dissenting.
What you see is what you get, correct? Not according to today’s majority opinion.
The referendum presented to and approved by the voters of Carroll County stated that the proposed special purpose local option sales tax (“SPLOST”) would be imposed “for the raising of not more than $34 million.” The majority opinion, however, construes the term “$34 million” to mean “$34 million, plus whatever additional amount can be collected before the expiration of five years.” In order to achieve this result, the majority ignores several basic principles of statutory construction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
1. The 1987 version of the Revenue Code was in effect at the time the Carroll County SPLOST was approved and implemented, and *635governs the resolution of this appeal. OCGA § 48-8-112, as set forth in the 1987 Code, provided that a SPLOST would terminate on the earliest of the following dates:
(1) If the [tax] resolution . . . provided for the issuance of general obligation debt. . . [at] the end of the first calendar quarter ending more than 80 days after [validation of the debt is denied];
(2) On the final day of the maximum period of time specified for the imposition of the tax; or
(3) If the tax was imposed solely for purposes other than road, street and bridge purposes, as of the end of the calendar quarter during which the commissioner determines that the tax will have raised revenues sufficient to provide to the county net proceeds equal to or greater than the amount specified as the maximum amount of net proceeds to be raised by the tax.4
The Carroll County SPLOST at issue in this matter is a mixed purpose SPLOST — it is intended for both road purposes and capital improvements, with no provision for the issuance or relief of general obligation debt. Thus, subsection one of the statute, which applies only to SPLOSTS intended for the issuance of general obligation debt, does not control when the Carroll County SPLOST terminates. Nor does subsection three of the statute control the termination of the Carroll County SPLOST, as that subsection applies to SPLOSTS intended solely for road-related purposes. Therefore, the termination point for the Carroll County SPLOST is determined under subsection two of OCGA § 48-8-112, which requires that collection of the SPLOST will end “on the final day of the maximum period of time specified for the imposition of the tax.”5
As conceded by the majority, the “maximum period of time” for imposition of the Carroll County SPLOST is “specified” in the terms of the referendum presented to Carroll County’s voters in 1993, which provided that the SPLOST would:
*636• Terminate after the period of time required to raise no more than $34 million; and
• Terminate after a period of time not to exceed four (4) years, for the purpose of improving the County’s system of roads, streets and bridges; and
• Terminate after a period of time not to exceed five (5) years for the purpose of funding certain capital improvements.
Construing this referendum language by its plain terms, as this Court is statutorily required to do,6 I conclude that it was impossible for the voters of Carroll County, when faced with the referendum, to know the “maximum period of time specified” for the SPLOST’s imposition. Nothing in OCGA § 48-8-112 prohibited a local government from making the termination date dependent upon the raising of a specified amount of revenue. Accordingly, the referendum began by stating that the SPLOST would terminate once $34 million was raised. The referendum then stated that the SPLOST would last for four years, for road, street and bridge purposes. The referendum then went on to state that the SPLOST would terminate after five years, for capital improvement purposes.
Faced with these various termination dates, it is likely that Carroll County voters were unable to make an educated decision as to when the tax would end. The referendum stated that the tax would cease after either four or five years, or after the period of time required to raise $34 million. Of those three possible termination dates, the “maximum period of the time specified” for the tax could not have been four years (even though that is what the referendum specified for taxes raised for road improvement purposes). However, Carroll County voters could only speculate as to whether the “maximum period of time specified” for the tax was five years or, alternatively, however long it took to raise $34 million.
The majority concludes that the longest period of time specified in the referendum for the SPLOST’s imposition was five years, and hence SPLOST revenues could be collected for that long. However, that conclusion could not have been clear to all of Carroll County’s voters who voted on the referendum in 1993. Those voters had no way of knowing whether $34 million would or even could be raised within five years. It was possible that the $34 million could be raised in three or four years, and a Carroll County voter might have believed the SPLOST would terminate at that time. Thus, on its face, the referendum was uncertain as to the “maximum period of time *637specified” for imposition of the Carroll County SPLOST. On the one hand, it may have been five years. On the other hand, it simply may have been the period of time necessary to raise $34 million. And this ambiguity left Carroll County voters to guess as to when the SPLOST they were voting on would terminate.
