dissenting.
In my opinion, denial of the application for a conditional use permit was a gross abuse of the City’s discretion. Therefore, I dissent to the reversal of the trial court’s grant of mandamus in favor of appellees.
The City’s ordinance provides that a conditional use “shall be permitted subject to” certain specified conditions. “Shall” is generally construed as a word of command. State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 (436 SE2d 209) (1993). Thus, if appellees satisfied the conditions enumerated in the ordinance, the City had no discretion to deny their application. Jackson v. Abercrombie, 229 Ga. 775 (194 SE2d 473) (1972). Included among those requirements is that “the conditional use will not be injurious to the use and enjoyment of the environment or of other property in the immediate vicinity or diminish and impair *683property values within the surrounding neighborhood. . . .” According to the majority, this condition contains “subjective aspects” so that, in determining whether appellees met that requirement, the City had the discretionary authority to apply the standards of its Tree Protection Ordinance (TPO).
Although I agree that the ordinance sets a somewhat subjective standard, I cannot agree that the City’s discretion thereunder is so broad as to authorize the denial of appellees’ application based upon the TPO. By its terms, the exclusive focus of the ordinance is upon the “conditional use” itself. “Use” is
defined as “(a) any purpose for which a building or other structure or a tract of land may be designed, arranged, intended, maintained, or occupied, or (b) any activity, occupation, business, or operation carried on, or intended to be carried on, in a building or other structure or on a tract of land.” [Cit.]
(Emphasis supplied.) Municipal Elec. Auth. v. 2100 Riveredge Assoc., 180 Ga. App. 326, 329 (348 SE2d 890) (1986). Appellees contemplate using their property for the operation of a convenience store and gasoline station. There is no contention that such use will injure the immediate environment or will diminish property values in the surrounding neighborhood. The sole objection is to the configuration of the proposed establishment. According to the City, appellees can use their property as they propose, but only so long as they design their facility to comport with the TPO. However, there is nothing in the ordinance which authorizes the denial of a conditional use application based upon esthetic objections to the design of the applicant’s proposed facility, as opposed to substantive concerns regarding the proposed use itself. “[T]here is an analytical distinction between building and use restrictions.” Payne v. Borkat, 244 Ga. 615, 617 (1) (261 SE2d 393) (1979). Objections to the layout of appellees’ proposed facility relate to building restrictions, whereas the ordinance itself expresses concern only for use restrictions. Certainly, noncompliance with the TPO could be an independent ground for denying an application, i/the ordinance so provided. However, I cannot agree that the ordinance, as presently worded, either expressly or implicitly authorizes incorporation of the building restrictions established by the TPO as a condition which appellees must satisfy in order to use their property as the site of a convenience store and gasoline station.
Moreover, even assuming that the City had the discretion to incorporate the TPO into the entirely separate provisions of its conditional use ordinance, I still believe that the trial court correctly granted mandamus. The TPO requires only that the property owner use “all reasonable efforts” to save specimen trees. Appellees presented evi*684dence of their unsuccessful efforts to design their facility so as to save all of the trees, but the City was adamant and refused to accept anything less than a configuration which protected each and every tree. In my opinion, denying a landowner the opportunity to engage in an admittedly valid use simply because that use is not compatible with maintaining all of the trees currently growing on the property is such a gross abuse of discretion as would authorize the grant of mandamus against the City. See Fulton County v. Bartenfeld, 257 Ga. 766, 771 (4) (363 SE2d 555) (1988).
Decided June 12, 2000 Reconsideration denied July 28, 2000. Bovis, Kyle & Burch, C. Sam Thomas, Jana B. Tabor, for appellants. Wilson, Brock & Irby, Richard W. Wilson, Jr., James S. Teague, Jr., for appellees.