concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion to affirm the trial court’s award of double damages to Tamitha Shepard, Beatrice Perry, William GMoser, and Debra Rosseter (collectively, “plaintiffs”) for willful violations of the Public Utilities Act by Bonita Vista Properties, L.P. and Vickie Safely-Smith, as General Partner of Bonita Vista Properties, L.P., Trustee of FVS Trust, and individually, (collectively, “defendants”). I also concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion to affirm the trial court’s award to Debra Rosseter for wages she earned for hours worked as the campground’s office manager and for which she was not compensated.
I disagree with that portion of the majority’s opinion which affirms the trial court’s award of treble damages and attorney’s fees based upon plaintiffs’ unfair and deceptive trade practices (“UDTP”) claims. The trial court’s conclusion of law stating that “[defendants’] trespass, [] attempts to wrongfully evict Plaintiffs without resort to judicial process and [] willfully charging electric rates in excess of that prescribed by the North Carolina Utilities Commission pursuant to G.S. 63-139 constituted unfair or deceptive trade practices in commerce within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 75-1.1” is erroneous as a matter of law. I vote to reverse the trial court’s order in part and respectfully dissent.
I. Standard of Review
“The standard of review on appeal from a judgment entered after a non-jury trial is whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.” Cartin v. Harrison, 151 N.C. App. 697, 699, 567 S.E.2d 174, 176 (citation and quotation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 434, 572 S.E.2d 428 (2002). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Humphries v. City of Jacksonville, 300 N.C. 186, 187, 265 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1980).
*629II. Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
The majority’s opinion holds plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages and an award of attorney’s fees based upon their UDTP claims, regardless of whether plaintiffs were residential tenants entitled to protections under Article 2A and Article 5 of Chapter 42, commonly known as the Residential Rental Agreement Act (“RRAA”). I disagree.
Here, plaintiffs alleged four separate UDTP claims, three of which pertain to each individual plaintiff. Plaintiffs specifically alleged: (1) a landlord-tenant relationship existed between defendants and plaintiffs; (2) defendants’ “ self help’ actions amounted to a constructive eviction!;]” (3) “[defendants’ self-help actions to remove or attempt to remove [plaintiffs] from Pine Lake RV Resort, were contrary to the manner prescribed by North Carolina statute, and therefore [defendants are liable to [plaintiffs] for damages caused by [plaintiffs] removal or attempted removal[;]” and (4) “[defendants’ eviction of [plaintiffs] from the leased premises without resort to judicial process constituted unfair and deceptive acts or practices in commerce.” Plaintiffs also argued extensively to the trial court and in their appellate brief that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42, et seq., is applicable, plaintiffs are entitled to the protections contained therein, and violations thereof trigger recovery under the UDTP statute.
Plaintiffs alternatively purport to argue in their appellate brief that their UDTP claims “were not based upon the allegation that Plaintiffs were residential tenants protected under North Carolina landlord-tenant laws.” Clearly, this assertion is incredulous after review of the allegations listed above and expressly asserted within plaintiffs’ complaint.
It is well established that “[a] party is bound by his pleadings and, unless withdrawn, amended, or otherwise altered, the allegations contained in all pleadings ordinarily are conclusive as against the pleader. He cannot subsequently take a position contradictory to his pleadings.” Davis v. Rigsby, 261 N.C. 684, 686, 136 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1964). Our Supreme Court has also stated: “It is axiomatic with us that a litigant must be heard here on the theory of the trial below and he will not be permitted to switch horses on his appeal. Nor may he ride two horses going different routes to the same destination.” Graham v. Wall, 220 N.C. 84, 94, 16 S.E.2d 691, 697 (1941). Plaintiffs are barred from arguing on appeal that defendants’ actions constituted UDTP based upon a legal theory not asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint and tried in the district court. Id.
*630The majority’s opinion asserts plaintiffs argued their UDTP claims were not dependent upon proving violations of Chapter 42 before the trial court. I disagree. Although plaintiffs’ counsel made the bare statement to the trial court that “even if the Court would decide that there wasn’t [a landlord-tenant relationship], that does not mean that the Plaintiff’s [sic] case has now failed[,]” the substance and totality of plaintiffs’ arguments are based upon defendants’ violation of the RRAA. Even after plaintiffs’ counsel made this statement, he extensively argued to the trial court that defendants’ actions constituted “self-help constructive eviction” and presented the trial court with case law supporting the assertion that a violation of the RRAA equated to UDTP.
