specially concurring.
I concur in the result obtained by the majority in the instant ease. However, I deem it necessary to express my disapproval of the overly broad language of the majority as it relates to the interpretation of the Idaho Constitution in determining the point in time at which Idaho’s speedy trial constitutional guarantee “comes into play.” The majority correctly indicates that the speedy trial guarantee of Idaho’s Constitution is not necessarily identical to that right *314guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States. The majority further correctly indicates that this Court in State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 531 P.2d 236 (1975), has stated that the speedy trial guarantee under the Idaho Constitution “comes into play no later than the time at which the complaint is filed, * * * ”. Lindsay, in turn, was purportedly based on State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 509 P.2d 331 (1973); Richerson v. State, 91 Idaho 555, 428 P.2d 61 (1967); Jacobson v. Winter, 91 Idaho 11, 415 P.2d 297 (1966).
The majority here notes that the appellant’s principal argument is that he was denied a speedy trial because of the unwarranted delay between the filing of a John Doe complaint and the arrest of the appellant some nine months thereafter. In my judgment, the record sustains the majority in its conclusion that law enforcement authorities did not know the appellant by any other name except “Lloyd” and had attempted to locate him during that interval of time. I agree with the majority in its rejection of the “best efforts” standard of the law enforcement activities as applied by the trial court. Nevertheless, I find no necessary requirement in our prior cases interpreting the Idaho Constitution to require the application of a speedy trial question merely because a complaint has been filed.
It is true that such language is contained in Lindsay: “Herein the time for computing the delay begins on February 14, 1972, the date of issuance of the complaint.” Id. 96 Idaho at 476, 531 P.2d at 238 (Emphasis added.). Wilbanks, supra; Richerson, supra ; and Jacobson, supra, were all cited as authority for that statement.
In Lindsay, however, a complaint had issued in February of 1972 and the defendant’s initial court appearance in Idaho was not made until February, 1973. In the interim, however, Lindsay had been taken into custody in Utah on three different occasions.
As previously stated, one of the cases relied upon for the overly broad and unnecessary statement in Lindsay was State v. Wilbanks, supra. In Wilbanks a unanimous court rejected appellant’s claim that the speedy trial guarantee applied to pre-accusation delays. Wilbanks, during all of the pre-complaint and post-complaint delay, was incarcerated in either a county or federal institution. The Wilbanks court again used what I deem to be unfortunate and overly broad language, stating that “the relevant period for measuring the State’s delay in bringing a case to trial begins to run at the time of filing of a criminal complaint.” Id. 95 Idaho at 350, 509 P.2d at 335, citing Jacobson v. Winter, supra, as authority therefor.
In Richerson v. State, supra, a unanimous court, in denying a petition for rehearing, stated that the filing of a “complaint” was sufficient initiation of proceedings to trigger the speedy trial provisions of Idaho’s Constitution, but the court specifically noted therein that there the defendant was incarcerated in a federal institution and that the Idaho law enforcement authorities had placed a “hold” on Richerson to require his return to Idaho at the expiration of his federal incarceration. Richerson, during his federal incarceration, had filed a motion in the Idaho courts for a speedy trial on the Idaho charge. As stated by the court, “[Tjhis appeal presents for resolution the question whether following request for a speedy trial by an accused, the refusal of the state to initiate procedures under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4085 for return of the accused, who is an inmate in a federal correctional institution, to this state for trial on a criminal charge deprives such accused of his right to a speedy trial * * Id. 91 Idaho at 555, 428 P.2d at 61. The court again referred to its earlier case of Jacobson v. Winter, supra.
I come then to Jacobson v. Winter, supra, which appears to be the root opinion in Idaho establishing the so-called rule that Idaho’s speedy trial constitutional protection is triggered at the time of the filing of a complaint. Again, the Jacobson court, without any analysis, merely stated the rule as “a party is accused when a criminal *315complaint is filed against him.”1 Id. 91 Idaho at 14, 415 P.2d at 300. However, Jacobson was serving time in the Idaho State Penitentiary when a criminal complaint was filed against him. County law enforcement officials placed a “hold” with penitentiary officials which would have required that Jacobson be delivered to the county officials upon the termination of his incarceration in the penitentiary. Jacobson, while still in the penitentiary, made his demand for a speedy trial on the charges which are the subject of the complaint. Hence, I see the factual situation in Jacobson as distinguishable from the circumstances of the instant case. The court in Jacobson stated, “The trial court was correct in its analysis of this issue, that the time should be determined from the filing of the original complaint when the accused is incarcerated within the jurisdiction of this state and his whereabouts are known to the prosecuting authorities. When the whereabouts of the accused are unknown, the time should be considered at least from the time the prosecuting authorities obtain knowledge of the accused’s whereabouts, when he is within the jurisdiction of this state, whether incarcerated or not.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
In sum, it is my opinion that the overly broad rule of Jacobson v. Winter, supra, and its progeny should be restricted to circumstances similar to Jacobson. In circumstances such as the instant case where the defendant had not been arrested, was not in custody and his whereabouts were unknown to the prosecuting authorities the speedy trial provision of the Idaho Constitution should not be triggered at the time of the filing of a complaint.
. The only authority cited by the court is two decisions of the California Supreme Court, neither of which furnish a basis for such a broad rule.