The law does not tolerate ambiguities in taxation provisions, such as existed in the Carroll County referendum. As made clear by precedent, we are bound to construe all ambiguities concerning the power to tax in favor of the taxpayers and against the taxing entity. Whenever the terms under which a tax is levied are “not clear and positive . . . or . . . [are] open to various interpretations through indefiniteness of . . . provisions, it is to be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the citizen.”7 Furthermore, this Court “construe [s] all doubtful cases against the power to tax and in favor of the taxpayer. . . . Tf there is any doubt as to the power of the county to tax in a particular instance, it must be resolved in the negative.’ ”8
It follows that in this case, the ambiguity that existed in the 1993 Carroll County referendum concerning the date for termination of the mixed-purpose SPLOST must be resolved in favor of the earliest possible removal of the taxation burden from Carroll County’s taxpayers. The specified amount of revendes to be collected pursuant to the Carroll County SPLOST — $34 million — was collected before the expiration of five years. Hence, this Court is bound to rule that the Carroll County SPLOST terminated when the maximum amount of revenues had been raised, which the record indicates was early in 1998.
2. Under the 1987 version of OCGA § 48-8-111 (a) (3), voter resolutions seeking approval of a SPLOST were required to specify “the maximum cost of the project” to be funded by the tax, “which shall also be the maximum amount of net proceeds to be raised by the tax.” A referendum ballot for a SPLOST also was statutorily required to designate the maximum amount that could be collected pursuant to the SPLOST, and revenues in excess of that amount were not allowed.9
However, under the 1987 version of OCGA § 48-8-111 (b) (3), if a SPLOST was to be imposed, in whole or in part, for road improvement purposes (as was the Carroll County SPLOST), “the maximum cost and maximum proceeds to be raised shall be omitted.” Despite this provision, Carroll County elected to specify in its ballot that the *638maximum amount of SPLOST revenues it would collect was $34 million. Having made that affirmative representation to its citizens, the County should not be allowed to negate it under subsection (b) (3). By ruling otherwise, the majority has effectively sanctioned ballot language that made an affirmative misrepresentation to the voting public.
Decided July 10, 2000 Reconsideration denied July 28, 2000. Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Daniel M. Formby, Deputy Attorney General, Warren R. Calvert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, David A. Runnion, Assistant Attorney General, for Jackson. David A. Basil, Carothers & Mitchell, Richard A. Carothers, Thomas M. Mitchell, for Carroll County. Gary R Bunch, for Shadix. R. Mark Mahler, James F. Grubiak, Kelly J. Pridgen, Walter E. Sumner, Ernest De Pascale, Jr., Lee, Black, Scheer & Hart, R. Jonathan Hart, Emily E. Garrard, amici curiae.In this regard, the majority incorrectly concludes that, in setting $34 million as the maximum amount of SPLOST revenues to be raised, the County simply sought to provide more information to the voters than was required.10 Quite to the contrary, having informed its citizens that no more than $34 million would be collected under the SPLOST, the County was bound by the general statutory scheme set forth in the 1987 version of OCGA § 48-8-111 (a) (3), (c) and (d) to terminate the SPLOST once that amount of revenue was raised. Indeed, if the majority is correct and the SPLOST was not intended to terminate upon the raising of $34 million, but instead was intended to exist for five years regardless of how much revenue was raised, then why did the referendum presented to Carroll County’s citizens state that the tax was to be imposed “for the raising of not more than $34 million?”
Because the majority opinion fails to satisfactorily address that particular question, in addition to all of the other reasons discussed above, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join me in this dissent.Ga. L. 1987, p. 1322, codified at OCGA § 48-8-112 (b) (l)-(3) (1987).
Id. Of course, it is not entirely clear that OCGA § 48-8-112 (2) does apply to this matter, as the 1987 Code does not plainly state that subsection two applies to mixed purpose SPLOSTS such as exists here. While the majority fails to address this ambiguity, it appears that the Legislature has alleviated problems arising therefrom, as the 1997 Revenue Code provides that all SPLOSTs terminate when the maximum amount of revenues has been raised. Ga. L. 1997, p. 519 § 1. Contrary to the majority, see op. at 633-634,1 believe it is obvious that the Legislature enacted the 1997 amendments because it was aware of the ambiguity in the 1987 Code that underlies this particular matter, and sought to rectify the problems arising therefrom.
See OCGA § 1-3-1 (b).
(Citation omitted.) Thompson v. Georgia Power Co., 73 Ga. App. 587, 597 (37 SE2d 622) (1946).
(Citation omitted.) Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282, 286 (216 SE2d 250) (1975).
OCGA § 48-8-111 (c), (d).
Op. at 633-634.