Further, the trial court expressly concluded as a matter of law:
3. That considering all the circumstances of Plaintiffs’ tenancies, Plaintiffs were residential tenants who leased living spaces as their primary residences and Plaintiffs are entitled to assert claims under Article 5 and Article 2A of Chapter 42 of [t]he North Carolina General Statutes.
9. That Defendant Safely-Smith’s trespass, her attempts to wrongfully evict Plaintiffs without resort to judicial process and her willfully charging electric rates in excess of that prescribed by the North Carolina Utilities Commission pursuant to G.S. 63-139 constituted unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 75-1.1.
Under the applicable standard of review, this Court must only determine: (1) if competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact; (2) whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law; and (3) whether the trial court’s conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law. Cartin, 151 N.C. App. at 699, 567 S.E.2d at 176; Humphries, 300 N.C. at 187, 265 S.E.2d at 190.
Defendants failed to except to any of the trial court’s findings of fact. Without exceptions taken, the dispositive issue on de novo review is whether the trial court’s conclusions are correct as a matter of law. See State v. Pickard, 178 N.C. App. 330, 333, 631 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2006) (“Where an appellant fails to assign error to the trial court’s findings of fact, the findings are presumed to be correct. . . . However, the trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and must be legally correct.” (Citation and quotation omitted)). The *631trial court awarded plaintiffs treble damages and attorney’s fees on three alternative bases: (1) defendants’ trespass; (2) defendants’ violation of the RRAA; and (3) defendants’ violation of the Public Utilities Act. We unanimously agree that defendants violated the Public Utilities Act, plaintiffs are entitled to double damages under this statute, and a violation of. the Public Utilities Act cannot also serve as a basis to award treble damages and attorney’s fees on plaintiffs’ UDTP claims. As such, plaintiffs’ UDTP claims must be based upon either defendants’ alleged trespass or violation of the RRAA. On the record before us, neither of these claims, nor other alleged conduct, supports an award of treble damages or attorney’s fees under the UDTP statute.
A. Trespass
Our Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t is elementary that trespass is a wrongful invasion of the possession of another. Furthermore, a claim of trespass requires: (1) possession of the property by plaintiff when the alleged trespass was committed; (2) an unauthorized entry by defendant; and (3) damage to plaintiff.” Singleton v. Haywood Elec. Membership Corp., 357 N.C. 623, 627, 588 S.E.2d 871, 874 (2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, no evidence in the record shows defendants trespassed on any real property or chattel owned by plaintiffs. Nor is there any evidence that plaintiffs reimbursed defendants for the electricity they consumed during August 2005 when their occupancy at the campground ended. Record evidence tends to show that plaintiffs were billed in arrears for electricity consumed the previous month after defendants were billed by the electric company. Part of Rosseter’s duties, as defendants’ employee, was to invoice plaintiffs and others at the campground to reimburse defendants for electricity consumed the previous month.
Defendants merely disconnected plaintiffs’ plug-in power drop cords from defendants’ meter base and shut off the electricity to those connections at the end of the month. All plaintiffs left the campground the following day. Defendants were under no legal obligation to provide free electricity to plaintiffs. Defendants never entered any of plaintiffs’ camper trailers, nor kept or converted any of plaintiffs’ property or equipment. Defendants’ actions on their private property and privately owned equipment cannot be construed as a trespass to plaintiffs’ chattel or any other legally protected property interest. Further, camper trailers generally contain an independent and self-*632contained means to generate electricity. Plaintiffs have failed to show all of the requisite elements to establish a claim of trespass.
Presuming arguendo a trespass in fact occurred, no North Carolina case law or statute supports the notion that an alleged trespass can be bootstrapped to support plaintiffs’ UDTP claims and an award of treble damages and attorney’s fees. The only remaining notion upon which plaintiffs’ UDTP claims may rest is defendants’ alleged violation of the RRAA.
B. Residential Rental Agreement Act
The RRAA was enacted in response to our Supreme Court’s decision in Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981), which specifically held that at common law, a landlord was permitted to employ peaceable self-help measures in repossessing leased premises. See Robert S. Thompson, Landlord Eviction Remedies Act-Legislative Overreaction to Landlord Self-Help, 18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 25, 25 (1982) (“Recently, . . . the North Carolina General Assembly altered the common-law rule in response to a court of appeals decision applying the Mosseller doctrine.” (Citing Spinks v. Taylor, 47 N.C. App. 68, 266 S.E.2d 857 (1980), rev’d in part, 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981)).
