This case presents a very difficult issue: Was there a reasonable suspicion to make a valid Terry stop of the defendant’s automobile? The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows: On November 1, 1985 Officer J. V. Wilson of the Henry County Sheriffs Department reported for duty. As he left the stationhouse to go on the 4:00 o’clock shift, the dispatcher handed Officer Wilson a note. In the words of Officer Wilson, the note read: “ ‘Lookout, El Camino,’ [Tag Number RD 8940], ‘Otis Lee Chumbley driving. Subject has suspended driver’s license.’ ” Officer Wilson testified that the information was telephoned to the dispatcher, that he did not know who called it in, and that he was not aware that it was an anonymous tip. The caller did not give a physical description of Otis Lee Chumbley to the sheriffs department, and Chumbley was not known to Officer Wilson.
Later that night, at about 10:00 p.m., Officer Wilson spotted an El Camino being driven on Highway 42. The officer followed the vehicle for about one-half of a mile. He observed that the license plate matched the tag number on the note he received from the dispatcher. No traffic offenses were committed by the driver of the vehicle. Moreover, Officer Wilson did not observe any suspicious behavior on the part of the driver. Nevertheless, Officer Wilson stopped the vehicle. It was being driven by defendant, Otis Lee Chumbley. The officer asked defendant for his driver’s license. Defendant informed the officer that he did not have a license. The officer “plugged” defendant’s name and date of birth into the computer. In short order, the officer learned that defendant’s driver’s license was revoked because he was a habitual violator and defendant was arrested.
Thereafter, via indictment, defendant was accused of being a habitual violator in violation of OCGA § 40-5-58. He was tried by the court sitting without a jury and found guilty. Following sentencing, defendant appealed. In his sole enumeration of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence and a motion in limine. The motion sought to suppress the testimony of Officer Wilson on the ground that it was the fruit of an unlawful Terry stop. Held:
*604“The Supreme Court of the United States has held that when a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). To justify a warrantless intrusion of this nature, the State must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, together with rational inferences drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, supra; [cits.]
“What is demanded of the police officer, as the agent of the state, is a founded suspicion, some necessary basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. [Cit.] ‘Where no circumstances at all appear which might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of following and detaining a vehicle and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen.’ Brooks v. State, 129 Ga. App. 109, 111 (198 SE2d 892) (1973).” Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 341-42 (211 SE2d 294) (1974).
This case involves one of the factual predicates upon which an articulable suspicion may be founded — the receipt of information from an unidentified informant. From the testimony of Officer Wilson, Chumbley infers that the tip was anonymous. The record simply does not support this. All the record shows is that Officer Wilson knew someone had called the police, and that he relied on the information given him by a fellow officer. The information given him was not that Chumbley was driving and might not have a license; he was told, “Subject has suspended driver’s license.” Officer Wilson was entitled to rely on the information given him by a fellow officer. See State v. Waters, 170 Ga. App. 505 (2) (317 SE2d 614) (1984); Griggs v. State, 167 Ga. App. 581 (1) (307 SE2d 75) (1983). To hold that he could not would virtually halt law enforcement, as each officer of the line questioned his superior about the source of the information upon which orders for lookout were based.
In the recent case of State v. Noble, 179 Ga. App. 785 (347 SE2d 722) (1986), this court stated that a police officer “would have been remiss in his duties” had he not acted to verify information given him by an unknown driver that the driver of the car behind him was drunk. Id. at 786. In Noble, we found that the actions of the officer were based upon reasonable and articulable grounds. So, too, were the actions of Officer Wilson in acting upon information given him in the normal course of police business by another police officer.
Therefore, we hold that Officer Wilson’s brief stop of Chumbley to check his driver’s license was based on more than mere caprice and was allowable under Terry, supra. See Frankum v. State, 174 Ga. App. 660 (1) (331 SE2d 52) (1985); Griggs v. State, supra; Anderson *605v. State, 123 Ga. App. 57 (2) (179 SE2d 286) (1970). The ruling of the trial court denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Banke, C. J., Deen, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Carley, Sognier, Benham, and Beasley, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., dissents.