”
Id. at page 321.
Id. at page 321.
Id. at page 323.
Id. at page 323.
Id. at page 323.
Id. at page 323.
Guardianship of Radoll (1936), 222 Wis. 539, 269 N. W. 305.
Treglown v. H&SS Department, supra, at pages 322, 323.
Guardianship of Sprain (1935), 219 Wis. 591, 263 N. W. 648.
Treglown v. H&SS Department, supra, at pages 321, 322, this court saying, as to Guardianship of Sprain, supra, that: “. . . The guardian objected only to the charge for the five-month observation period. . . . While liability for the longer period was not disputed, the court approved charges against the estate for the period of confinement following his being found insane and his re-commitment to the Central State Hospital for hospitalization as insane.”
Id. at pages 324, 325, this court stating: “. . . Recovery from such incapability of understanding is the sole test for return to the court to face further proceedings. Sec. 957.13 (3) provides: ‘When the hospital superintendent considers that the defendant has recovered sufficiently to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense the hospital superintendent shall notify the committing court thereof. The court shall thereupon issue an order remanding the defendant to the custody of the sheriff pending further proceedings in the cause, but if the court finds that the defendant has not so recovered the defendant shall be recommitted to the hospital.’ The mandatory provisions for return to court upon sufficient recovery establish that commitments under this statutory provision are made for treatment *208alone. No factor other than insufficiency of recovery justifies further confinement.”
Id. at pages 323, 324, this court stating: “Under the Mental Health Act, eh. 61, Stats., upon a finding by court or jury of insanity from a medical standpoint sufficient for civil commitment, the person is committed to a hospital for treatment until recovered. Recovery from, mental illness is the sole test for release. In fact, in some cases, the patient, confined in a treatment facility in a civil commitment proceeding, may be released before fully recovered. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Id. at page 324, this court saying of commitments where, on a finding of insanity, proceedings are stayed and the patient committed until able to stand trial: “In the case of commitments, made under sec. 957.13, Stats., as involved in the Sprain and Radoll cases, supra, the provisions for release are less flexible but the clear test is the recovery of the patient. . . .”
Id. at page 324.
Id. at page 323.
Id. at page 322.
Id. at pages 322, 323.
Id. at page 323.
Estate of Pamanet (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 514, 517, 175 N. W. 2d 234, 177 N. W. 2d 105, citing Sun Prairie v. Public Service Comm. (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 96, 100, 154 N. W. 2d 360, stating: . . This court has long been committed to the principle that a construction given to a statute by the court becomes a part thereof, unless the legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change.” See also: Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N. W. 2d 648; Kindy v. Hayes (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 301, 171 N. W. 2d 324.