Our General Assembly enacted Article 2A and Article 5 of Chapter 42 in order to “determinen the rights, obligations, and remedies under a rental agreement for a dwelling unit within this State.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-38 (2005) (emphasis supplied). The plain and unambiguous language of the Act expressly limits the statute’s applicability to “a rental agreement for a dwelling unit within this State” and enunciates the manner of ejectment residential landlords must employ when regaining possession of “a dwelling unit” from residential tenants, who breach their lease, or who hold over after their lease has expired. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.6 (2005) (“It is the public policy of the State of North Carolina, in order to maintain the public peace, that a residential tenant shall be evicted, dispossessed or otherwise constructively or actually removed from his dwelling unit only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 3 or Article 7 of this Chapter.”). The RRAA expressly excludes “transient occupancy in a hotel, motel, or similar lodging” as well as “vacation rentals” from Chapter 42 summary ejectment protections. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-39 (2005).
The central issue then becomes whether paying for a recreational vehicle lot space at a campground constitutes “a rental agreement for *633a dwelling unit in this State” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-38, which would entitle plaintiffs to the protections accorded to residential tenants under the RRAA. (Emphasis supplied). In making this determination, this Court must recognize the Founding principle that “[sjtatutes in derogation of the common law . . . should be strictly construed” particularly where the “statute infringes upon common law property rights of others.” Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass’n, 357 N.C. 396, 401, 584 S.E.2d 731, 736 (2003) (quoting Stone v. N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 479, 495 S.E.2d 711, 715, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1016, 142 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1998) and Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 594, 374 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1988)); see also Bell v. Page, 2 N.C. App. 132, 137, 162 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1968).
The term “dwelling unit” is not specifically defined within the RRAA. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-40 (2005). However, the term “[premises” is defined as “a dwelling unit, including mobile homes or mobile home spaces, and the structure of which it is a part and facilities and appurtenances therein and grounds, areas, and facilities normally held out for the use of residential tenants.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-40(2). Plaintiffs argue that recreational vehicle lot spaces in a transient campground are analogous to “mobile home spaces.” I disagree. The logical extension of plaintiffs’ argument is that a person, who is sleeping in their motor vehicle as their “principle residence” and who parks that vehicle on someone else’s property, cannot be compelled to vacate that parking space, unless the property owner, under the threat of treble damages and attorney’s fees, resorts to judicial ejectment to remove them from the property. This arcane result cannot be what the General Assembly intended when it enacted the RRAA.
Plaintiffs cite Baker v. Rushing in support of their assertion that plaintiffs were residential tenants pursuant to the RRAA. 104 N.C. App. 240, 409 S.E.2d 108 (1991). In Baker, this Court found genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether occupants of a hotel could be considered “residential tenants.” Baker, 104 N.C. App. at 247, 409 S.E.2d at 112. This Court concluded that “[w]hether the plaintiffs . . . were residential tenants must be determined by looking at all of the circumstances [.]” Id.
However, the factual scenario in Baker is clearly distinguishable from the facts at bar. In Baker, the plaintiffs resided in an “apartment” which contained “either one or two bedrooms, a kitchen/living room and a separate bath” which clearly constitutes a “dwelling unit.” Id. *634Here, plaintiffs parked their recreational vehicle in a designated space on defendants’ property.
Whether a recreational vehicle lot space can be equated to “a dwelling unit” under the RRAA appears to be an issue of first impression in North Carolina. In Comeau v. Vergato, the New Hampshire Supreme Court resolved a similar controversy. 823 A.2d 764 (N.H. 2003). In Comeau, the defendant was a vehicle campground owner, who rented parking spaces, equipped with utilities to campers on a year-round basis. 823 A.2d at 765. The plaintiff rented a space and lived on the defendant’s property in a camper/trailer from March 2001 through January 2002. Id. Plaintiff allegedly owed back rent and the defendant, the defendant’s son and a campground employee: (1) entered plaintiff’s camper; (2) removed some of the plaintiff’s property; and (3) placed a “For Sale” sign on the plaintiff’s camper. Id.
The plaintiff filed a petition with the district court requesting the return of her property and argued that the defendant was a landlord subject to a statute, which prohibited “willfully seizing, holding or otherwise directly or indirectly denying a tenant access to and possession of such tenant’s property, other than by proper judicial process.” Id. (quoting RSA 540-A:3, III (Supp. 2002)). In New Hampshire, “[l]andlord” is statutorily defined as “an owner, lessor or agent thereof who rents or leases residential premises including manufactured housing or space in a manufactured housing park to another person.” Id. at 766 (quoting RSA 540-A:l) (emphasis supplied). The district court found a landlord-tenant relationship based upon the duration of plaintiff’s stay at the campground. Id. The dis-positive issue before the New Hampshire Supreme Court was “whether the plaintiff’s premises were ‘residential’ within the meaning of the statute.” Id.
