(dissenting).
I am in accord with what Justice Ellett says and with his conclusion about substantial compliance with the statute in obtaining the search warrant. However, in my view, the far more important consideration in this case is that the denial of the motion to suppress the vital evidence is justified on the broader foundation that it was lawfully obtained even if there had been no search warrant. The fact that effort was also made to obtain a warrant, even if there were some defect in the procedure, should not be deemed to impair the validity of the evidence otherwise lawfully obtained.
The basic issue in this case is as stated by the defendant himself in his brief:
Defendant seeks reversal of the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress [evidence] and reversal of the conviction.
If the evidence was lawfully obtained, the refusal to suppress it cannot properly be reversed. This remains true regardless of any illusory arguments which may seem to divert attention from or becloud that issue.
The possession of narcotic drugs (marijuana) is a continuing felony. Because it can be quickly and easily hidden or disposed of, there is special justification for considering that peremptory action is not an “unreasonable” search.1 The law is that when a police officer has good reason to believe a felony is being committed, he has not only the right but the duty to enter where it is being committed to interrupt its continuance, arrest the perpetrator and take possession of any material evidence bearing on the crime, just as was done here. It is clear that Officer Adair in fact had good reason to believe that a felony was being committed. Upon the basis of the information he had, he said so under oath. His additional effort to obtain a search war*32rant, when none was necessary,2 did not destroy his right to enter.
Applicable in principle to the instant case is the recently decided Cooper v. State of California,3 where the Supreme Court of the United States in affirming a conviction based on evidence obtained in searching a car without a warrant said:
We made it clear in Preston [citation given therein] that whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. * * *
In that same case, in answer to the claim that the police could have obtained a warrant, the court further observed:
* * * It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant, for "the relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was unreasonable.”
Assuring one accused of crime of the protections of the law, and the assurance of citizens of protection against unreasonable search or unwarranted invasion of privacy are salutary objectives with which no one will disagree. But to extend them beyond reason in particular circumstances is but to create impedimenta to proper law enforcement. If a police officer, conscientiously performing his duty, who has good reason to believe a felony is being committed, cannot enter to interrupt and deal with it without cumbersome preliminary formality, his effectiveness, and perhaps even his desire to do so, will be seriously curtailed. To this evil are added not only the dangers in loss of protection to the public, but also in some instances to the occupants of the place itself, who may be victims of serious crime.
Under the circumstances here disclosed I do not believe it is shown that the search was “unreasonable.” On the basis of what I have said above, I think the motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied, irrespective of any irregularity that may have existed in connection with the issuance of the search warrant. I would affirm the conviction.
. As to right of police to enter and seize narcotics which can be quickly destroyed see Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 123, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1959); State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962), cert. denied 374 U.S. 835, 83 S.Ct 1879, 10 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1963).
. As to the probable cause necessary to justify arrest and search in connection therewith, see McCray v. State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed. 2d 62 (1967); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 434, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); Ker v. State of California, supra footnote 1.
. 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).