dissenting.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 2 but respectfully dissent to Division 3 because facts could be proven which would establish a valid claim under OCGA § 46-2-90, specifically, violation of a Public Service Commission order by the defendants.
Under the Civil Practice Act a motion to dismiss a complaint *306for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be granted unless averments in the complaint disclose with certainty that plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proven in support of the claim.Decided March 30, 2000 Clinton W. Sitton, Claude M. Sitton, for appellants. Smith, Gambrell & Russell, Lisa C. Tripp, Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr., Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Allegra J. Lawrence, Teresa W. *307Roseborough, J. Henry Walker IV, Steven C. Adams, James R. Thompson, for appellees.
*306(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ledford v. Meyer, 249 Ga. 407, 408 (2) (290 SE2d 908) (1982). When undertaking this analysis, we must remember that
the objective of the [Civil Practice Act] is to avoid technicalities and to require only a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and a general indication of the type of litigation involved; the discovery process bears the burden of filling in [the] details.
(Citations omitted.) Dillingham v. Doctors Clinic, 236 Ga. 302, 303 (223 SE2d 625) (1976). “Complaints do not have to allege facts sufficient to set forth a cause of action and are no longer to be construed most strongly against the pleader.” Richter v. D & M Assoc., 228 Ga. 599, 604 (1) (187 SE2d 253) (1972). Finally, it is no longer necessary for a complaint to set forth all of the elements of a cause of action in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Christner v. Eason, 146 Ga. App. 139,140 (245 SE2d 489) (1978); Hill v. Lariscy, 118 Ga. App. 699-700 (165 SE2d 315) (1968).
In this case, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, in part, because “[p]laintiffs have failed to cite to any failure of the Defendants to do an act required of them by Georgia law or by an order of the PSC.” While the plaintiffs’ failure to point to a specific PSC order might be fatal in the summary judgment context, it does not warrant a dismissal for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs in this case clearly asserted a claim under OCGA § 46-2-90 that provided the defendants with “fair notice of what the claim is and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.” Dillingham, supra. The fact that they may not have alleged an element of a cause of action under OCGA § 46-2-90, violation of a PSC order by the defendants, does not support the majority’s conclusion that their complaint failed to state a claim.