In determining this issue, the New Hampshire Supreme Court was required to engage in statutory construction. Id. The Court stated:
the trial court overlooked the last clause of the definition for both “landlord” and “tenant,” which states that “residential premises” includes “manufactured housing or space in a manufactured housing park.” The inclusion of this phrase indicates that the legislature considered the form of the housing relevant in determining whether it is “residential.” If the legislature intended the duration of the stay to be sufficient to establish a residence, it would be superfluous to include a specific form of housing within the ambit of the statute. Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiff *635lived on the defendant’s property for a certain length of time did not establish a landlord-tenant relationship, and the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling otherwise.
Moreover, the definitions of both “landlord” and “tenant” specifically mention only one type of residential premises — manufactured housing. We believe it unlikely that the legislature intended “manufactured housing” to be just one of many examples of trailer and camper units encompassed within “residential premises.” Elsewhere in the statutes, the legislature describes “manufactured housing” in exclusive terms, defining “manufactured housing” not to embrace “campers” and “recreational vehicles.” Surely, if the legislature had intended campers and trailers to be residential premises, it would not have included as the sole example a type of residence that specifically excludes campers and trailers from its ambit.
Id. at 766-67 (emphasis original) (internal citations omitted).
The reasoning and holding in Comeau is particularly instructive to the case at bar. Here, our General Assembly specifically included mobile homes and mobile home spaces within the definition of “[premises” which is defined as “a dwelling unit.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-40(2). As the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated in Comeau, I also “believe it unlikely that the legislature intended [‘mobile homes’] to be just one of many examples of trailer and camper units encompassed within [the term ‘dwelling unit’].” 823 A.2d at 767. Further, the definition of mobile homes for taxation purposes expressly excludes “trailers and vehicles required to be registered annually pursuant to Part 3, Article 3 of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-316.7 (2005). A recreational vehicle is required to be registered under Part 3, Article 3 of Chapter 20. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-50 (2005). If the General Assembly intended for recreational vehicle lot spaces in a campground to be considered a “dwelling unit” pursuant to the RRAA, it would have expressly stated so in the statute.
Strictly construing Chapter 42 as in derogation of the common law, plaintiffs are not residential tenants under “a rental agreement for a dwelling unit” as provided in the RRAA and are not entitled to the judicial ejectment protections contained therein. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-38. Plaintiffs’ “right” to park their recreational vehicle on defendants’ campground was arguably nothing more than a revocable license. See 1 James A. Webster, Jr., Webster’s Real Estate Law in *636North Carolina § 15-39, at 753 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 5th ed. 1999) (“A license is the least important of the rights in the lands of another. As a matter of fact, a license does not create ‘rights’ in land but gives one only a personal, revocable privilege to do an act or series of acts upon the land of another without conferring any estate or interest in the land. Hence, licenses are, in general, freely revocable by the licensor.”). This assertion is supported by a registration card and not a lease being issued to each of the plaintiffs which stated the “property is privately owned and the management reserves the right to refuse service to anyone[.]”
Even if plaintiffs’ stay on the campgrounds was construed to be a month-to-month tenancy, defendants provided plaintiffs with the statutorily required notice to quit their possession of defendants’ property and were entitled to use peaceful self-help to unplug plaintiffs’ electrical extension cords from defendants’ meter bases and to shut off the power to those connections. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-14 (providing in relevant part that a month-to-month tenancy may be terminated by a notice to quit of seven days); see also Spinks, 303 N.C. at 263, 278 S.E.2d at 505 (“[W]hile a landlord is permitted to use peaceful means to reenter and take possession of leased premises subject to forfeiture, he may not do so against the will of the tenant.”). A party’s lawful actions or peaceful self-help conduct is not an unfair and deceptive act and does not support recovery under the UDTP statute. The trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding plaintiffs were entitled to an award of treble damages and attorney’s fees based upon a violation of the RRAA or any other claim alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint.
III. Conclusion
I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion to affirm the trial court’s award of double damages to plaintiffs based upon defendants’ willful violations of the Public Utilities Act. I also concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion to affirm the trial court’s award of compensatory damages to Debra Rosseter based upon her breach of contract claim.
The trial court’s conclusion of law that defendants’ actions violated the UDTP statute based upon either: (1) defendants’ alleged trespass; (2) a violation of the RRAA; or (3) a violation of the Public Utilities Act is erroneous as a matter of law. I vote to reverse the portion of the trial court’s order awarding treble damages under the UDTP statute. *637Because the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees is predicated upon plaintiffs’ UDTP claims, that award must also be reversed. The majority’s opinion correctly notes that the trial court’s order and award of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs is also fatally defective. I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.