(dissenting).
Section 70B-S-103, U.C.A.1953, was enacted for the purpose of preventing oppressions which often result in connection with the repossession of goods sold under title-retaining sales agreements and the persistence in further collection on the purchase price, costs and attorneys’ fees as provided in such agreements. The remedies provided therein are usually in fine print, unwittingly agreed to by purchasers who are uninformed, and/or in many instances unable to bargain at arm’s length anyway. The statute is purposed to minimize injustices by giving the seller his option; to repossess the goods and keep what has been paid thereon; or to sue for the purchase price, but not to allow him both.
The trial court correctly saw through the instant transaction as but a subterfuge to avoid 'the effects of the statute just referred to. It is plainly apparent that the plaintiff was fully aware of and participating therein from the fact that the plaintiff made its check, not to Perry as it would have done under a separate, independent *286and unrelated loan, but made it to Perry and the automobile dealer. Thus the trial court was correct in determining that plaintiff was particeps to the “consumer credit sale”; and in concluding that its rights are governed by said Section 70B-5-103. The main opinion is correct in characterizing itself as a “loophole” through which those engaged in the business can circumvent what the legislature intended as a salutary effect of that statute. I decline to join therein. I would affirm the judgment.